

## Peace Book 2

### ABOUT THE AUTHORS<sup>1</sup>

These authors are notorious. They are addicted to criminal insanity. Their unthinkable indiscretion was that they both became psychologists. For this insanity there was really no choice. They had to be 'put away' in insane asylums. Eventually, the asylum staff became bored with the pair, and so they pretended that the two crazy unfortunates had recovered. Consequently, they were transferred to jail to serve the rest of their time.

Doug notes that those in the asylums became bored with Reg quicker than with Doug. Reg was relegated to an asylum for only fifteen years, spending his next twenty-five years in jail. Reg remarks that Doug was confined for twenty years in asylums before being transferred to jail to serve his remaining twenty years. This was because Doug was a harder nut to crack and, anyway, he was found guilty of the further offence of man's-laughter -- he found the staff at the funny farm just too hilarious for restraint. Indignantly, Doug retorts that Reg was clearly less cookoo than a psychologist is supposed to be, qualifying better as a crook.

Both agree, however, that they were both crooked and crazy enough to rise quickly to positions of leadership among the disruptively deranged and criminalistic members of their guild who were serving time with them. In this, Doug acknowledges that Reg excelled. In their settings, Reg became the Chief, and Doug only the Senior Psychologist. Grudgingly, Doug also admits that Reg did

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<sup>1</sup> The "final" version of this paper was written by Doug Quirk about 1997.

not excel in being despicable -- Reg was paroled three years before Doug. Both are now serving time at large, creating street hazards by their unrestrained tendencies to criminally nutty ideas.

Setting aside for now their own personal characteristics and qualities, the thing that got these authors interested in craziness at the outset was that craziness seemed to be the phenomenon most closely linked to human suffering. And they wanted to contribute as much as they could to human suffering. They did. However, they encountered a source of deep frustration in their attempts to maximize the human suffering they studied. Sadly, they discovered that confidentiality constraints in the health field concerned with craziness made it hard for them to follow-up on crazy people to extend their exposure to their crazy folks' human suffering.

That frustration drove them from craziness to crime and addiction -- although they remained addicted to crazy crime. The advantage they saw in crime and addiction over craziness was that there was a whole existing societal structure in place whose entire efforts were directed at ensuring that any crime that interested them (with or without associated addictions) was verified as crime and was verified as to who was responsible for it. The justice system existed solely to provide them with crooks who had been thoughtfully apprehended with much documentation about crimes and addictions, carefully verified for their identities as crooks, and then held in captivity so they could be criminally harassed at will by being studied. Besides, far from criminal behaviour being held in confidential secrecy, criminal actions were a matter of public record. So the writers could follow-up easily on crooks' criminal

activities, and implicitly on their addictions, until they reached the point of personal satiety. What a rich feast for the writers' own criminally addicted crazy scientific appetites!

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PRACTICAL PEACE II:

Some Motivational Variables

Douglas Quirk and Reg Reynolds

Acknowledgement: The authors acknowledge nothing -- not even to one another. They are still debating whether or not to acknowledge these volumes.

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#### FORWARD (the air-head brigade)

Under the Reynolds Principle of Perversity, as modified by the Quirk Principle of Characterological Divergence, it seems clear that people will take only humour seriously -- ridiculing anything presented seriously as fatuous rubbish. Although we have no idea what any of these words mean, we take them seriously enough that we decided to present ourselves (About the Authors) in a justifiably demeaning way. Our hope is that the rest of what we have to say will be considered in the serious light in which it was intended.

Like volume I, this work attempts to use what we have learned to derive practical or workable ways to foster peace. We have succeeded if you understand and pursue even some of the ideas expressed. If we succeed, we will hold ourselves gratefully indebted to you.

In our opinion, the most basic goal in life is to achieve peace -- intra-personally, inter-personally, intra-communally and inter-nationally. Still, this goal is only an instrumental one.

Achieving peace provides the necessary pre-condition for any other constructive, cooperative, harmonious, healthy and joyful purposes to be pursued. Without peace, each of us becomes absorbed

in constant efforts to avoid or prevent uncomfortable and disruptive events and states -- preoccupation with which interferes radically with the pursuit or accomplishment of our own positive purposes that might give colour and meaning to our daily lives.

We pray the Prince of Peace will bless our minuscule efforts.

Doug and Reg

## INTRODUCTION

In Practical Peace I, we concerned ourselves principally with the mechanics of achieving peace. We focused our attention on an appreciation of the indicators of peace and the absence of peace, and ways in which the underlying causative factors could be identified, understood and modified in essentially problem-solving, cognitive or rational terms -- even although we recognized that much of what we said might well be considered to be counter-intuitive or even wrong. Our presentation was organized around the factors we had found that disrupt/foster peace by virtue of the fact that they disturb/enhance people's human relationships.

In the present volume, we are concerned with another set of issues bearing mainly on the motivations of people by means of which we disturb ourselves (and others). Although this statement sounds as though we will restrict ourselves here to the intra-personal sphere of peacelessness and peace (i.e., 'distress' or 'serenity'), the effects of these motivational factors can be seen at all levels of peace or its absence, from distress or serenity,

through disharmony or harmony and crime or cooperation, to war or international peace. In a sense, although both volumes contend with rational or cognitive systems and with motivational systems, in this volume we focus mainly on the motivational bases of each level of peace or peacelessness. In another sense, the first volume was concerned with strategies that might be used in peace efforts, while this volume is concerned more with the fuel, instigators, drivers or motivators involved in peace efforts.

Originally, we had intended to limit ourselves to problem-solving in relation to peace, such that each individual might feel empowered with hope and tools by which to contribute to peace at all its levels. When we completed the first volume, however, we realized that the task had not yet been accomplished. We justified this fact by telling ourselves that peace at all its levels could not be addressed fully in one volume. That, in itself, suggested the need for a second volume. But what we felt was missing from the first volume was more than just 'not enough'. It was a whole dimension of the task, namely, the personal motivation needed to achieve peace. It seemed all very well to argue that peace could be achieved by means of specifiable methods addressing specifiable problems and initiatives. But that alone seemed to us to leave out the essential ingredient of the personal initiative required to undertake the achievement and the specifiable initiatives.

All of this is both abstruse and obvious. Any sensible person knows that in order to achieve an outcome anyone needs both a strategy and the necessary motivation. One might well ask, then why didn't we just go back to the first volume and write in the

needed but omitted motivational elements? We did try to address both elements in the first volume. But there are at least two features that interfered with an adequate achievement of that solution. First, the two elements do not lend themselves well to combined presentation. The underpinnings of the two elements are so different in nature that, although they commonly meld smoothly in daily life, they seem to require different forms of exposition in talking about them. Second, we concluded that a presentation of both elements together would demand more by way of the written word than each considered separately (perhaps creating three volumes of talk), and that the resulting single presentation would necessarily be incomprehensible, or at least utterly confusing, to anyone trying to work his or her way through it.

These two observations must sound as though we are trying to fabricate an excuse for preparing two volumes. And we will not try to contradict that statement. We do feel we must keep the two presentations separate. To begin to appreciate the problem we had to confront, you might remember what happened in the 'replication' study that we reported in volume I. In that study we tried to combine treatment methods for two factors of criminality and addictions in single treatments. Even although we tripled the amount of time devoted to each of the 'combined' treatments, we were unable to achieve the effects we sought on the test measures for one of the treatment targets. Of course, we personally might have been the problem. That is, we might have insufficient skill or intelligence to master the combined task involved, or to master the difficulty of presenting the problem-solving and motivational



elements in a single treatise that would be understandable and integrated well enough for mutual compatibility. Indeed, we would acknowledge that we are not able to do so. Hence, we felt we had to write volume II.

In volume I, the Introduction focused on the necessity that the reader, to gain benefit from the presentation, adopt a primary value, purpose and goal for peace. A general method to approach that task was proposed. That request has to be made again here. However, in this volume, the question is not so much how that might be accomplished, but more why would we bother to assign pre-eminent importance to peace? In the usual presentation, the question 'why' tends to lead to elaborate rationalizations to justify the request, presumably in the hope that at least a percentage of the readership will either be convinced by or be ready to resonate with the given justification. Our aim is to obtain agreement by much more than 'a percentage' of the readership. So we have to find another way to acquire your motivated participation in the common task of peace.

Unfortunately, it's too early in the presentation to offer the main essences of our attempt to contact your motivation. All we can do at this point is to hint at a couple of things we will ask you to consider. Some of these things have been sketched in broad outline in volume I. Some will have to be addressed as new issues in this volume.

In part II of volume I we talked briefly about causality in animate (behavioural) life, positing 'final' (or purposive) cause as having wider and deeper applicability than 'initial' cause. That is, all animate life does most, if not all, of what it does

due to the purposes (functions, if you wish) served by the actions. All actions now, seek to achieve future purposes. To ask you to assign pre-eminence to peace is to ask you to consider selecting peace as a pre-eminent purpose for your future. Of course, there are many, much more immediate, purposes we might want to pursue right now, including acquiring food and other resources for our immediate survival, power and wealth, social interactions and a host of personal wishes for the immediate future. So, why would anyone select such a distant, uncertain and common (with many others) purpose as having greater importance now than these other much more urgent purposes? Of course, aside from high-sounding theoretical justifications, such as our long-term survival, to which few of us really pay much lasting attention, there is no reason why we would do such a thing. Let others take primary responsibility for that initiative. We have much more important things to do with our time today -- and tomorrow and the next day.

At least on the level of a thought, we could all accept that the very human attitude adopted at the end of the last paragraph poses a very real practical problem for peace. So perhaps, for today anyway, we might be willing to elevate peace to a preeminent position among our purposes. Of course, we all know that we will forget that decision in at most a day or two under the impress of daily pressures and personal needs and wants. Besides, even if we did not allow ourselves to forget such a decision, it's obvious we would not really even entertain pre-eminence for that purpose. Let's be real. A third of each day will be devoted to performing our daily work chores, another third has to be assigned to our

needed sleep, and the remaining third has to be largely allocated to eating, travelling to and from work and shopping, talking with our families and friends and, of course, taking time for recreation that is so necessary when one considers the pressures and strains of daily life. That doesn't leave much (or any) time for our intended new peace purpose.

Did you ever notice that when you first meet someone you like, with whom you might like to establish a friendship, you can't find much time to devote to that person? It's the same for all of us. Once we get to know the new person in brief contacts or by bringing him or her into our existing social groupings, we all seem to find more and more time to be with those we really like. It's as though we find time for the person for whom, initially, we had no time. Thinking about that matter, most of us might notice that some other activities or people have had the time assigned to them curtailed by a bit, and we might conclude that we have sacrificed these other time-users to permit time for the new person. While that is sometimes true, it is not necessarily always true. Often, the only thing sacrificed is 'wasted' time. We restructure our schedules almost unconsciously to whittle off wasted time, and we cut down on the time from 'useful' activities that has been assigned in excess -- we can tell when excess time has been assigned because we tend to feel 'bored' during that part of the activity in question. Is this 'wedging' or 'shoe-horning' method the approach we are suggesting as a way to deal with the problem of assigning more priority and time to the peace purpose? It is not.

In volume I, we suggested that it would be worthwhile for all

of us repeatedly throughout life to list in detail and in order of their priority all of our beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values. If we were to do so carefully and completely enough, two things ought to emerge. One is that we would begin to see the inter-relatedness among our beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values, their instrumental subordination across listings (e.g., the relevance of sets of beliefs, goals and purposes to our needs and values), and the roles played by each in relation to each other. The other thing of which we might become aware is the abstraction process involved as we move from beliefs through to values. In turn, that might help us to think about how we could integrate the drivers that fuel our daily actions, both so they subserve more than one or two drivers each, and so that a global priority grows within all the drivers affecting our daily lives. One result of this process would tend to be that every moment of every day begins subtly to push us forward in a host of different areas and ways in life toward common beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values. We illustrated this process from one author's life in volume I.

Of course, we have no way of knowing what sort of hierarchies or subordinations might develop within your beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values. So we cannot predict confidently that peace would somehow emerge in a predominant position in your life. However, the fact that you have chosen to do some reading in the area of peace suggests to us that peace might have been assigned more than just a passing interest in your life. It seems quite possible that you might find that peace, as a belief, goal, purpose, need and/or value, might well emerge as something you are

pursuing everyday in all you do. To our surprise, it turned out to be the pre-eminent focus absorbing nearly all of our waking days for both of us as we undertook this process of examining our beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values as increasingly abstract drivers in our lives.

Are we arguing that the task of assigning pre-eminence to the peace purpose and value is best achieved by means of an abstraction task applied to our beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values? That might be one of several ways to enhance the priority assigned to peace. However, it is certainly not the only one. Part of this task includes the discovery of instrumental means by which to foster and pursue our predominant beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values. But please note that, as we described for one of us in volume I, even if peace emerges as the over-riding or superordinate belief, goal, purpose, need and value, it remains subordinated to the existing high-priority beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values, since its pursuit functions in an instrumental way to the pursuit or achievement of the others. That is, peace does NOT supplant any of the existing hierarchical orders of priority.

Another driver or motivator that we will consider in this volume has to do with the personal importance to each of us of our existing needs. We all pursue things best if they are to our own personal advantage. Unfortunately, we are not yet in a position to expand on the personal benefits of peace -- or anything else. The proper presentation of this matter must await a lot of analysis of the nature of personal needs, their sources and how they work. And we hardly even hinted at this whole matter in volume I.

Again, in this volume, we must acknowledge that this is not really an introduction to anything. All we have tried to do here is to isolate a couple of issues that will have to be addressed in our overall purpose, to note in a general way the primary focus of this work, and to propose one kind of initiative we each might be able to undertake to foster peace as possibly instrumental to the pursuit of our existing beliefs, goals, purposes, needs and values. So far, this introduction has not even indicated how we will proceed in the rest of the volume. But it has prepared us to offer a limited way of saying how we will organize what follows.

In this volume, we are less interested in the volume I task of identifying rational ways to recognize and measure peace. Instead, we are interested in finding the drivers that lead or mislead us in our efforts to understand and pursue peace or the avoidance of peacelessness. Compared with volume I and consistent with the aims of volume II, there will be relatively few strategies offered to achieve peace -- strategies are a volume I task. However, again in this volume, the presentation is organized in two parts. The first part will try to focus on the drivers that push us toward the avoidance of peacelessness, so that we can understand how we set ourselves up for negative and avoidant means to achieve peace. That is, part I is concerned with 'why' we create conflicted and avoidant solutions to the pursuit of peace. The second part will try to focus on the drivers within us that might pull us toward peace as an approach task. That is, part II is concerned with how we can create peace through pursuing it as a positive goal.

Again, part I is formulated in relatively familiar terms and,

even although much of it will sound 'far out' and even crazy (recall that an appropriate set of observations ought to be counter-intuitive, or they would have been found, along with peace, long ago), it should be moderately easy to understand. It seems likely that the part II presentation will be quite difficult to understand, at least if part I has not been pretty thoroughly assimilated. With these caveats, we proceed.

## Part I

### Nominalizations and Avoidances

#### Chapter 1

#### Causality

As in volume 1, there are two major topics that have to be addressed before proceeding with the main presentations concerning peace. Each of these topics bears centrally upon all the issues to be addressed in the several chapters. Each demands considerable attention that, if afforded within the other chapters, would disrupt the flow of information and confuse the reader. Besides, each is an important issue in its own right that needs to be understood if the rest of the presentation is to be understood. Finally, just as language and conflict are basic issues in the understanding and modification of cognitive or strategic factors interfering with peace, so causality and needs are basic issues in understanding and modifying the motivational factors in peace and its disturbances.

But what could possibly be said that is not obvious concerning

causality? 'The cause' of anything is anything else that regularly precedes the thing in question. That is, all causality is widely understood to be concerned with antecedent or 'initial' causes that regularly occur before their effects in time. Consideration of whether or not this statement is valid must be delayed until a couple of other issues are addressed. However, we should point out here that, whatever the nature of causality, since we are setting out to find the causes of peace and its disturbances, we ought to be sure where to look and what to look for before we begin our voyage of exploration. If we look for the wrong kinds of things in the wrong places we doom ourselves to failure in our efforts. But an understanding of causality depends upon a couple of other items of information.

First, we all live in two universes. The physical universe is comprised of objects or things. The psychological or behavioural universe is comprised of actions or events. There are important differences between things and events. Things are identified or located mainly by their coordinates in space. That is, if we look for a thing at the wrong place we will not find it. Behavioural events are identified or located primarily by their coordinates in time. That is, if we look for an event at the wrong time we will not find it. This does NOT mean that events are any less factual or observable than things. If we record an event (on film, paper) while it is occurring, it has been transmuted onto a thing, and it can be referenced or studied in any way, anywhere at any time in the future. However, if we fail to record an event at the time it



occurs, we can only study it later if it repeats itself.

Second, things or events are identified with their universes, and are of scientific interest, mainly based upon their capacity to be observed repeatedly. That is, if a thing is observed at one moment and then cannot be observed at the next moment, at least some quality of it is seen to be of the behavioural universe (e.g., it might be in motion and has passed by), or it is attributed to the behavioural universe (e.g., it might have been an illusory hologram or a spook). Things of either universe are of scientific interest mainly if observation of them can be repeated. The repeatable quality of things tends to be attributed to their relatively solid or stable (over time) characteristics. The repeatable quality of events tends to be attributed to their innate or habitual (i.e., repeating) nature.

Third, different kinds of causalities, operating in different ways, seem to characterize the two universes. The lawfulness of the physical universe seems to be governed almost exclusively by 'initial' or antecedent causality. In this kind of causality, the cause occurs before its effect(s). In the physical universe, it is appropriate in seeking causes to pursue the historical roots of things. When we do, what we would finally find is that every thing and event since the 'big bang' is part of the cause underlying every other subsequent thing. That is, every thing in the universe exerts some, however minor, effect on everything else.

Because physical science developed before behavioural science, and because we have all received more training in the physical than

in the behavioural sciences, we all tend to think of 'initial' causality as the only kind of causality. However, philosophers recognize several other kinds of causality than just 'initial' causes. It's true that most other kinds of causality have been described by philosophers in rather metaphysical ways -- although that is unnecessary. Even in the physical universe, two other kinds of causes could be claimed. Inertia is the tendency of anything to remain in its existing state of motion or immobility until an external (initial cause) force acts on it. Inertia might be viewed as a kind of 'perpetuating' or maintaining cause that acts at the same time as its effects in an object. And tropisms (e.g., phototropism of plants) might be construed as representing a kind of 'final' or purposive cause, where the cause (approaching the sun) does not occur until after its effects (growth).

In the behavioural universe, events are also subject to 'initial' causes. Antecedent practice lays down physical neural pathways fostering later habitual actions (effects). However, in the behavioural universe, 'final' and 'perpetuating' causes tend to serve as the much more important, useful and common ones governing behaviour. Since this fact will be central in much of what we will have to say, this last statement requires some extended exposition.

Consider any action. A ball is thrown. The 'initial' causes of the throw include the prior existence of the physical apparatus to perform the throw (an arm comprised of rigid bones, muscles and blood and nerve conduits), the energy required to be imparted to the ball (from oxygen and nutrients in the blood stream) and the

level of maturation and habit needed for the purpose (the neural pathways and electrical impulses). All these 'initially' caused elements form aspects of the physical system (whether human or robotic) required to make the throw of the ball possible.

If the ball is a basket-ball, it is likely to be thrown over-hand, in an upwards direction, toward a hoop. If the ball is a bowling ball, it is likely to be thrown under-hand, in a horizontal direction, toward some other objects. Again, 'initial' causes are involved in prior experience with balls, deciding how the ball is likely to be perceived (as a basket- or a bowling-ball) and how the throw is likely to be undertaken.

However, these observations do not exhaust the issues involved in any throw. The ball (basket- or bowling-) might be thrown (how) as though it were of the other kind, if the thrower wanted to do so -- that is for another purpose than that for which it was intended. The existence of the physical elements (arm and ball) do not decide when, where or how the ball will be thrown. These will be decided by the purposes of the thrower. How the ball is actually thrown, when it is thrown and where it is thrown all depend upon what purpose the thrower is trying to achieve. Note, however, that the purpose to be accomplished is not realized until after the throw it causes and, as a cause of the throwing action, it exists only in the mind or imagination of the thrower until after the throw is completed. That is, the purposes of any action serve as the 'final' causes of the action, determining the immediate how, when and where affecting the action (as the effect). The tiger would

have some difficulty in trying to chase its dinner if it had already eaten it.

Moreover, the foregoing does not tell us how well the throw will be performed. It is true that prior experience with a particular kind of ball might establish neural habits deciding in part 'how well' the throw is done. But there are other elements in the quality of the performance. There is a kind of cybernetic feedback that occurs in the muscle sensations returning to the brain during an act of throwing, on the basis of which minute changes in the way the throw is done are undertaken to correct the throw. And there are results of the throw that tell the thrower how well he/she has done from the moment that the ball leaves the hand until it goes wherever it is going. These types of feedback (cybernetic and visual) accompany every throw, enhancing the present and future skill of the thrower's throws, and they seem to go along with the action, at the same time as the action or after it, as if they function as 'perpetuating' causes for the action. That is, how well the purpose is achieved is decided in part by the perpetuating causes of the outcomes, consequences, reinforcements or rewards achieved. A tiger that has eaten its fill is not only unlikely to pursue its dinner, it will also chase a dinner in a clumsy way and without learning much about how to catch it.

The point so far is that causality works somewhat differently in the physical and behavioural universes. In the physical universe, although one might argue that 'final' and 'perpetuating' causes play a role, 'initial' causality is the predominant and main

type of operative causality. In the behavioural universe, although 'initial' causality plays a role (mainly controlling the physical apparatus in which behaviour occurs), 'final' and 'perpetuating' causality are the predominant and main types of causality involved. The main difference among these three kinds of causality lies in the temporal relationships existing between the causes and their effects. In 'initial' causes, the cause occurs before its effects. In 'perpetuating' causes, the cause occurs during or immediately after its effects. In 'final' causes, the cause occurs after its effects. In experiments, it is easiest to study the effects of 'initial' causes, controlled to observe their subsequent effects. Perhaps that's why 'initial' causes are most often studied, even in the behavioural sciences.

In the behavioural universe, 'perpetuating' causes are best represented by reinforcements, outcomes or consequences, and by the habit strength or skill (how well) that grows as their result. 'Final' causes are best represented by the purposes of events (that decide when, where, how for an act) and the by person's needs that underlie his or her purposes.

There is another thing that ought to be said about the three kinds of causes referenced in the foregoing. It should be recalled that our purpose in writing this is to find ways to modify or change the (causal) factors underlying peace and peacelessness. How does the foregoing help us to approach that task?

'Initial' causes are part of history, and are in the past by the time an event (effect) occurs. There are ways to 'change

history' as it is recorded or represented in the mind. However, changing history as represented in imagery does not change history as it happened or all the effects it had on the physical system. We believe that the relative ineffectiveness of psychotherapies (e.g., psychoanalysis) using retrospective methods (using initial-cause thinking) is due to the fact that they focus on and seek to change initial causes. To seek to change initial causes is equivalent to trying to change the direction at a bridge of water that has already flowed past it. It cannot easily be done.

'Final' and 'perpetuating' causes happen with or after their effects. If these causes are changed, their effects change. We believe that psychotherapies directed at the present reinforcers (e.g., behaviour modification) or the future purposes (e.g., values training) are relatively much more effective than retrospective psychotherapies precisely because they seek to modify perpetuating and final causes, thus modifying behavioural effects and outcomes directly. In all our treatment work referred to in these two volumes, we have sought to direct our attention toward individuals' purposes or needs, and gains, rewards or future outcomes. It's a case of leading a horse to a well when it's thirsty, and ensuring the well contains water it likes to drink when it gets there.

With apologies for the 'folksy' illustrations, we hope that the foregoing has helped to clarify the 'what' and 'why' of our repeated focus in both volumes on indicators and outcomes, and on purposes and needs. Since we want to find and modify the causes of behavioural events such as peace, we have to find both indicators

and workable strategies to recognize and achieve peace (volume I), and the relevant drivers or motivators involved in our collective purposes and needs, reinforcers and skills (volume II). We are now almost ready to examine the nature of these kinds of motivators.

#### The need for careful empirical analysis

There is one more general issue we need to address here. Most of us assume that our prior training and experience, will allow us to find 'what needs to be done' in approaching most problems. Here we are seeking to point out our common tendency to mix together two or more different operations of analysis, and our tendency to think and act as if the plurality involved were but one issue.

The two operations referred to here are understanding and conceptualizing a phenomenon being considered, and understanding and strategizing to do something about it. The first task in understanding any problem is to classify the issues within their appropriate operational areas. In these two volumes we have selected crime and addictions as the primary experimental targets for our demonstrations. Into which areas of human living do these phenomena fall? Although crime must be driven by some motivators, making it appear a compulsively pursued activity, it involves the application of behavioural strategies, varying from one situation to another -- to solve problems. In this sense, conceptually, it seems likely that the essences of crime lie in the cognitive or problem-solving sphere of human behaviours, although it will have its own characteristic motivational roots. Although addictions also vary (different kinds of substances used in varying ways), the

compulsive character of addictive behaviour seems to characterize it to a greater extent than its strategic character. This would seem to mark addictions as belonging most in the motivational area of human behaviour, with only a secondary element of cognitive strategy involved in them. It seems possible to use our prior training and experience to categorize our subject matter pretty adequately in advance of data collection.

Having thus classified the conceptual area of a phenomenon, we might be inclined to assume that the next steps will be equally susceptible to conceptual analysis and intervention based on our prior training and experience. The next steps involve identifying the relevant causal processes, and appropriate means by which to modify the phenomena in question. In this chapter, we have gone to some lengths to show that even the first of these two steps is neither as obvious as it might appear given our common training and experience, nor necessarily leading to the expected answers. In the next chapter, we will try to show that the targets (and thus the methods) of intervention or modification also might not be as obvious as most of us would like to think. The general caution we are trying to advance here is that, if we want to achieve much success at each stage of any task, it is terribly important to exercise the utmost care and self-critical questioning at each step of an investigation, especially the early ones.

A couple of examples of the problems involved here might help. If we fail to identify the 'areas of human behaviour' involved in a phenomenon under investigation, we are apt to mislead our later



enterprises. If we concluded that crime and addiction were similar to one another as strategic or cognitive phenomena, we would be inclined to approach them in much the same ways. If we concluded that both were cognitive phenomena, we might be inclined to seek their (initial cause) origins in people's early selections of strategies in life, thus trying to bring to bear the plethora of initial-cause analyses in the experimental literature. These are such 'obvious' approaches to the problems of both crime and addictions that they are likely to be adopted uncritically.

However, there will be natural consequences to the adoption of any solutions. First, by travelling the same route taken by so many colleagues in the past, we would likely achieve about as much as previous efforts had accomplished. Second, by selecting the usual 'initial cause' analysis, we would restrict ourselves to relatively ineffective behavioural intervention strategies. Third, as a result of the consequent expected limited benefit from the interventions used, the experimenter and his or her colleagues would, once more, be forced to the conclusion that behavioural methods of analysis and intervention are relatively weak or impotent. This, in turn, would likely impress upon us all the idea that 'the real' controlling variables, and the ones that will eventually yield the required benefits to society, are those at other, non-behavioural (e.g., chemical or physiological), levels of analysis. This conclusion probably underlies much of the poor morale found among psychologists, wherein, having committed their efforts to the behavioural field, they find themselves doing mainly

temporizing things of weak power while they await 'real' solutions to human problems from chemistry and medicine. Too bad! We have at hand a terribly powerful level of analysis that allows us to control some of the most important and useful phenomena in living.

Psychologists often seem to forget that the structure and chemistry of the human body is virtually the same whether the body is alive or dead. Life involves action or behaviour. Psychology is the main and most basic life science and practice. It is at the level of analysis most appropriate to living, and its variables are likely to be those most relevant and directly related to (thus most readily controlled for) the essences of living and its problems.

The purpose of this last series of observations was to point out that, all too often, many of us adopt ideas, solutions, methods and strategies that seem intuitively right. We wish to repeat an idea that we stated in volume I and again in this volume. If any idea or solution seems 'intuitively' right, we are apt to mislead ourselves, especially if the area in which we are working is one that has so far resisted adequate and/or powerful solution. If a topic has defied satisfactory solution, then its solution is likely to be a counter-intuitive one. Peace and addictions have not yielded well to previous attempts at solutions. Perhaps effective and powerful solutions to these issues should be expected to be quite counter-intuitive.

In pointing this out, we are making a plea for patience and forbearance as we seek to explore, often in strange and counter-intuitive ways, the causal issues involved in creating and

maintaining peace. Of course, it could be argued that we make this plea to justify the peculiarities of our approach to the problems we are trying to address. However, it is also possible that we are expressing something about the experiences we had as we struggled, often against our own sense of what seemed 'right' or what seemed counter-intuitive, to understand and experiment with the issues we encountered in our analyses of the causes of peace and the problems that undermine it.

## Chapter 2

### Needs and Rewards

In what follows, pursuant to our conclusions in the last chapter, we will be speaking about purposes and needs as the 'final' causes that determine our behaviour, and about outcomes, rewards and reinforcements (along with their consequent skills or habit strengths) as the 'perpetuating' causes that determine our behaviours. The purposes and needs will be spoken about as though they were the motivators and drivers of our actions, and the outcomes and rewards, and their attendant habit strengths, will be referred to as the reinforcers or consequences of our actions. It is necessary to define some of the language to be used before we try to communicate about anything.

Reinforcers depend upon the existence of a need or purpose. If the motivation is not there, the existence of a reinforcing state of affairs becomes essentially irrelevant. Hence the old

saw: 'You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make it drink.' Although both are necessary elements in behaviour, we will concern ourselves first and primarily with people's purposes and needs, and only secondarily with reinforcers or outcomes. It is for this reason that we will often seem to be talking only about purposes and needs. However, the existence and nature of a purpose or need implies fairly directly the kind(s) of reinforcer(s) that will be effective in perpetuating a behavioural effect.

In trying to identify purposes and needs that might contribute positively or negatively to peace, we began by listing all the needs and purposes we could think of. We found some of these in the writings of motivologists such as McDougall and Allport. We got some more by picking our own and our colleagues' brains. A few more emerged from each of the stages of our analyses, and from the ways in which we formulated our questions for ourselves. The result was certainly not an exhaustive list by any stretch of the imagination. However, as we said repeatedly in volume I, our efforts did NOT seek to achieve perfect peace. We believe that perfect peace is a gift from God and not a sensible human goal.

Traditionally, we have asked: what causes a behavioural event? That question might have been put rather poorly. It seems to direct attention to 'initial' or antecedent causes, the weakness of which has already been remarked. And it seems to imply that the person and the behavioural event are at the mercy (an effect) of an external cause -- a destructive way of thinking. Another question that is asked with increasing frequency is, what does the person

notice or find as a result of a behaviour? Some answers to this question have been that he/she notices/finds behaviour triggers or immediate gratifications. At least this question and answer seek some of the 'perpetuating' causes or reinforcers of behaviour, and they include the person as an active part of the causal process.

Another, even better, way to formulate the question might be: what is the person (as the active, causal subject) seeking to achieve with the behaviour? Possible answers to this question might include: gratification or relief of a motivation or a need ('final' causes), or definable kinds of results in the way he/she feels (reinforcements or 'perpetuating' causes -- which also reveal the nature of the motives or needs or 'final' cause involved).

It is interesting that, when the authors have talked to others about the notions being put forward here, the almost automatic rejoinder at this point has been: but what causes the needs (final causes) or the rewards (perpetuating causes)? So deeply entrenched by our training is our reliance on 'initial cause thinking' that it is almost impossible for us to put it aside even for a moment. Nevertheless, the question about the causes of needs, and thus of their reinforcing effects, leads us in another important direction.

Indeed, what causes or creates any need or any element of personality? The answer is probably relatively simple. The body comes equipped with very few systems that can create lasting (or 'chronic') problems or states. As Selye (1976) and many others have shown at the level of problem generation, and as Wolpe (1958) and others have shown at the level of treatment, the main available

system implicated in most human suffering and presenting problems is the autonomic nervous system (ANS). It is a hard-wired system feeding all the organ systems of the body directly or indirectly. It is a survival system, responding to every perceived emergency, which means that its messages achieve predominance over all others. It is an adaptable system that can be modified in any direction of its responses, and thus can be used to regulate other associated behaviours. It is comprised of nervous tissue, so that it learns. And it learns enormously quickly. Its effects are so versatile and pervasive that it is affirmed here that the ANS and the stress, immune and anxiety responses that it initiates, regulates and orchestrates, underlie most (not all) lasting human distress.

The first level at which the ANS can produce distress or problems involves direct arousal of the sympathetic-immune-stress-anxiety branch of the ANS. The sensation is usually uncomfortable, and the response to such arousal tends to be escape or avoidance (the 'flight' response). The arousal-anxiety response of the ANS can be uncomfortable or unpleasant; escape or avoidance behaviour tends to be maladaptive in most circumstances; and both the arousal and the avoidance actions can evoke uncomfortable or unpleasant derivative responses such as muscle tension and its many results or consequences (e.g., arthritis). Also, any of these responses can themselves become habitual (learned), so that their unpleasant consequences can become relatively 'chronic'.

The second level at which suffering can be produced by ANS activation is built on the first as a higher-order conditioned

response. Learned escape can be conditioned to predictive cues to create conditioned anticipatory avoidance. Almost anything can be avoided in an anticipatory fashion. 'I never get angry', 'I don't know what love feels like', 'I am always clear in my mind about everything; I am never confused', and a host of other expressions of anticipatory avoidance illustrate this level of human subjective experience. Anticipatory avoidance habits are clearly learned, and they tend to be represented in many characteristics or traits by which people describe themselves, and in many kinds of problems or distresses that might interfere with peace.

The third level at which the ANS can produce suffering is built on the second by still higher-order conditioning. Traits or characteristics generated by anticipatory avoidance, if they create comfort in the person, can be generalized or, if they feel uncomfortable, can serve as cues for further avoidance. If clear or rational thinking diminishes confusion and its discomfort, the person might become increasingly introverted and rational -- which, however, can itself become an unrecognized source of confusion and/or dissatisfaction. If an absence of felt anger is valued or feels good, anticipatory avoidance of all energy use can develop -- which is likely to lead to depression or joylessness. If a lack of awareness of love feelings results in an uncomfortable emptiness, and if internal bodily sensations feel reassuring, the latter might be magnified, perhaps to eventuate in hypochondriasis. Since the avoidances involved often go unnoticed (see later), the resulting 'state' of the person may become habitual and may become even more

clearly a source of self-definition or of distress.

A fourth level can then emerge derived through the above chain of higher-order conditioned sequences. And here the progression can result in almost unremitting rigid habits (such as addiction). Introversion and its consequences may 'feel' oppressive; depression and its associated consequences, or hypochondriasis, may 'feel' awful or create desperation; and weak positive emotions may 'feel' unfulfilling. Such consequences from the previous stage of higher-order conditioning, tend to become persistent and pervasive temperamental states of the person, setting him/her up to demand repeated relief from them. In the attempt to reduce these unpleasant feelings, the person may seek and find rapid means by which to relieve his/her distress. Such means include the use of psychotropic or addictive chemical substances, compulsive acts or political activism. Using such means to create relief from the distress of higher-order conditioned or derived feelings or needs tends to have at least two effects. First, if relief is achieved, however temporarily, the means used to achieve relief (perpetuating reinforcement) can be learned rapidly, as in addictive, compulsive or disruptive behaviour (that relieves by distraction to external events conveniently selected to be held responsible for the felt distress). Second, the accomplishment of the 'state' (purpose or final cause) achieved as a result of the relief (e.g., feelings of omnipotence, euphoria or vengefulness) can itself become a learned habit, pursued as though it were a positive purpose or need.

Needs and reinforcers, assumed to play the roles described,



were built into our lists of purposes and needs, and reinforcers. However, we became interested in the extent to which each need or reinforcer might be accessible to conscious awareness on the part of each person. This seemed to be an important question since we were going to try to modify the need and reinforcement causes underlying peacelessness. If some of them are learned by higher-order conditioning, to serve as anticipatory cues for more direct or concrete needs and reinforcers, does that mean they are likely to be more or less available to conscious awareness? We answered this question in two ways.

#### Awareness of Primary versus Derived Motives

It seems likely that derived or higher-order conditioned needs and rewards would be less consciously represented in awareness than primary ones. But this might be true only in a limited sense. Felt needs or gratification might be as available to awareness for both primary and derived needs and rewards, but the role of the behavioural effects (the purpose and how it works) might be less apparent for the derived ones.

This last assumption seemed important to us. We wanted to find ways to identify and modify needs that might be relevant to peace and its disturbances. For this purpose, we needed to find a finite list of needs and targets for treatment. We will return to this issue later. Meanwhile, in order to allow conscious and less conscious needs to be represented fairly, we attempted to balance the numbers of primary and derived needs and reinforcers in our lists of needs and reinforcers. This was done from a particular

point of view. The viewpoint deserves comment to illustrate how the postulate about relative degrees of conscious awareness works.

It was assumed that the purpose of some needs would be quite conscious, direct and obvious. For example, stimulus hunger, reliance on social influence, need to inhibit aggression, need for social contact and need for self-enhancement seem fairly clearly to represent needs that a person might pursue actively (later to be designated Nd). The 'need' components of other purposes might be indirect, implicit and less conscious or obvious. Rebellion against authority and need for vivid images are needs for means by which to achieve their purposes (i.e., disinhibition or arousing stimuli), although the pursued purposes themselves seem less clear. Nevertheless, both kinds of drivers might be thought of as needs in and of themselves (later designated Nd).

Other human initiatives or actions create needs indirectly. Reactive depression creates uncomfortable sensations that are likely to drive the person actively to seek a happier or more comfortable state, and a rigid self image may limit the range of personal experience or perpetuate an unpleasant view of the self. These would be likely to drive the person actively to seek varied experiences or to escape from awareness of a negative self-image. In these ways, the 'needs' involved in some purposes form derived needs or create drive stimuli (later designated SD). These kinds of variables function as needs. However, their need-character may be derived from higher-order conditioned temperamental or cognitive states, or their resulting experiences, which may demand relief.

Similarly, the 'reinforcement' components of some purposes are direct and obvious. Social enjoyment, inhibiting intolerable guilt, denying painful realities, and successful effort at control or control of others, if desired, are fairly obviously likely to be experienced as rewarding (later designated Rf). The reinforcement elements of some other outcomes are indirect or implicit. Although hedonism sounds like an actively pursued need (and probably is), the achievement of hedonistic pleasure would be rewarding whether or not hedonism was pursued actively. That is, the pleasure aspect of hedonism might be more generally applicable than the more easily noticed pursuit of a hedonistic life-style. So, perhaps, among even the primary reinforcers (later designated Rf), some of their aspects may be less available to conscious awareness than others.

Still other features can create their own derived reinforcers (later designated rf). Social anxiety creates the need to avoid upsetting social situations that, accomplished, feels better or rewarding. Felt loneliness creates an unpleasant set of sensations whose purpose seems to be to motivate the person to become more sociable, and thereby to obtain the rewarding state of affairs of relief from the loneliness. And social withdrawal creates the reward of relief from oppressive sensations experienced in social contact. In these ways, some 'reinforcers' create derived drivers and reinforcers (later designated rf) beyond their primary ones.

It seems likely that the roles of derived reinforcement (rf) effects (e.g., from addictives) would be less clearly understood or less apparent in conscious awareness than those of primary rewards

(Rf). The same is likely true of the purposes of derived needs (sD) as compared to primary needs (Nd).

Awareness of Explicit vs. Implicit Motives: Not only are some needs and reinforcers experienced directly (Nd, Rf) or indirectly (sD, rf), there also appear to be explicit and implicit needs and reinforcers. One implicit kind was referred to above as the second group of primary needs and reinforcers, which create indirect and implicit but primary needs (Nd) and rewards (Rf). Another kind is found in traits that develop at the third level of higher-order learnings described earlier (causes of needs and reinforcers).

For example, introversion and anhedonia might be considered pre-existing and lasting traits of the person. Also, rationality might be considered a desirable result of maturity, and depression and hypochondriasis pathological states. The fact that these kinds of attributes are given nominal labels, tends to lead the person to think that the needs and experiences associated with them are 'things' that are inescapable except through temporary 'physical' treatment (or self-medication, Khantzian, 1975). Moreover, some of the needs and experiences derived from them are not easily recognized as derivatives of the associated conditions.

Consider introversion as one example of these learned traits. Introversion is a result of little more than exaggerated verbal mediation of experience -- something everybody does to some extent. A parent, seeing a child moving toward a hot stove, is apt to warn the child: 'Don't touch the stove! It's hot; you'll get burned.'

If the child stops and does not touch the stove, introversion has received one practice trial. 'That box-like thing over there is called 'stove'' -- verbal mediation. 'It's hot; does that mean like the hot water tap is hot? I'll get burned; is that like a sun-burn?' -- mediation by associated ideas. Now, unlike physical things, words and ideas are just sounds used to represent things and events. In order to keep them active and 'alive', they have to be repeated in thought, and the thoughts have to be noticed. Each inward turning of attention to think and to notice thinking is an introverted action. The relative amount of this inward turning of attention can be used to express the amount of introversion.

Introversion has several, often unnoticed, consequences. The first one is that thought and action mutually compete with each other. Thus, the more introverted the person, the less active he/she is likely to be. However, the body is an energy-producing machine. So, introverted inactivity results in feeling confined, as energy use is inhibited. Of course, few people can appreciate that their sense of uncomfortable confinement is self-induced. So most introverted people look around them and in their histories to find the sources or 'causes' of the felt confinement. Some notice rules and other people's expectations and demands; they may become angry or rebellious. Others notice that many of their thoughts and memories are unpleasant or unhappy; they may become depressed. Some notice they can't remember anything before about 10 to 12 years of age; they may try to fill the imagined void with reasons for the presumed amnesia. Some notice that the world around them

never quite lives up to the illusory abstract ideals they have created; for them everything is a short-fall from what it 'should' be, which sucks the joy out of life to eventuate in anhedonia. The first consequence of introversion, then, is that it is confining, with its self-selected meanings and consequences.

To the extent that a person is introverted, the repetition of verbal mediation acts (thinking) increases the amount of thought occurring -- pressure of thinking. This second result has a host of, often unnoticed, consequences. Increased thought provides for increased cognitive differentiation and alternatives of action and understanding -- which sound like good things. However, they also increase uncertainty and thus indecision. But the main personal purpose for verbal mediation is to reduce ambiguity -- probably the greatest single stimulus for anxiety among all people. And the increased uncertainty and indecision, resulting from introversion increases-in-cognitive-complexity, increases ambiguity intolerance. The result is either confusion (concentration difficulties) or the corrective attempt to maintain care and precision (or perfection), which leads to obsessive behaviour. So the second consequence of introversion is thought pressure. It may lead to problems with confusion, concentration or rumination that, in turn, increase the original underlying problem of ambiguity or uncertainty fears that the introversion was intended to resolve.

These are only two of the many consequences of introversion. But they might serve to illustrate the idea under discussion. A person's recognized or unrecognized introversion is the underlying

factor in many elements of personal distress. Thus introversion might be the variable that has to be treated to correct its derived factors of personality, even although its consequences might have to be listed as needs or reinforcers and recognized as causal elements in given kinds of behaviour (such as peacelessness).

Some of the derivatives of introversion include a sense of confinement (demanding disinhibition) and its many consequences, such as rage as a response to confinement (whose felt need may be to cool down), rebelliousness (discipline intolerance), depression (demanding social contact and enlivenment), joylessness (seeking pleasure) or amnesia (that may demand memories and retribution). Another derivative of introversion involves pressure of thought (demanding relief from oppressive thinking) and its consequences, such as indecision (creating dependency), uncertainty (demanding meaning and structure), confusion or defence against it in oppressive obsessions (demanding relief of ambiguity anxiety or of the guilt associated with obsession). Any of these might be recognized or unrecognized, but their relationships to one another and to the underlying introversion are very unlikely to participate in conscious awareness.

What seems to be missing from conscious awareness with respect to most of these kinds of implicit or derived motivational elements is their relationship to one another and to their underlying sources in personality. The result is that the person, failing to grasp such relationships, is unable to find a suitable conscious strategy with which to modify the underlying cause (or driver).

Instead, the person tends to try corrective measures, most of which are defensive and/or compulsive, and which serve mainly to perpetuate the problem the person experiences.

The last paragraph seems to us to be of central importance to the treatment of motivations. One problem we have faced repeatedly in our attempts to explain the position to which our data have led us has been that a good deal of what we find ourselves forced to say is counter-intuitive. Of course, it would have to be so. If understanding and strategizing for the treatment of motivations was obvious, intuitive and consistent with common sense, then their professional- or self-treatment would long since have been achieved and without difficulty. The problem is that the intricacies involved in the ways we try to cope with consequences of our learning histories create implicit (unaware) maladaptive and almost incomprehensible non-solutions. To find workable solutions, it seems almost axiomatic that paradoxical and divergent solutions to paradox have to be used, and that, almost necessarily, must result in counter-intuitive ideas and strategies that sound plain wrong.

#### Method of selection of needs and reinforcers

The task we had given ourselves was to find motivators that might be disturbed in people, that we could measure, validate and modify. In order to measure identified motivators we would have to use some kind of questionnaire or test. If we could develop a test for the motivators we selected, we might be able to measure the effects of any modification efforts we undertook. So the next task was to develop a test. But how?



Test items (questions) are in the form of sentences. In any self-descriptive sentence, the subject is the personal pronoun ('I'). That would be a constant in each item. That leaves the verb and object to function as variables to evoke the information needed to access the respondent's motivations.

In order to find verbs and objects to carry their required motivational content, we took a quite specific, and perhaps limiting, approach. Words that carry motivational properties ought to exert a kind of 'pull' on the person toward a relatively extreme direction of response. Words that 'pull' people in one direction or another could be characterized as polar or dimensionalized words. That is, words that seem to imply a dimension or distribution between two polar attributes might be thought of as evoking a pull on the person based upon his or her motivations.

We began to list every dimensional or polar concept we could think of -- regardless of the kind of motivation that might be involved. We expanded our listing of polar concepts by reference to the lists of motivations referred to earlier. Of course, we exercise limited brain power. Consequently, our initial list of polar or dimensional concepts barely exceeded twenty in number.

The next thing we did was to create from the list of polar concepts, two lists of the poles or dimensions involved. The one list (of verbs) sought the verb forms of the involved poles, while the other list (of objects) sought the nominal forms of the poles that might serve as objects of sentences. We now had a basis for constructing self-descriptive sentences (test items) in which the

verbs and objects could vary in definable ways -- to carry the motivational elements to be investigated.

We examined the two lists (verbs and objects) to be sure that we had included sufficient representation of each of the kinds of motivations mentioned earlier (Nd, sD, Rf, rf). To do this, we simply made the best guess we could about the most probable nature of each combination of verb-and-object combinations of dimensions. We were overjoyed to note that the four kinds of motives or 'main causal functions' seemed equally represented. The final list of verb-and-object combinations, with the motivations they seemed to represent and their probable type or nature, is presented below.

Addicaus Scales: Characteristics built into the 68 test axes.

<u>Axis</u> & <u>Tone</u>	<u>Addicaus</u> <u>Scale Title</u>	<u>Main</u> <u>Causal</u> <u>Functn</u>	<u>Mostly the Verb</u> employing <u>Dimension 1 (X)</u>	<u>Mostly the Object</u> employing <u>Dimension 2 (Y)</u>
01-.	Social Anxiety	rf	Avoid/Approach	Social/Self
02+.	Group Enjoyment	Rf	Approach/Avoid	Social/Self
03-.	Reactive Depression	sD	Passive/Active	Integrat./Disintegration
04+.	Stimulus Hunger	Nd	Active/Passive	Integrat./Disintegration
05-.	Rigid Self Image	sD	Unchanging/Learn	Purpose/Random Self
06+.	Social Influence	Nd	Learn/Unchanging	Social/Self
07-.	Aggression Inhibition	Nd	Avoid/Approach	Active/Passive
08+.	Guilt Intolerance	Rf	Avoid/Approach	Passive/Active
09-.	Loneliness	rf	Passive/Active	Social/Alone
10+.	Social Contact Need	Nd	Active/Passive	Social/Alone
11-.	Reality Denial	Rf	Avoid/Approach	Real/Unreal
12+.	Authority Rebellion	Nd	Approach/Avoid	Unreal/Real

13-	Joyless Depression	sD	Impotency/Power	Forward/Backward
14+	Vivid Imagery	Nd	Power/Impotency	Forward/Backward
15-	Control Effort	Rf	Power/Impotency	Mind/Body
16+	Control Others	Rf	Power/Impotency	Mind/Body
17-	Grief Reaction	sD	Power/Impotency	Loss/Gain
18+	Event Self Enhancement	Nd	Power/Impotency	Gain/Loss
19-	Pain Sensitivity	sD	Sensitive/Insensitive	Pain/Pleasure
20+	Hedonism	Rf	Sensitive/Insensitive	Pleasure/Pain
21-	Social Withdrawal	rf	Bad/Good	Social/Alone
22+	Subcultural Values	sD	Good/Bad	Social/Alone
23-	Dependency Inhibition	Nd	Power/Impotency	Change/Persistence
24+	Immediate Gratificat'n	Rf	Power/Impotency	Change/Persistence
25-	Paranoid Sensitivity	rf	Sensitive/Insensitive	Social/Alone
26+	Rationality Defence	rf	Sensitive/Insensitive	Social/Alone
27-	Oppressive Inhibition	Rf	Precise/Error	Good/Bad
28+	Comfortable Inhibition	Rf	Precise/Error	Good/Bad
29-	Disturbed Feelings	rf	Anxious/Depressed	Mind/Body
30+	Affect Denial	rf	Avoid/Approach	Body/Mind
31-	Put Down Others	Nd	Dissatisfy/Satisfy	Other/Self
32+	Group Satisfaction	Rf	Satisfy/Dissatisfy	Group/Self
33-	Dogmatism	rf	Good/Bad	Persistence/Change
34+	Need To Be Different	Nd	Bad/Good	Persistence/Change
35-	Self Depreciation	rf	Bad/Good	Self/Other
36+	Rigid Moralization	sD	Good/Bad	Self/Other
37-	Paroxysmal Energy	sD	Impotency/Power	Facilitate/Impede
38+	Rules Intolerance	rf	Impotency/Power	Impede/Facilitate

39-.	Effort Strain	rf	Power/Impotency	Impede/Facilitate
40+.	Pep Up Effect	Rf	Power/Impotency	Facilitate/Impede
41-.	Rigid Habits	sD	Persist/Change	Habit/Learning
42+.	Easy Going Enjoyment	Rf	Change/Persist	Learning/Rigidity
43-.	Metabolic Disorder	sD	Avoid/Approach	Power/Impotency
44+.	Fast Lane Living	Nd	Approach/Avoid	Power/Impotency
45-.	Hypoglycaemia	rf	Insensitive/Sensitive	Body/Mind
46+.	Allergy Stress	rf	Sensitive/Insensitive	Body/Mind
47-.	Physiologic Anxiety	rf	Power/Impotency	Body/Mind
48+.	Punitive Rewards	Rf	Bad/Good	Learning/Rigidity
49-.	Affect Avoidance	Nd	Sensitive/Insensitive	Ugly/Beauty
50+.	Sensitivity Control	Rf	Sensitive/Insensitive	Beauty/Ugly
51-.	Guilt Proneness	sD	Passive/Active	Power/Impotency
52+.	Anger, Hostility	Rf	Power/Impotency	Active/Passive
53-.	Somatic Depression	rf	Passive/Active	Body/Mind
54+.	Hungry Heart	Nd	Active/Passive	Mind/Body
55-.	Impaired Self Esteem	rf	Lose/Gain	Other/Self
56+.	Masked Disappointment	sD	Lose/Gain	Other/Self
57-.	Felt Rejection	rf	Separate/Together	Other/Self
58+.	Communication Need	Nd	Together/Separate	Other/Self
59-.	Calm Nerves Need	Nd	Avoid/Approach	Pain/Pleasure
60+.	Substance Excitement	Nd	Approach/Avoid	Up/Down
61-.	Forget Failures	Nd	Lose/Gain	Failure/Success
62+.	Different Experience	Nd	Gain/Lose	Change/Persist
63-.	Avoid Depression	Rf	Avoid/Approach	Passive/Active
64+.	Assert Confidence	Nd	Approach/Avoid	Active/Passive

65-. Avoid Attractiveness	rf	Avoid/Approach	Beauty/Ugliness
66-. Impaired Sleep	sD	Impair/Facilitate	Sleep/Awake
67+. Relaxation Need	Nd	Facilitate/Impair	Calmness/Tension
68+. Substance Dependency	Nd	Passive/Active	Self/Other

At this point in time it is hard to be sure whether the motivation labels or the verb-and-object dimension combinations were picked first. We suppose that the left- and right-hand concepts were selected more or less together from the lists of motivators and verb-object dimensions. We do know that the planned test was given a name while we were creating the above listing. We called it the Dimensional Addicauis Questionnaire or the DAQ to represent its probable relevance to addictions (see later).

There were 68 axes or scales on which we planned to measure motivations for our present purposes. The next question we had to address was that of the number of items (questions) to be used to obtain a measure of each motivation. We knew that sixteen items would likely be the optimal number of correlated questions to obtain good measures of each. However, 16 items for each of 68 scales, or a total of 1088 questions, would make excessive demands on the patience and persistence of our respondents -- whoever they might be. We tried 8-item scales, but they were a little too unreliable to suit us. Finally, we decided that we would use 12-item scales, or a total of 816 test questions.

Next, we realized that in responding to test questions, people tend to reflect in such a way that they reference self-talk and

images of themselves in relevant situations. We knew that some self-talk is concerned with rational thought, while some concerns emotional or affective associations. We decided that half of the items in each of the 68 scales/axes should be formulated in cognitive (thoughtful, rational) terms, and half in affective (emotional) terms. Also, we knew that the imagery of some people was primarily visual in nature, for others it was auditory, and for others it involved kinaesthetic-movement. In order to ensure that no special group of people was advantaged or disadvantaged in expressing themselves in the test, the questions of each scale ought to be constructed in three groups such that an equal number of items in each was formulated with visual, auditory and kinaesthetic imagery. Accordingly, four items would be written to represent imagery in each of the three sensory modalities.

As a result of this intention to counter-balance cognitive and affective elements and visual, auditory and kinaesthetic elements in each scale's items, a kind of format for writing items was adopted. The twelve items for each of the 68 scales or axes were written to match the formula presented below.

Item Composition. Formula used for the items of each axis.

<u>Item Number</u>	<u>Verb: 1st Polar Concept</u>	<u>Object: 2nd Polar Concept</u>	<u>Processing</u>	<u>Sense Modality</u>	<u>Response</u>
<u>Subject</u>	<u>Pole</u>	<u>Pole</u>			
v	v	v	v	v	v
1. 'I'	Dimension X+(verb)	Dimension Y-(object)	Cognitive	Visual	0 1 2 3 4
2. 'I'	Dimension X+(verb)	Dimension Y-(object)	Cognitive	Auditory	0 1 2 3 4
3. 'I'	Dimension X+(verb)	Dimension Y-(object)	Cognitive	Kinesth.	0 1 2 3 4

4.	'I'	Dimension X-(verb)	Dimension Y+(object)	Cognitive	Visual	0	1	2	3	4
5.	'I'	Dimension X-(verb)	Dimension Y+(object)	Cognitive	Auditory	0	1	2	3	4
6.	'I'	Dimension X-(verb)	Dimension Y+(object)	Cognitive	Kinesth.	0	1	2	3	4
7.	'I'	Dimension X-(verb)	Dimension Y+(object)	Emotional	Visual	0	1	2	3	4
8.	'I'	Dimension X-(verb)	Dimension Y+(object)	Emotional	Auditory	0	1	2	3	4
9.	'I'	Dimension X-(verb)	Dimension Y+(object)	Emotional	Kinesth.	0	1	2	3	4
10.	'I'	Dimension X+(verb)	Dimension Y-(object)	Emotional	Visual	0	1	2	3	4
11.	'I'	Dimension X+(verb)	Dimension Y-(object)	Emotional	Auditory	0	1	2	3	4
12.	'I'	Dimension X+(verb)	Dimension Y-(object)	Emotional	Kinesth.	0	1	2	3	4

That is, each of the 12 items for each scale or variable would start with the personal pronoun ('I'), continue with a verb based on the first (X) of two dimensions (polar concepts) to be used for the scale, and conclude with an object based on the second (Y) dimension to be used for that variable. The two poles of each dimension (represented by the '+' or '-' following the X or Y) would be counterbalanced in groups of three, but tending in opposite directions with respect to each other to represent the probability that 'conflict' would be part of distress-relevant variables. The first six items of each scale would be expressed in 'cognitive' (C) terms, while the last six would be expressed in 'affective' or emotional (E) terms. In addition, visual (V), auditory (A) and kinaesthetic (K) imagery would be woven into item contents in rotating order. Finally, the response options 0 to 4 would be used for every item.

For example, the first item of the test's first axis is:

"I avoid being noticed in social groups if I can.            0 1 2 3 4"

It begins with the personal pronoun. It expresses avoidance of an aspect of social involvement, and implicitly indicates approach to self-involvement -- the two dimensional concepts' poles. It does not imply much emotion, but rather a kind of cognitive choice. As the first item for an axis, it focuses on the visual modality -- i.e., "... noticed ...". And it offers five response alternatives.

With this much constraint imposed on the writing of each item, it is hardly surprising that the items almost 'wrote themselves'. Obviously, items written to a formula in this way would run the risk of being boring and repetitive. Some variation was afforded by the use of the two poles of each dimension, which were also employed in a counter-balanced fashion (see the + and - signs). In addition, for the sake of maintaining interest, an attempt was made to vary the apparent nature and content of each item slightly without putting aside the 'formula'.

Finally, separate scales or axes were written to express the two poles of each dimensional concept (+ or - following the item number). Thus, the first axis or scale (12 items) uses the dimensions of Avoid-Social, and thus seems to represent social anxiety. The second axis or scale (12 items) uses the dimensions or poles of Avoid-Self, and thus seems to represent social enjoyment -- even if in a somewhat negative or by-default sense.

Although these features define how the test's items were written, they do not complete the task of test construction. We wanted to get from our respondents all the information we could that might be relevant to the issues we wanted to address in our



study. Consequently, we appended three pages to each test form.

The first page sought to discover the opinions of respondents concerning the 'final' (purposes, needs), 'perpetuating' (skills, (reinforcers) and 'initial' causes underlying their conduct in the area of inquiry. If the area of inquiry involved disturbances of the peace, we wanted their views of why they had been involved in any such disturbances; if the area of inquiry involved addictions, we wanted their views about the (initial) causes, and the (perpetuating) effects (that might imply needs or purposes) of their addictive behaviours in various areas of addiction. This page should allow us to infer the respondent's causal thinking.

The second appended page provided instructions for the final page, indicating how ratings to be requested of respondents should be 'anchored' so they would be meaningful and comparable. The final appended page listed all sorts of indicator or target actions that might be involved in the area of inquiry, and asked for ratings of prior involvements in each. If the area of inquiry was disturbances of the peace, various types of such disturbances would be listed; if the area of inquiry was addiction, a sampling of the various types of addictive substances would be listed. Each of the respondents was asked to indicate personal involvement or use of each listed category, duration of time (Years) over which use or involvement had occurred, anchored ratings indicating the strength or intensity (Use) of involvement or use, time since last involved or used (Off), and present rated (anchored) strength or intensity of desires (Want) for involvement or use. We intended to use these

items of information as parts of our 'dependent' or criterion variables by means of which we might be able to evaluate the psychometric properties of the test's scales or axes.

We are sorry for inflicting all the foregoing detail on you. Our purpose was to let you know that the DAQ test we constructed was not thrown together in a haphazard way, but was carefully designed to ensure that any measures we obtained would be fairly stable. This seemed necessary since we were trying to measure motivational properties of people that are notoriously variable, as well as subject to fluctuations over time. Also, in describing how the test was developed, we wanted to communicate just how seriously we take the whole issue of motivation, especially as it bears upon distress or disturbances of the peace.

#### Indicators of disrupted motivations

Why did we expend all this attention on lists of motivators and on whether or not they are represented in conscious awareness? In considering how we might investigate motivations and their relevance to peacelessness, we concluded at once that it would be both impractical and unacceptable to start a war just to permit us to experiment with its instigation and prevention. We had to find another existing issue as the target of our experiments.

In volume I we selected crime (intra-communal disruption) as the experimental target for our main studies. This selection seemed to us to be a practical and a useful target for our work. Besides, it seemed to us that crime represents a behavioural strategy used by some people to solve personal problems. As such,

it might be a suitable target for cognitive and problem-solving attempts at its understanding and modification. As a target of investigation, it had the advantages of being objectifiable (both before study and in follow-up), of inherent importance (in its societal effects) and of being at an ideal level of analysis (less global than warfare, and yet more general than the personal or inter-personal levels of analysis). We knew we would have to develop such information and method if we were to hope to make a meaningful presentation about peace.

In volume II we were faced with the same kinds of problems. We needed to find a target for experimentation having similar characteristics to crime as those mentioned in the last paragraph. But it would be necessary to find a target where disturbances of motivation seemed the central issues to be addressed. The targets we considered included emotional distress, pain, compulsive acts, autonomic or auto-immune disorders and political activism. We would have liked to focus on political activism. However, we knew that such a target would create more political havoc for us than we could hope to create for it. Besides it suffered from all the limitations of the other targets we considered. We would have a hard time finding sufficient numbers for study in any one place of political activists, emotionally disturbed people, people in pain, compulsives, or people suffering from autonomic or immune system disorders. And we would have no way to follow-up on intervention effects in our subjects after we had done our work in investigation and modification. We felt we had to seek another kind of target.

Fortunately, another group of people was available to us that existed in large numbers, could be identified fairly reliably, could be followed-up at least indirectly, and were subject to a socially important disorder, at a similar level of generality to that of crime. The target we selected was chemical addiction. We had access to large numbers of addicts who were also criminal offenders. Although their addictions could not conveniently be followed-up after our work, since many elements of their addictions interacted meaningfully with their criminal behaviour, we could use their subsequent criminal behaviour as a means indirectly to assess what had happened to their addictive behaviour. Some had been convicted of substance abuses as at least some of their offenses. Some had been convicted because of their involvements in dealing in substances or in support of their addictions. And some had been convicted of offenses fostered by, or disinhibited because of, the substances they were abusing.

Tactically, substance abuse or addiction seemed to be an admirable target for our investigations. Moreover, the compulsive nature of chemical addictions suggested to us that substance abuse was likely to represent a disturbance of motivations rather than a strategic or problem-solving issue. Of course, we were not sure that the motivations contributing to chemical dependencies would be the same as those contributing to disturbances of the peace at any of its levels (inter-national, intra-communal, inter-personal or intra-personal). That might seem a very real limitation affecting our selection of addictions as the target for our studies. Still,

as in volume I, we were NOT seeking to identify and modify ALL of the motivational variables disturbing or fostering peace. We were prepared to be satisfied with identifying and modifying a sample of such motivations, partly for illustrative purposes, and partly to address at least a few of the motivational factors that might contribute to peace and peacelessness. Besides, the approach to our task that we had adopted (see the foregoing sections of this chapter) seemed to obviate the need for concern with this limiting issue. The identification and modification (if possible) of disturbed motivations in addictions ought to represent ways to address motivations of any kind affecting peace.

By way of summary, in the foregoing we have tried to address some of the issues affecting motivations (needs/purposes/final-causes and reinforcers/skills/perpetuating-causes) that seemed important to us in our attempts to analyze motivation. We used conventional sources for listing motivators/drivers, and then set out to find ways to express them in words so that they could be subjected to measurement-observation. Having selected the kinds of words that seemed most relevant to revealing motivations, we constructed a test to measure each composed of the kinds of words we had selected. We reported in considerable detail the nature and characteristics of the test we constructed, including its motivation labels, the dimensions used to measure each, and the formula employed for writing items to counter-balance in each scale cognitive and emotional, as well as visual, auditory and kinaesthetic elements. Finally, we set about the task of selecting

a suitable indicator of peacelessness for our demonstration investigations of disturbances of the peace. The indicator we selected, based on several practical and meaningful criteria, was chemical abuse or addictions.

### Chapter 3

#### Creating Warfare

We all contribute at every moment of every day to the creation of warfare. It really doesn't matter how righteous and peaceful are our intentions. Unintentionally and automatically we create war in the ways in which we think and formulate our actions. These outrageous and outlandish statements are one of the startling discoveries we made as we began to examine and sort out the factors operating within the criminal offenders with whom we each worked for over twenty years. We began to reach these conclusions as we studied our offenders. That was shocking enough for us and, as we hinted in volume I, assimilation of this kind of intelligence cost us a great deal in time and pain. But then we began to notice that our co-workers, first in the usual formal correctional activities, and then in the supporting professions, were doing the same kinds

of warful activities and communications (although often in a different form) as the offenders. Finally, to our horror, we discovered that we too were creating warfare daily in what we did.

At first, when we began to realize that we too were doing and saying the same kinds of things to create warfare, we felt a deep sense of shame. We clawed our way out of that set of feelings by recognizing our all-too-human failure to be aware of what we were doing. But that left us feeling just plain stupid. Surely, with all our training and experience, which ought to have placed us at the pinnacle of knowledge concerning humans and their behaviours, we ought to have seen years ago what we were doing. Why we didn't is the topic we want to address in this chapter. Let's put that in a slightly more positive form. The topic of this chapter is how we all set out to create warfare every day of our lives.

One way we create warfare is really quite obvious. As we were at some pains to point out in volume I, politicians not only declare wars, they construct prohibitive laws that actually foster opposition, lawlessness and warfare within and between people. But that's just politicians with their corrupt ways, right? Wrong. It applies to all of us. We do the same thing in at least two ways. First, we exhort all those with whom we are in contact 'not to do ... this or that.' 'Don't do it that way.' 'Don't do that.' 'Lower your voice.' 'Speak slower.' 'Be nice.' A host of exhortations like these consume our human interactions. Second, we oppose faulty positions of others. While this is being written, the local school teachers are out on an 'unlawful strike' to try to

force the local government to modify a law it is about to enact to regulate local educational processes. The government is making war on previously operating notions about how education is undertaken, funded and the like; and the teachers are exercising the political attempt to make war on the government for doing what they consider their rightful prerogative. Of course, the political clamour, which is part of the present moment's warfare here, is augmented by the political posturing of the government as it claims support from the majority of its electorate, and of other unions, parent groups and students offering or rejecting support for the initiatives being taken by the teachers. It really doesn't matter much which political initiatives and counter-pressures are being noised in the media and on the streets at any given time. Each really does contribute to warfare. And each of us, regardless of our silent or noisy participation in (or even awareness of) a warful initiative, contributes daily to such warfulness.

Are we are suggesting that we ought to cease to be involved in such political or warful initiatives? We are not. We all have opinions, positions, personal needs and agendas, and a host of other pressures to which we can hardly fail to respond. All we are saying is that each time any one of us, citizen or politician, friend or enemy, litigant or lawyer, takes a position, he or she is creating and maintaining warfulness. And we all do it, every day. The only reason at this moment for making this point is to help us each to acknowledge his or her personal participation in this really quite obvious way we all create warfare.



We don't know about you, but this first observation that we made about ourselves took a bit of 'chewing' time before we could get used to it. In principle, we didn't like to acknowledge that we were active participants in war-mongering. It offended our self-images and our wish to feel virtuous. And we felt even more acutely upset when we extended this bit of intelligence about ourselves to include our position-taking concerning our most virtuous and self-righteous initiatives. The war-mongering in common position-taking applies just as much to our attitudes and approaches to preserving our environments, to preventing crime and addictiveness, and to trying to stop our children and ourselves from doing dangerous things like smoking cigarettes or crossing the street without sufficient caution. What unspeakable war-mongering bounders we turned out to be! But also how human, how right-headed and how intuitively correct we are!

Still, that's the end of our personal contributions to creating warfare, right? Wrong. It's only the beginning. But perhaps we don't vote -- to give one person more political power than another. Perhaps we reject pay-raises offered us -- that might give us a sense of competitive superiority over others. Perhaps we don't praise or reward our children for relatively good grades in school or athletic or pulchritudinous accomplishments that exceed those of others. Perhaps we always yield space in traffic for others to get ahead of us, or fail to pass anybody who is driving at the speed limit. Perhaps we always 'yield the floor' to others when they wish to speak, or fail to push our own

positions in discussions. Perhaps we never blame others for our distress or other feelings ('You statements'), or find fault with (criticize) others. Perhaps we only find the good in others and are always nice (and phoney) to others.

But then perhaps we're being much too hard on ourselves and everyone else in all these observations. Let's be clear about what we are saying here. If the above (not-done) things refer to sins, faults or human frailties (of action or of thought), then we, Doug and Reg, are possessed of them all, and in spades. And if you are free of any one of them, you are not only more saintly and more righteous than anybody either of us has ever met, you also merit being locked away in a museum of human-superlatives-of-immense-note -- if such a museum exists. We human beings do create warfare. And we do it all day, every day.

At this point you must be thinking that our purpose here is to make us all feel like bad folk who are doing things we ourselves disapprove. That was not our purpose. Our purpose was merely to draw attention to behaviour in which we all participate -- with the hope that each of us will be able to accept ideas against which we ordinarily defend ourselves or that we reject out of hand. Recall that in volume I we suggested that 'acceptance' of ourselves and others is an important step in the pursuit of peace. We have to do that too. And it was to illustrate some of what we have to accept in ourselves that we entered this part of the presentation.

OK, so why are we disinclined to be aware of our own daily contributions to warfulness? There are several types of answers,

at various levels of functioning, that might be addressed. Since this chapter is concerned with (international) peace (or war), we will restrict ourselves here to a specific group of factors.

The most surface factor involved is our beliefs. Beliefs have very little to do with fact or evidence -- the reasons we usually tend to think govern our beliefs. Beliefs emerge from our daily participation in various kinds of groups. We are all involved in 'cliques'. We are more inclined to say we all have friends -- same thing. We spend time with those we like and want to be with. If others try to 'horn in' on our time with our friends, we are apt to feel a bit 'put out', even annoyed. A group of friends (i.e., two or more people) tends to be 'exclusive', keeping others at arm's length to a greater or lesser extent. Those excluded form 'the out-group'. The in-group adopts common attitudes, points of view and values, which are usually deemed not-to-be-shared by those in the out-group.

This adoption of common beliefs comes about by any valued or 'central' member expressing a point of view or an idea with which others agree, and later re-express or regurgitate. Each person in the group, whether specially-valued by the others or not, feels as though each commonly agreed idea or view is almost a required item of intelligence, essential in order to continue as a member of the clique. Note that the truth or factual character of the idea or view is not really at issue at first. At first, it is merely a matter demanding agreement in order to maintain clique membership. Later, however, since all the right-headed and good people (i.e.,

the members of our clique) hold the idea or view in common, it seems self-evident that it must be true. Note also that a clique might be comprised of peers (the usually construed type of clique), but it also might be comprised of a couple, or parent(s) and child(ren), or fellow employees, or teachers and students, or any other grouping of people -- including members of any given culture, race or nation.

Most beliefs are of this order, brought about from attitudes expressed and agreed in reference groups (cliques), and only later accepted as valid or correct. This is particularly true of beliefs concerning vile or poorly-tolerated qualities of other (out-group) people. These latter attitudes and beliefs tend to be held particularly immoderately and unremittingly because of the extra motivation derived from fear (and later from anger) lest out-group people might insinuate themselves into the in-group (clique). It might be recalled here that the avoidance gradient (especially near at hand -- at the outskirts of the in-group or clique) is stronger than the approach gradient (see volume I, chapter 2). The quality of 'belief' concerning attitudes toward out-group people, is enhanced or increased greatly by the accompanying emotional (fear or hatred) charge associated with the attitudes/beliefs involved.

It will be no surprise to anyone to encounter the idea that people's beliefs, especially those opposed to others not from one's reference group or clique, is an important element involved in warfulness. It might be a bit more surprising when we affirm that (a) beliefs have little or no basis in fact or truth, but only in

agreements within an in-group, (b) beliefs are continually afforded strength and reinforcement by being re-expressed and agreed within the membership of an in-group or clique, and (c) beliefs are held at a relatively conscious level (and thus re-referenced easily). The latter is because most people are members of several in-groups. Thus, discriminations concerning the 'appropriateness' (to this or that group) of expressing given beliefs have to be made repeatedly and consciously -- so we don't make a faux pas. Please note that none of these features of attitudes and beliefs has anything to do with any 'validation' other than in-group consensual validation -- that is, what other members of our groups happen to think or say.

The second most conscious factor that impairs our self-awareness of our warfulness has to do with the nature of language. Several features are involved here. Perhaps the strongest single factor is our use of 'negative format' statements ('Don't do'). We referred repeatedly to such statements in volume I. The relevance of negatively formatted statements to conflict and to opposition was remarked in that work. This relevance requires a slightly different handling here. Quite apart from the instigating effect on behaviour of a not-do instruction, just the use of not-do verbs in ordinary descriptive conversation has warful effects. To say, 'That thing is immobile', or 'I didn't go there', or 'He/She isn't happy', or even 'He/She isn't unhappy', all create a particular kind of conflict in the speaker and the listener.

Speaker and listener tend to feel a kind of challenge to react to the implicit 'lack' in the thing to which reference is made.

It's almost as though an immobile thing has to be mobilized, the denial that I was there implies I might have been there, the unhappiness or the lack of it ought in some way to be corrected toward happiness or toward unhappiness -- including the implicit demand on both speaker and listener to 'defend' themselves lest they be thought to be responsible for the 'lack'. The reader might think we're stretching it a bit to imply these action and defensive demands in such ordinary statements. It's possible that we are, but we don't think so. It might be useful to take our 'emotional pulse' when we deliver or receive negative format statements. The very least we are all apt to feel is an increased arousal -- as the avoidance gradient, as opposed to the approach gradient, is challenged. This effect will be encountered again when we are talking about how we create distress.

A much less conscious problem is encountered linguistically when we use nouns or nominalizations. Again, we have to take this matter in a slightly different direction than that mentioned in volume I (chapter 1). In that earlier discourse, we focused on the unreality and immobilizing effect of nouns. Here we need to focus on their underlying process of abstraction. Because the classes of events created to form nouns employ only a few salient qualities of each object, leaving others to vary, most things can be construed as belonging to a plurality of classes. Bessie might qualify as a cow, a Holstein, a domestic animal, a farm animal, a herbivore, a mammal and who knows what. A person might qualify as having a particular skin, eye and hair coloration, a range of height, girth

and weight, a given race, language, culture and religion, from a given family, and so on. While some might wish to argue that such qualities allow us to distinguish among members and identify given individuals, we are most interested here in both the support that such differences give to stereotypical and warful attitudes, and the resulting complexity of ideation concerning each individual we encounter and experience.

The support offered by such differences to stereotypical and warful attitudes has received comment in volume I under the role of differences in disharmony. All we would add now is the idea that such differences facilitate identification of others as out-group members as part of the means by which warful stereotypes and beliefs are fostered. Differences among people are not only differences between others, they are also apt to mark differences between 'them' (out-groups) and 'us' (in-group).

Complexity of ideation poses another pair of problems. If the differences at issue are subtle ones (e.g., medium skin tones), the 'task' of discrimination concerning the person is made difficult. The demand to make subtle discriminations among stimuli has long been recognized by psychologists as one method to increase arousal and distress -- thus increasing the emotional charge associated with any discriminative response that eventuates. That is, if the person is perceived as a member of an out-group, the negative emotional response is apt to be enhanced.

As conceptual complexity (number of possible identities for a given person or thing) increases, the person having the complex

ideation experiences both an increased demand for thought (to resolve the resulting ambiguity) and an associated (resulting) inhibition of action while thought is in progress. That is, conceptual complexity is characteristic of introversion with its associated inhibition of activity and its cognitive rigidity or difficulty in maintaining adaptability and flexibility. The cognitive rigidity arising from this source enhances the strength and unyielding nature of beliefs concerning out-group others. By itself, this would pose enough of a problem for peace.

However, the associated inhibition of activity adds an even greater and more subtle feature fostering warfulness. Inhibition arising from thought-related sources feels to the thoughtful person as though external restraints are being imposed upon him or her. The felt restraint can have two equally damaging effects from the perspective of peace. If the restraint is externalized, others are perceived as the source of inhibition, leading to anything from bitter resentment directed at the (out-group) other, to anger and rage seeking to 'break out' of the inhibition or to 'break down' the imagined external restraints. This is a main driver in war. If the constraint is merely felt as helplessness (in the face of an external restraining agent), the result is apt to be a kind of (in-) group depression. If this happens, the effect is almost more dangerous. The felt restraint is less likely to be reacted to with individual frustration or rage, and more likely to be shared among in-group members as 'blaming' or complaints directed at out-group members. This 'sharing' of resentments grows insidiously and



slowly consolidating in-group ferment that can eventually erupt in group 'retaliation' -- commonly called war.

Finally in this connection, abstract nouns also serve as parts of our self-definitions. Yes, words do trigger off emotional and motivational states. And if the words are nouns, they tend to perpetuate the emotional states they evoke. If I am angry, the emotion tends to be current and short-lived. If I am an angry person, the emotion is readily re-referenced and is made to seem relatively continuous. Also, self-definition is a strong source of perceptual filters. Not only do I feel the identifying emotion easily, I am also unlikely to notice contradictory feelings.

Another linguistic factor fostering warfulness is that we often tend to obscure our intentions by asking the wrong questions. In Nazi Germany, a common question apparently asked was, 'Who is responsible for our common economic disadvantage and our national disgrace?' Quite apart from the fact that the question is asked in a dually presumptive way (i.e., the 'conditions are as specified, and there is somebody else responsible for it), the pursuit of responsibility and the attempt to allocate blame is involved -- a common trait in most people and cultures. Such a pursuit and attempt is never appropriate. Effectively, we are all responsible for everything that happens in our lives. Of course, we are also causes in the lives of everyone else -- in what we did and what we failed to do, and in our parts in the causality of everything in the universe. Every event since the 'big bang' has caused every other event that followed it. To isolate one person or group as

responsible for anything is merely to find a 'scapegoat'.

And we compound our errors by repeatedly asking the question 'why?' Why, by its nature, is an unanswerable question. It seems to ask for initial causes (i.e., everything that happened since the universe began), but it confuses by really asking a question of purpose or motivation (nearly always inscrutable). While 'what' and 'how' are probably answerable questions, our common 'why' question is not. And the difficulty in answering it when it is asked, or the multiple answers it breeds, just add to our collective sense that the question was an important one, and that our answers are important (and contribute to warfulness).

But there are more subtle mistaken questions with which we afflict ourselves. Questions are a kind of behaviour -- in this case, verbal or cognitive behaviour. Our actions are governed by our purposes and values. If our purposes include the need for self-importance, for example, we are apt to ask ourselves and others questions in such a way that the answer tends to demean others. We will encounter this matter of purposes and needs later under creating distress. If our values include reflexive (and also avoidance) ones, we are likely to ask questions about the failure of others to meet our needs, externalizing the responsibility for events in our own lives, and thus attributing to others control over our own lives and destinies -- by which we set ourselves up to scorn, blame and feel hostile toward others. The role of values (reflexive and avoidance) was partially addressed in volume I, and will receive more attention throughout this volume.

The third factor affecting our limited awareness of our role in warfulness has to do with our histories of conflict. Our common search for 'the causes' of those things that affect us in our histories is predicated upon our common tendency to understand 'the cause' of any event as the antecedent event(s) that regularly precede it. The error in this approach to causality was hinted in volume I and in the Introduction to this volume, and was discussed in chapter 1. There is probably limited relevance or use for any attention to history, other than to acquire from it information about the original sources of questions asked in a field of endeavour that might contribute to contemporary solutions.

Conflict received a fairly thorough coverage in volume I, chapter 2. Throughout volume I it was shown to bear directly on all the features that disturb peace. It requires additional comment here only because most of us are not aware of the range and role of conflict in ourselves. We tend to externalize our internal conflicts as though they had primary relevance to interactions between ourselves (our in-groups) and others (out-groups). That externalizes our personal responsibilities for internal conflicts and draws our attention away from them. We are not yet ready to 'expose' internal conflict to the 'light of day'. However, we might recall that conflict underlies warfulness, and that much of our conflict is internal and only partly available to awareness.

The fourth factor limiting conscious awareness of warfulness is concerned with the nature of human needs. We are all conscious of our needs. right? Wrong. At least we are rarely conscious of

the roles that some of our needs play in life and of the sources from which those needs are derived. We have addressed needs at length in chapter 2. However, we also have to remark here that to the extent that we are unaware of our needs, to that extent they have a kind of 'free reign' to disrupt peace and its pursuit insidiously and outside of our conscious control. We will expand later on the role of needs in forming primary factors governing constraints acting on us that, robbing us of freedom, help us to feel restrained, resentful, and to react in oppositional, rebellious and warful ways. Some of the roles of needs should become clear when we address motivations in addictions.

In this chapter, we have skimmed over some of the factors that contribute to warfare, and by means of which we create war. Most of the factors mentioned seem at first to have little bearing on the creation of warfare. It was for this reason that they had to be addressed here in brief. Although most of the factors mentioned are elaborated elsewhere in these two volumes on peace, it seemed important to illustrate their roles in human living, not only where they are elaborated, but also more globally in creating war.

As in volume I, it is our general contention that, aside from some limited effects from community sources (e.g., political and media systems that use and foster the internal factors described), the major bulk of factors involved in the creation of war lie within the individual, whether or not they are buried to obscure them from conscious awareness. We have tried in this chapter to draw in elements from other chapters to show some of the ways in

which each of us contributes to, or even creates, war.

Is this presentation intended to help us to create more war or to modify our warful activities? It is intended to foster neither purpose. Instead, it is intended both to make relatively conscious some of the factors within ourselves by means of which we all foster warfulness and, by acknowledging our own contributions to warfulness, to suggest that we can all benefit from 'accepting' ourselves and what we do in our very human ways. One problem creating warfulness is that we tend to be particularly poorly consciously attuned to our own motivations.

## Chapter 4

### Creating Crime

One might think that we had completed our understanding of crime in volume I. In that work we pointed out that the factors we considered might understandably account for up to about 67% of the variance of crime. There must be other factors 'external' to the individual, which also assist in the creation of crime. We want to devote a little time here to these other factors.

Addictions might be construed to be one of the other factors. In a sense they are. That is, the unlawful abuse of chemical substances, the societal provisions to make such substances available (pushers), the crimes they foster to support addictions and the disinhibiting effects of substances in fostering crimes, all make addictions relevant to crime. However, we will consider

addictions later in a separate chapter.

There are 'external' factors that contribute to crime as an aspect of warfulness. The kinds of factors we will consider here are politics, laws, enforcement methods, sanctions, exclusive acts, parenting, expectations and values. While some of these have been mentioned already in other contexts, particular aspects of each ought to receive specific attention as instigators or drivers of peacelessness in our daily creation of crime.

Politics are a focus around which several motivational elements creating crime tend to coalesce. If we seem unduly harsh in our comments about politics, we see ourselves as being really quite gentle and accepting of the crimes involved in politics and its issues. We noted in volume I that politics is inherently corrupt. By this we meant to communicate that our use of the term 'corruption' refers to the attempt to control anyone else. This is perhaps most clearly seen in political efforts to be elected in order to control others through enacted laws. Of course, how the individual politician acts (overtly or covertly) in performing his or her job provides a 'model' of public behaviour for the citizens. The 'model' presented by all politicians is one seeking to control others, and it seems to be approved (and participated in -- by voting) by society as a whole. This can be seen to justify for the citizenry the effort to control others, to exercise personal beliefs and wishes, and to acquire personal power over others. Of course, some will note that individuals (e.g., criminals) do not have to follow the models presented in politics. And, anyway, the

participation of the society in political enterprises marks their actions as acceptable -- in contrast to the acts of individual entrepreneurs. However, these features are surely parts of what permits or disinhibits criminal conduct of such entrepreneurs. And the permission and disinhibition afforded is not just rationalized. Modelling tends to occur at a barely conscious level in those most affected by it -- as Eysenck observed, crime is most likely to occur in extroverts, who tend to be relatively suggestible.

But that is only the beginning of the relevance of politics to crime. In a very human way, since they are likely to want to be re-elected, politicians are likely to find ways to explain anything that goes wrong politically in terms of the actions of people other than themselves. Externalizing the responsibility to others for any action is a particularly insidious source of crime. Criminals, like everyone else, want to think of themselves as 'good' people. Externalizing responsibility for events and their actions provides them (anyone) with a rationalization to avoid personal blame. One problem with a rationalization is that it is one of the main psychological means to disinhibit otherwise unacceptable behaviour. We will encounter this phenomenon again later in this chapter.

The models offered by politicians for individual conduct, in addition to fostering externalization and rationalization, include making it appear that the free exercise of personal beliefs and attitudes is acceptable conduct. If I believe that others, having no more rights to possessions than I do, have more than I have, I can freely exercise my rights to acquisition of possessions. If I

believe that others are less worthwhile, or less powerful, or less important than I am, I have the right to exercise control and even violence if they fail to do as I demand. And, if I notice that power is not equally shared by all members of society (politicians having a major share), it seems acceptable that I also demonstrate my power over others. Obviously, such beliefs or attitudes will predispose some to criminal conduct.

Some of the other relevances of politics to crime will be mentioned in what follows concerned with other factors, such as law and sanctions. For the present, it was our intention only to draw to conscious attention some of the drivers of crime that can be attributed to politics.

Laws, under codified law, are expressed in negative format terms. Many of the consequences of this fact were considered in volume I. Two additional related issues need to be mentioned here, namely, the focus and methods of law.

The focus of any negatively formatted law is upon failures to conform to lawful behaviour. By its nature, this kind of focus automatically prepares the practitioner (any citizen) to adopt a critical and fault-finding attitude toward an offender. That would be counter-productive enough as we suggested in volume I, but the damaging effects of this are much broader than just the critical attitude it evokes. The use of a blaming attitude sets one up to use aggressive 'You-statements', and sets up the respondent to act in defensive ways, opening the door to the adversarial approach in the courts that, almost more than any other thing, stimulates,



models and trains people in adversariality, opposition and war (and crime) in society at large. And blaming attitudes also make almost inevitable issues addressed below (see enforcement, sanction).

Having noted some of the issues involved, we would be derelict in our duty if we did not repeat the central role of the law, as such, in creating crime. Of course, the law defines the acts that will be deemed to be criminal. In this sense, laws can be said to be an initial cause of crime. But, by being expressed in negative format terms ('You shall not ...'), they also remind people what not-to-do and, even more importantly, create complexity of instructions such that some members of society experience great difficulty responding as demanded.

Let's say this a little differently than we said it in volume I. There are many people who have particular difficulty processing verbal (linguistic) instructions. These people are, for the most part, the sub-population from which criminal offenders are selected (or emerge). They have special difficulties in processing complex verbal formulations -- the best single example of which is any negatively formatted statement. They either 'do not hear' the negation part of the statement, or they react to it by responding to both of its parts -- doing and undoing the behaviour. We just cannot over-emphasize the importance and the destructive effects of negatively formatted ('Do not') statements.

It's all very well to try to show the limitations and difficulties of the law and its negatively formatted statements. But what alternatives are there, and how might they work? The

alternatives are legion. We cannot outline them all, or even a sample of them, here. What we might do is to illustrate briefly one alternative that has been tried at the correctional facility in which we worked for more than twenty years. It was no surprise to us that the Ontario Correctional Institute (O.C.I.) was selected by the American Correctional Association as the premier correctional facility in north America in 1997. To do any kind of justice to how the O.C.I. functions would require another set of volumes. But one particular example might illustrate how it works.

When the American Correctional Association award was being presented at the O.C.I., the (now retired) deputy superintendent responsible to coordinate treatment activities performed his role as the institution's administrative staff had always performed their duties. He went around to all the institution's living units and offices, thanking all the staff he could find for their roles and contributions in achieving the A.C.A. award. In doing this, he was carrying out the approach adopted by all staff in the Institute in recognizing and appreciating (and modelling) in a positive manner the positive contributions of all staff (maintenance and correctional to professional) to the pursuit and learning of positive life-styles on the part of the inmates.

The administrative staff, relating appropriately to the other staff, sought continuously to recognize and appreciate the efforts of all staff -- thus offering their staff a model for how best to relate to the inmates for whom they cared. Of course, the inmates also had to see the staff as helpful, trustworthy and concerned

with their best interests -- if they were to benefit from the staff efforts. That was part of the task of the professional staff. As senior members of the professional staff at the O.C.I., the authors tended to be viewed by inmates as being of central importance to their treatment. We spent much of our contact time with inmates helping them to understand and use the skills and roles of the exemplary line staff, especially of the superlative correctional officers. We often found ourselves weeping with pride and joy as we spoke of the highly competent and dedicated correctional staff -- who, as case managers, served as the primary change agents.

Enforcement methods seem to most of us to be comprised of any means that work, given that enforcement is required both by law and for the protection of the populace. Criminals are sometimes brutal and violent. It seems necessary to meet such behaviour with like enforcement behaviour. Indeed, let us state here that if violence is encountered, enforcement might well have to be at least as violent. However, there are a couple of flies in that ointment.

First, aggressive (especially violent) enforcement is apt to be met (also reciprocally) with aggressive or violent behaviour on the part of the criminal. We tend to think of the police as reacting to criminal behaviour. Criminals are people too, and they react as they anticipate or discover others act. It cuts both ways. We have worked all our professional lives with the most crazy and the most severely criminal offenders. We have never been attacked or treated in an aggressive or dangerous way by anyone, except a few epileptics (who did not know what they were doing at

the time). All we mean to communicate by this is that people tend to react more or less as they are treated. Criminal behaviour is less dangerous or violent when enforcement officers treat the people to whom they relate with respect and reserve. The more aggressive the police, the more violent the crime and the offender.

Second, police tend increasingly to function as a clique that maintains a psychological distance from other citizens. The police tend to argue that this is necessary in order to remain free from influence and subjective involvement with people upon whom they may be called to exercise enforcement measures. There is justification for this position. However, all the consequences of involvements in cliques flow from this self-induced social isolation of police.

Beliefs about the righteousness of police persons and their attitudes and the 'badness' of others who might be offenders, about the levels of aggressiveness required in enforcement, about the risks involved in 'trusting civilians', and about the need to be equipped and ready to dispense violence to meet expected or presumed violence in offenders, will all be fostered in such a clique. Of course, many will argue that experience proves such beliefs to be valid. It does. But this might be due to the pre-existing beliefs that fostered anticipatory behaviour from police in their handling of suspects and offenders. For example, self-righteousness almost automatically evokes from others (the non-righteous) a defensive, and often an angry or aggressive, response that seems to justify the need for the righteous to (re-) act violently. One rejoinder might be: 'Then let the un-righteous

become righteous, and there will be no problem.' But the self-righteousness of believer members of the enforcement clique extends itself to all who might eventually be un-righteous, and can be felt by all citizens in the social isolation of the police clique. And, righteous or not, the defensive reaction, with its attendant (probably unwarranted) guilt feelings, occurs to enhance violence if it ever erupts in the given citizen.

The above will be viewed by many as an exaggeration of the size of the effects (if any) of clique behaviour on the part of enforcement officers. The size of the effects implied is actually much greater than we have suggested. Zimbardo, a researcher at Stanford University decided to explore the effects of role playing on the behaviour of two defined groups or 'cliques'. He built wooden cells in the basement of a Psychology department building. He advertised for student volunteers who would be paid to live there for a while playing pre-defined roles. Some of the volunteers were designated as 'prisoners' and put in the cells. They were looked after by another group, designated as 'guards'. This harmless and entertaining game turned out to be a nightmare. The 'prisoners', playing out their roles within their cells, became subservient and passive -- essentially automatically, without coaching. Apparently in response to these qualities of the 'prisoners', the 'guards' became exacting, domineering and mildly sadistic. In this simple, temporary and artificial setting, the two groups (known to be fellow students) became polarized, and both began to suffer immense strain. Zimbardo had to cancel the whole

experiment prematurely because of the high level of disturbance manifested amazingly early in the volunteer subjects. The ways we interact with one another impacts immensely powerfully on us all.

Any statement of negatively formatted laws tends automatically to create profound reliance on 'black-and-white', or stereotypical thinking. This is inevitable since the law enforced has only two options -- unlawful and other conduct. The effect of such polarization of thought is to increase the emotional intensity concerning the behaviour in question (and thus blindness to any other points of view) and to enhance rigidity of moralistic attitudes concerning unlawful conduct and the righteousness of the resulting two poles of people within society. Rigidification of attitudes and beliefs tends to be enhanced by the associated emotionality, creating fervent beliefs that simply ignore, or cannot even consider, alternative formulations about anything. We probably do not need to provide extended illustrations of this phenomenon as it applies to law enforcement ('law and order' morality), the practice of the law (the importance of which in lawyers' eyes is attested to by the unconscionable fees charged) or the courts (that simply assume that their business is important enough to take precedence over anything else ongoing in society). We do believe that such all-or-none thinking enhances warfulness in society greatly. For example, do encounters with the presumptuous attitudes of practitioners of the law madden you to the point of evoking crime? One of us is maddened by such encounters almost to the point of assault.

Sanctions for crime certainly create crime. Of course, the common view is that sanctions are required in order to enforce the law. We all fail to notice the implicit assumption in that sort of statement, namely that laws or their enforcements are necessary. This attitude is stated in a form similar to: 'How can you stop beating your wife?' The statement assumes you have a wife and that you beat her.

Quite apart from the necessity of laws and their enforcement, sanctions deserve special attention. First, no satisfactory evidence exists that sanctions achieve what they are supposed in law to achieve. If anything, sanctions might increase the anger and future crime of the offender. They do not seem to deter either the offender or other citizenry who might subsequently perform that or other offenses. The punishment meted out might feel justified to the victim, but does nothing to allay the victim's suffering -- although it may seem to justify the efforts of the virtuous people working at the court to enforce justice by retribution. Second, sanctions tend to afford public evidence that the offender has been defined-out or excluded from belonging in society. This affords the offender a concrete self-definition that tends to perpetuate his or her identity (and activity) as an 'out-law'. Third, by being punitive in nature, sanctions make it possible for the righteous in society to model for the offender 'the right' way to act, namely, by punitive retribution. Everybody does the best he or she can, and sees him or her self as a 'good person'. Thus others retributive sanctions are undeserved violence, which ought

(by precept and model) to be reacted to punitively with equivalent retributions. Sanctions teach offenders to act offensively. Fourth, some sanctions are unlawful, and justify unlawful conduct of an entrepreneurial type. Capital punishment serializes murder, and justifies it -- since the state considers it to be acceptable behaviour that it practises. Incarceration affords the offender time to think about what is happening to him/her. Since what has happened is kidnap and confinement, along with accessory brutality, the state communicates that kidnapping, confinement and brutality are acceptable, even socially desirable, forms of conduct that probably should be practised in the future. Sanctions seem quite clearly to help us to create crime.

Exclusive acts create cliques with their conflictful consequences. They are involved in designating some people as offenders, 'bad people' or out-group members (out-casts, out-laws) and assigning sanctions to them. And they rob us of the benefits of others' ideas and points of view -- especially from those likely to have fresh, new and inventive views, given that they are out-group people. By excluding anyone from anything, we formally request that he or she be at war with us. We place that person in an 'out-group' that only has meaning if it is in some kind of conflict with the 'we' of the 'in-group'. Of course, that is precisely why we act in excluding ways -- to create war with those we dislike or about whom 'bad' things are expressed in our group. We make war on crime. So, if that is our purpose, why bother to point out the obvious? There is a kind of a reason, beyond merely



making our own conduct conscious so we can accept it.

The truth is that in any war the conflict involved is within us as participating individuals. The discrimination between the in- and out-group is an internal and personal discrimination -- even although it might be shared with others. The exclusiveness of one group with respect to another is a personal and internal exclusion -- that attributes absolutely imaginary (stereotypical) characteristics to the members of the in- and out-groups. The sanctions favouring one group in contrast to the other are experienced every moment and only by the individual person who discriminates (others of the in- or out-groups imagine different sanctions) -- even if 'real' sanctions are sometimes meted out to given out-group people. We ourselves suffer (and feel as if we enjoy) the consequences of exclusiveness, and we lose the benefits that might accrue to inclusion of 'different' others.

Parenting was explicitly excluded in volume I as a cause underlying crime or any other kind of warfulness. Why are we now re-visiting parenting? There are two reasons that almost reduce to one. First, all parenting is good, helpful and healthy parenting. It is true that all parenting people behave in non-parent ways from time to time. After all, parents are not just parents. They are also workers, sleepers, eaters, lusters, entertainees, friends to their friends with a host of other identities. When they are being these other kinds of people, they often are NOT being parents. They are also being non-parents -- sometimes having assigned others (e.g., baby-sitters) to the parenting role. While parents are

being parents, whether by feeding, cleaning, clothing, talking with, admonishing, teaching or just being near their children, their parenting activity is 'good' and desirable activity. It fosters survival and the good in their children -- and even in their children's children.

And yet some offenders and other perpetrators of warfulness complain that their parents did not love them, did not care for them, or failed in innumerable other ways. How does this happen? Partly, of course, it seeks the causes for contemporary misdeeds and characterological faults in the early (initial cause) history of the complainant -- seeking evidences of failures on the part of others, most often the parenting ones. Partly, too, complainants making such claims make an error of understanding and expectation. They assume that parents were nothing but their parents, and thus ought to have been constantly attentive and supportive to them at the expense of doing anything else. In addition, such complainants tend to assume that punishments inflicted, disapproval evidenced, admonishments delivered and controls exercised, being in conflict with the desires or early habits of the complainant, were wrong, harsh, non-loving and non-parenting acts. That is, complainants tend to view parental behaviour through the eyes and frustrations of the child, uncorrected by adult experience and understanding.

While these kinds of parental behaviours are nearly always motivated by love and the desire for the best for the child, they also do breed conflict within children. And, predicated as they are on negative format (avoidant, preventing) communications, the

conflicts bred in children do tend to foster crime and warfulness in the long-run, if they seem to predominate or if they preoccupy the thought of the child-becoming-an-adult. The trick in being a parent seems to involve an over-abundance of positive and supporting utterances over critical, evaluative or negative-format communications, while seeking minor positive and growth-related elements to recognize and support. And most parents try to do that, even if their own training and experience, or personal habits, predispose them to critical and fault-finding behaviour.

Second, since all parents try to support the growth of their children in the best ways they know how, all parenting is 'good' parenting. The only problem with it is that there might not have been enough of it to foster the psycho-social growth of the child. One of the basic principles used at the Ontario Correctional Institute (O.C.I.) is that all the staff, and particularly the assigned correctional officer/case manager, are to function as 'good parents' for each offender. It was hoped that this would supplement the 'amount' of (good) parenting received by the offender -- thus fostering psychological and moral reasoning growth and pro-social behaviours for present and later involvements in the person's communities. Application of this principle seems to have been responsible for diminishing criminal recidivism rates among our inmates (compared with similar inmates incarcerated in other facilities) from 60% to 65% down to 40% to 45% (averaging about an overall 17% reduction) as determined in repeated follow-up studies over the years. Any supplemental or incidental positive human

interactions we can afford to others will likely diminish the risks of conflict and warfulness.

Expectations always present us with conflict. Let's face it, events in the 'real' world are never as horrible as those we anticipate, and are never as fortunate and rewarding as we hope they will be in our fantasy lives. The 'real' world of imagination seldom corresponds to, and is nearly always subject to extremes more than, the 'real' world of events outside ourselves. The conflicts involved in (positive or negative) expectations are entirely 'within' us, and create some of our most warful elements.

The single most malignant 'external' source of conflictful expectations is certainly the media, and especially television. The media collect, for exclusive presentation, all the dangerous, horrible and vile things that happen throughout the world -- called 'newsworthy' or 'sensational'. These events, presented in the 'news', are richly supplemented in 'entertainment' sections with every possible imagined violence, horror and vileness, presented almost as though the perpetrators were heroes or models of courageous and desirable conduct. Is it any wonder that most people believe that the world around them is replete with dangers and terrifying monsters? Of course, it is not. It only seems to be by 'virtue' of the predominance of such images in the media.

Similarly, in the news and entertainment media, the people depicted are either presented as non-human or very 'different' from the rest of us (subject to devastation and famine) or, more often, possessed of immense wealth allowing them to pursue whatever

entertaining things they want. It is as though a majority of the world with which we identify is advantaged far beyond the few of us that each of us knows, and particularly beyond we ourselves. The contrast between our lives and those of the people depicted in the media is made sharply, and sets us all up to expect that 'in reality' (really in fantasy) we 'ought' to be able to expect to receive our imagined equivalent share without doing anything much to earn it. The conflict within us, bred from this frustrating set of life-style expectations, has tended to increase our readiness for crime and other warfare, and might actually have created some crime and war that is motivated by avarice and money -- probably for the first time in history. The media are purveyors of genuinely hazardous products that, surely (if anything ought to be), ought to be subjected to stringent regulations and licensing limiting employment in the media to personnel who have demonstrated high levels of relevant education and ethical responsibility.

Values are the most general drivers or motivators for any kind of behaviour in all of us. But values are also manifested and learned from sources external to ourselves. Of course, other people exercise and evidence their values, and those values are constantly influencing all of us, just as our values influence others. However, values are also common within groups (out- or in-groups), communities and whole cultures. Largely under the impress of international media (heavily laced from American sources) and the manifest wealth and successes of the United States, the values that seem to be common (or at least are presented in the media as

common) to the American culture are being in-trained into various other cultures and nations of the world. When these values are those supporting democratic politics, perhaps entrepreneurial economics (only one aspect of capitalism), and proper concern with human rights and consideration for others, who would want to argue with the spread of such values. However, when the values spreading and proliferating themselves worldwide are those supporting crime, violence and communal terrorism (presented and apparently approved and rewarded in the media), genderist, racial and cultural violence and discrimination (promulgated by the media), propaganda favouring family break-down, divorce and childlessness, approval of some in-groups and disparagement of some out-groups, and continuities of between-community hatreds (implied in media contents and viewpoints). then the message we Americans are sending out is replete with warfulness and the creation of crime. And, by supporting such media with our attention, product purchases and other indicators of interest, we each, individually, foster international and intra-communal warfare and crime. The values implied in what we in any way support are being taught to others every day and everywhere.

Is it any wonder that we all and each create warfare and crime in what we do each and every day? And we do it by ourselves and to ourselves, whether or not we are aware of what we are doing. We believe that each of us ought at least to be conscious of what we are doing to foster and create crime and war, and how we are creating it, including where possible awareness of our underlying motivations in what we do.

## Chapter 5

### Creating Disharmony

So, we all create warfare and crime. But other people create disharmony, right? Of course, to other people, we are the other people who create disharmony. That can't be right. We are such kind, considerate, loving, tender and generous people that others automatically like us. Oh, sure, there are those few others who don't like us. But that's because they are such hateful, mean and critical people in their dealings with everybody. They are hardly worthy of attention and thought, since they will never change. To the extent that we resonate with the foregoing, we are war-mongers. We have just said the very kinds of things that justify and foster war. We have defined the large in-group, and the small out-group -- which is somehow foreign to our way of life and, being at a psychological distance from us, seems small in number and

vulnerable (easy to 'beat').

The approach we adopt to inter-personal relationships always amounts to a microcosm of our approaches to intra-communal and international beliefs, attitudes and actions. How we relate to the wider world around us will be seen in how we relate to one another. How much do we know about people from other states, from other countries or from other cultures? If we answer that question by referencing qualities of the people in other states, countries or cultures, it is almost certain that we are reacting stereotypically and displaying little real interest or knowledge in those others. What follows is a little exercise in peace-making to replace the warfulness of our standard stereotypes and other 'distancing' techniques that foster warfulness.

The exercise we suggest is to select another area of the world that we have never visited -- whether state, country or culture. Forgetting about what we happen to think about that place and its people, start by examining a map of the area in careful and extended detail. Find its major cities, its towns and its villages. Track the communications (roads, railways, flights) between these population centres. Look at the terrain on a relief map, first through which the communication links pass, and then on which rural people live. Try to recall similar kinds of topography and communications, urban centres and rural areas in places with which we are familiar. In imagination, breathe life and familiar feelings into the landscape and the population centres. Then find pictures of cities and villages, of representative group-housing



and individual homes (both well-to-do and poor). Study them to see if any other known place has similar living structures. Marvel at any differences, and be impressed with any similarities.

Only now begin to consider what the people living in that area do with their time. Again, try to find other people we know and like who do similar things with their time. Perhaps at this point, we might usefully write to tourist boards in the selected area both for travel brochures and literature, and for any available notations about the history and culture in the area. Just like the area in which we live, the tourist board will send out flashy pictures and other kinds of advertising. See through the materials received in just the same ways we would see through such materials from the area where we live. Enquire from friends to find someone from the area in question. Phone or write to that person with the idea of hearing from him or her about the physical surroundings and life in that area. When we are thoroughly familiar with that area of the world, whether by (finally) visiting it or by imagining it, we will find that a subtle change has occurred in our attitudes toward the people from that area. We will have included their part of the world (and them) in our own private world.

Of course, the foregoing exercise has another possible purpose and advantage from the point of view of peace. By the time that we get to talking to someone from that area we have some understanding of the area and its people, we induce ourselves to reach out to another person from another part of the world in a friendly way, and we set ourselves the task of listening attentively to another

person and learning from him or her. The exercise is a fascinating one involving (arm-chair) travel, participation with another part of the real world (as opposed to the world of television), and the joy of learning, expanding oneself and discovering we like another part of life.

We all spend an immense amount of time and attention (even if we use the 'blab-off' button a lot) in the task of making ourselves poorer and others richer. We do that most obviously while watching television. But we do the same thing while reading the newspaper, travelling to work (signs), while at work (materials we use), while preparing (packaging) and eating (foods eaten) foods, talking to friends (about clothing and other products), while shopping (ads, coupons, brands), and in almost everything we do. We set ourselves up to be spenders, and we accept all sorts of related exhortations (e.g., exercise and fitness things) as though the things involved were important. Are they really? And we resist expending much time or effort in the kinds of 'participaction' that might really bring value, interest and importances into our lives. And we all do it, all the time.

OK, so you noticed, we are about to return to talking about 'values'. Obviously, we were implying above that one of two things is probably true if we think our main values involve 'money' or 'possessions', 'security', or 'respect', 'approval', 'appreciation' or 'recognition' from others, or 'education', 'intelligence' or 'precision'. Either we are boring, unhappy and scared people, or we have not yet examined our values very carefully and completely.

These are either 'evaluator' values left over from childhood, and/or reflexive or avoidance values that create distress in us. We talked about this sort of thing in several places in volume I.

In the interpersonal sphere of harmony and disharmony, values play a terribly important part. We would like to expand on this statement in what follows.

The problem with values in the interpersonal sphere has less to do with the particular kinds of values held by the individual, and more to do with the compatibility of values among people living in proximity to one another. This last statement can be read as referring to individual neighbours or friends, to local communities of people, or to neighbouring communities -- including nations, all of which are now proximal neighbours. So the problem with which we are contending here is: how do values become mutually compatible?

In answer to this question it can be said that they already are. But if one asks different people to list their values (what is truly important to them), there is a great deal of variability in the values they report. So how can it be said that people's values are already mutually compatible?

The first answer to this question is that, whether or not we know it, everybody has at least a couple of basic values in common. This is because we all shared a similar set of experiences that were terribly important to us and to our survival. Thus, even if it is only represented at a very deep level of awareness, we ALL value love and nurturance (as a result of our infantile experiences in being parented), we ALL value health (as a consequence of

distress and illnesses we have experienced), and we ALL value learning (from the exciting process of discovering knowledge as we grew up). There might be other values we all hold in common, such as excitement of possibilities, security (or safety), freedom (from restraints), and energy or vitality. We have experienced some difficulty in establishing all of these common values, partly because we have not yet had the opportunity to make a 'penetrating' analysis of values in large groups of people. So far we have restricted our analyses of values to groups where initial listings were all we had available, because the values studies were instrumental to other initiatives.

But there is also a second level of commonality among people's values. There are values that are essentially common to whole cultures. Indeed, James and Woodsmall (1987) claim that cultural values evolve such that, as cultures evolve, values adopted become increasingly similar across cultures, at least among cultures-in-contact with one another. We are unclear about the evidence for this evolutionary shifting of values. However, we have noticed that, even at the point of initial 'screening' of values expressed in large groups of people, there does seem to be a kind of conceptual similarity among listed values. Contemporary values that seem to be held in common include recognition, appreciation, status, power, intelligence, perfection and efficiency. These (presumed to be) 'culturally common' values tend to qualify as either 'evaluators' or 'reflexives' -- probably because of the media culture in which most people have been raised. If we are

right about the commonality in these values, it can at least be said that there is some similarity among the values of most people. And this might be one important basis for interpersonal harmony.

In our view, the need to optimize commonality among values of large groups of people (in order to achieve harmony) can only be taken one step further if large groups of people were to agree on the desirability of assigning high importance to other values -- beyond those already held in common. There are two parts to this task, as we see it.

First, we think it would be wise to examine any values that are identified as already being held in common to see whether each is consistent with both a happy and a harmonious life. For example, some of those we think are common due to common early experiences are covert avoidance values (e.g., health, security, freedom) that are likely to keep us anxiously vigilant and unduly on edge. Also, most of the common values from common later (media) experiences are either reflexive (e.g., recognition, appreciation, status) or evaluative (power, intelligence, perfection, efficiency) values that are likely to prove unsatisfying and to create a sense of vulnerability. If common values having these characteristics are found, it might be wise, while retaining them for the sake of commonalities among people, to move them in each person's priority ranking of values to low ranks, perhaps to fifth position or lower.

Second, we think it would be wise for people to select a set of active and approach values on which we can agree, and to move them to high levels in each person's priority ranking -- probably

above the sixth position. This should enhance the quality of each individual's life, while also facilitating commonality among values for the sake of harmony among people.

A method to shift the position of values, either up or down, in the person's priority ranking was described in volume I, chapter 8, under values). The method is relatively easy to undertake, and it seems to relocate values in a priority ranking more or less permanently -- although a periodic re-check of one's values ranking might be appropriate to confirm the stability of re-positioning. The method proposed does not need to be repeated here. What does need to be done here is to address the motivation that might underlie resistance to seeking and achieving commonality among high-ranking values.

Here we are up against a problem. We do NOT want to address motivations of any kind in such a way that they are changed without personal desire to change them on the part of the reader. There are motivational roots that prevent us from wanting to modify our own attitudes, beliefs and values toward those of others. Most of us would acknowledge that a main impediment to our willingness to modify our values (for example) is that our values are important (that's what makes them values), right (given that each is composed of a series of our beliefs) and morally or ethically correct (as each belief depends upon a set of attitudes) for us. But please note that each of these acknowledged features underlying our reticence to modify our values is a cognitive, rather than a motivational, factor. Something else is buried in us to create our

warful resistance to taking our share in change.

The needs to be 'different' from others, to be 'unique' or 'special' might seem to serve as at least part of the motivation underlying our resistance to change ourselves toward others' views. In some people, these needs might play an important role. In most people, however, we think there is another operative motive. This other driver seems to be based on the complex of values, beliefs and (cultural) attitudes developed to support competitive impulses. In volume I we talked about the destructive effects of competition from the perspective of peace. Here we have to approach the issue of competition in a slightly different way.

Partly under the impress of our common assignment of importance to political matters, we favour unequal distribution of power among people. Partly, we hate to grant others equal and fair opportunities with ourselves -- for fear we are disadvantaged and others comparatively advantaged. Partly, throughout our lives we have (been) trained (ourselves) to pursue competition in which we achieve ascendance over others and, entrepreneurially, to pursue personal power/wealth/status/importance (evaluative values) to our own advantage -- without concern for the effects on others and the future (i.e., the condition of the world) of our initiatives. All of these (and other) factors have initiated in us a strong and fairly continuous drive to excel over others or to exceed others.

Unfortunately for us, the values resulting in us tend to be 'evaluative' and/or covert avoidance values (seeking to avoid being less successful, powerful, etc., than others). These kinds of

values keep us all in a constant state of vigilance, anxious arousal, angry aggressiveness and avoidance of consideration for others. These are the very (values) characteristics that predispose us to regressive and dependent actions, to unhappy and joyless lives, to interpersonal conflict and disharmony, to Type 'A' cardiac-prone and to criminal behaviours. Moreover, just as any negative/avoidance motivators and evaluative values do, these kinds of drivers tend to create in us a kind of 'blindness' to the underlying processes within us, and to lead us to avoidant non-solutions to life's problems. Indeed, the complex associated with competition is damaging to our own lives.

The foregoing will sound wrong to many of us. Heck, the driving and competitive pressures within us breed successes, are exciting, and afford many of us the main source of 'joy' in life. There is some justification in the last observation, given the experience many of us have with life. Thus the idea we are trying to communicate must sound wrong, and is rather hard to explain in a meaningful way. However, we have to try.

Allow us to distinguish between 'having fun', 'being excited' and 'feeling alive and challenged' on the one hand, and 'joy', 'happiness' and 'fulfilment' on the other hand. In our experience, the first group of feelings is found or pursued among people who (reflexively) seek entertainment from external sources as the main source of fun (partying, media, music, etc.), or who are able to achieve excitement mainly in tense and forced ways (in competition,



business, political/power-seeking activities), or who achieve a sense of 'aliveness' from sensation-seeking (from crime, drugs, risk-taking). The problems we see in such pursuits lie in their tendencies to disrupt peace (of course), to provide discontinuous sources of pleasure (that require repeated exposure to risks and the uninviting), and to drain stress and adaptation resources (so that other adaptations are rendered ineffectual). Indeed, far from representing the needs, mentioned earlier, for 'difference', 'uniqueness' or 'specialness', the drivers involved in the complex associated with competition tend to result in shared or uniform or parallel or trendy pursuits, such as partying, media, contemporary music, business and political enterprises, crime, drugs and risk-taking fads -- the kinds of commonalities among people's pursuits that do NOT lend themselves to fostering peace or serenity.

By way of contrast, 'joy', 'happiness' and 'fulfilment' are intended to refer to self-induced, continuous and satisfying (as opposed to fatiguing) states of being that affirm and support a sense of personal humanity and value. Unfortunately, there is no satisfactory language with which to communicate about these kinds of motivational states. We can offer a couple of examples.

Fetishistic (narrow-band, exclusive) forms of sexual arousal and gratification depend upon the activation of a high level of tense 'excitement'. They may be fun and, for those who practice them, they often feel like the only way to achieve 'real' sexual arousal -- permitting gratification. They rarely lead to an experience of satisfaction or fulfilment, and they commonly are

followed by a kind of discomfort or revulsion -- and even perhaps a sense of repulsion toward partners. In part, these forms of sexual activity are instigated by fearful distance (avoidance of emotional closeness) from others -- partly expressed in the use of others for personal gratification rather than mutually satisfying relationships. 'Normal' (non-fetishistic) forms of sexual arousal depend upon a kind of joy in intimacy with another. They tend to involve less by way of tense excitement, and more by way of warm pleasure and fulfilling joy. There tends to be less by way of a brief, intense and exciting climax, and more by way of a mutually satisfying, rewarding closeness. And the subsequent experience tends to have a warm shadow effect that lasts for a while, drawing the partners together in a sense of closeness and union. Arousal in this latter sense tends to involve intimacy and erotic kinds of stimulation. The former type seems to depend upon excitation of erogenous tissue with the participation of muscular tension and perhaps extensive fantasy (referrable to events external to the momentary experience).

A similar idea seems to distinguish two types of car drivers. The one group seeks to make driving an exciting experience. Risks may be taken by driving too close behind other cars; excitement may be induced by increasing speed, passing other cars and vigilantly watching for speed traps; a sense of power might be achieved by getting ahead of other drivers, defaming other drivers' skills and practices or feeling the power of the vehicle controlled by the driver. This group of people focus much of their attention on the

act of driving and the road around them. The other group of drivers tends to think of driving as an instrumental act both to reach a given destination, and to enjoy the company of others or the changing scene during motion from one place to another. This other group of drivers might be said to enjoy driving, as opposed to being excited by it. The group that seeks excitement is apt to pose a greater danger in driving both for others and themselves, and they certainly contribute to warfare on the roads, if only in their own minds.

But what has all this to do with disharmony? We have talked mainly about intra-personal warfare, rather than inter-personal warfare. Obviously, intra-personal distress associated with internal conflict will tend to enhance interpersonal conflict. It also presents the individual with a model of interpersonal relations where conflict, competition and strife are predominant themes. And it creates an image of a world that is rife with problems creating distress and demanding resolution. The interpersonal world it presents is one replete with disharmony.

Perceiving our world as disharmonious, enforces a world of disharmony -- 'an angry person lives in an angry world; the world we live in mirrors the way we are.' We create the disharmony in our interpersonal worlds. Others tend to respond to what they receive in like manner. Where we feel unkindly, we will tend to behave in (however unaware) unkindly ways, and evoke unkindliness. Even where we feel we are kindly, we are apt to adopt unkindly attitudes toward (out-group) others, and evoke unkindly ideas and

attitudes in those with whom we act in kindly ways. There is really no easy way to evade the responsibility for any warfare in our interpersonal relationships. If we want peace and harmony in our interpersonal interactions, it is up to us to foster it.

## Chapter 6

### Creating Distress

It will not be surprising that we are going to argue that all distress is created by ourselves. The only things we might say to surprise anyone would be how we each accomplish our outcomes in distress, and what purposes we might posit for creating distress. That's right. We do believe that there is purpose and method involved in the distress we create within ourselves. Sontag entitled one of her books: My Illness is Me. Even our illnesses involve purposes and methods of our own.

But who would want to suffer? Freud considered this question and, seeking as he did the initial causes of events, he had to invent explanations such as thanatos or masochism (as a sexual drive) for people's participation in their own suffering. The

implication seemed to be that, at some level, people 'wanted' to suffer. We reject this idea out of hand. Still, we do want to find the bases on which people actively participate in their own suffering. In considering this matter, we have concluded that different motives or drivers underlie different types of distress.

Perhaps the underlying processes involved that are easiest to grasp are the strategies people adopt -- which were hinted at in volume I. Many distresses can come about as a result of the attempt to reduce the discomfort of autonomic (ANS) arousal. If uncomfortable ANS arousal is experienced, the person is likely to try to reduce the discomfort, perhaps without noticing that the method adopted breeds a different type of distress. The dynamics involved here were described in this volume in chapter 2, under causes of needs. The strategy involved is to reduce immediate distress in exchange for future distress -- even although there is commonly no realization that another form of distress will emerge.

The most conscious form of motivational exchange in creating distress amounts to a kind of 'pay off' in the service of another kind of driver. Although it is no longer necessary to prolong grief, some people consciously prefer to experience and extend grief as a kind of sacrifice to or recognition of the value of the person or thing that is absent or lost. It is as though, if the grieving person did not feel grief it would imply devaluation or insufficient recognition of the worth of the missed other. Some people, therefore, almost intentionally extend their grieving as a kind of sacrifice. Others refuse to undertake the simple methods

available to moderate grief, either to represent their love for the missed other or in order to experience some feelings -- if they think they are relatively deficient in feelings.

Perhaps the next most conscious driver perpetuating distress is similar to Freud's notion that depression involves a kind of healing of a psychological wound. The motivation underlying this process is probably an autonomic- (ANS) mediated one. Injury, illness and distress create ANS arousal to activate the auto-immune system to perform its healing functions. Bodily energy seems to be drained into maintaining the ANS-mediated immune operations at the expense of energy available for work, fun and vitality. As these energies are drained, the person is apt to feel tired, energyless, depressed or uncomfortable. A slightly more conscious version of this phenomenon is encountered when injury or pain is experienced in a local area, especially a leg. As if to allow 'healing' to occur, the person tries to prevent painful movement of the part (leg) involved by increasing muscle tension around the member's joints. This results in a limp or other analogous movement anomaly. At a conscious level, the limp is created to minimize movement that might be painful. But it is also intended to allow the part (leg) to heal.

Limping is a good example of what is involved at the next most conscious level in creating distress. Limping acts can be seen by others. They are noticeable evidences of distress. Many people limp or create (or maintain) other movement anomalies (swinging the legs widely, shifting body weight over the supporting leg at each

step or 'waddling') as a kind of 'communication' to others of their suffering or incapacity. The relatively conscious motivation for such behaviour is apt to be the desire to evoke sympathy, tolerance or excuse (for task-evasion) from others. That is, the 'purpose' or 'final cause' of such behaviour is the need for understanding or sympathy from others. It might be argued that we are speaking of a relatively conscious wish or 'desire' for suffering. But please note that the desire is NOT for suffering. Suffering is considered a 'fact' or 'necessity' of the time, justifying the evidence of it in the limping behaviour. It is the limping behaviour (not the suffering) that is created or maintained with the desire to evoke sympathy or understanding from others. Few people realize that limping also tends to make it harder for the body to 'heal' itself, and to engender consequences in future distress (e.g., arthritis).

The desire to evoke sympathy or consideration from others is not the only complex of needs involved in creating and maintaining distress. Another fairly conscious motive involved is the need for 'importance'. Many people seem to feel that their importance (self or to others) is enhanced by indicators of distress varying from having a serious or chronic illness, being in pain or 'under the weather', having an injury or disability, being upset or 'having' a psychological malady, grieving or feeling depressed, all the way to feeling harassed or too busy. While the pursuit of sympathy seems to work as a purpose or need, the sense of importance seems to function most as a reinforcing state of affairs, perpetuating the kind of distress involved to the extent that it seems to the

sufferer to enhance his or her 'importance'.

Perhaps the strangest motivational anomaly creating distress is found at the next most conscious level. Somehow many of us have developed the idea that fear serves a protective function. This might be because we have become used, as children, to avoid dangers (and stern parental admonishment) by developing fear to motivate avoidance of events we have been told 'not to do'. Whatever its source, fear may be evoked as if it provided a kind of protective shield against risk. Fear of cancer, AIDS, heart disease, psychosis, Alzheimer's disease and arthritis are all instigated and maintained by the media and physicians, assuming that fear serves a useful function in evoking protective counter-measures.

The truth probably is that the fear enhances the risk of developing the distresses in question, or at least increases the severity and danger of their encounter. Cancer, AIDS and arthritis are immune diseases. Cancer is fostered by repeated attack of growth hormone on the target organ as part of the immune-healing response evoked by autonomic (anxiety) arousal concerning the target organ. AIDS, as an immune deficiency disease, is subject to enhancement by depletion of immune system resources from chronic autonomic (fearful) activation of the immune response. Arthritis is engendered by muscle tension around the target joint, where the tension is evoked anxiously to avoid (probably originally non-significant) pain from joint movement. Heart disease, and its many correlatives (e.g., cholesterol deposits, muscle innervation), are created in large part from undue and chronic ANS arousal. The



psychoses are largely by-products of chronic and out-of-control ANS-anxiety arousal, with its concomitant tendency to create stimulus over-generalization. And memory impairment (e.g., in Alzheimer's disease) is most easily accomplished by distraction from memory storage or retrieval by and to anxious (ANS-mediated) preoccupations -- such as those focusing attention on the inability to 'remember', in place of doing the remembering.

In the foregoing instances, fear is almost consciously evoked under the mistaken idea that it will result in protective measures. For some people, however, fear is evoked as if it were a positive and desired experience in and of itself. The most obvious examples of distress-producing behaviours of this kind are to be found in 'risk-taking' activities construed to be exciting. Bungee jumping, sky-diving, mountain-climbing, race car driving, riding some kinds of carnival devices, shooting rapids, and a host of similar activities provide examples of risk-taking excitements of this sort. The excitement comes from the thrill of anxiety arousal. Less obvious examples might include the use of some excitant street drugs (e.g., speed, crack), exposure to thriller, adventure or horror movies, participation in war games or big-game hunting, and even participation in political contests or some body-contact sports. In all of these activities, what is ordinarily considered to be distress (anxiety/fear arousal) is actively pursued as if it were desired and pleasant motivation.

The foregoing motivations are relatively conscious, even if the mechanisms involved are not entirely apparent. Both the

purpose and the mechanism tend to be less obvious to most people in the remaining motivations to be discussed. The hedonistic pursuit of pleasure seems to be aimed at achieving pleasure. In fact, it seems rarely to be quite that. More often hedonism seems to be pursued as a kind of counter-balance for uncomfortable distress -- to distract attention from discomforts. Alternatively, the pursuit of hedonism can serve as a learned (higher-order conditioned) kind of behaviour that serves as a suppressant or inhibitor of distress. Just as relaxation or assertion can serve as reciprocal inhibitors for anxiety (Wolpe, 1958), so can a pleasure experience.

There are many kinds of motivations that serve to create and perpetuate distress, not all of which can practically be listed or explained here. However, an unlikely and unusual motivation, which has perhaps the most convoluted process underlying it, is that involved in behaviour seeking to be 'unattractive'. There are people who seem actively to pursue an unprepossessing appearance. Manifestations of this syndrome can include (not all instances of) obesity, unsightly skin blemishes, baggy and slovenly clothing, social isolation and/or chronic disengagement of eye-contact. In the usual case, the person has felt abused (often with reason), and has developed a general pattern of social avoidance. In some of these cases, the person has developed a black-and-white world-view that anticipates either dangerously salacious intent from others, or alternatively destructive violent or damaging intent from others. In these latter cases there is often no 'middle' road in human interactions. From this kind of basis in perception or

belief, the person has progressed to seeking, as an anticipatory response, to prevent any kind of interaction with others (or only those interactions completely controlled by the person). The means that might be learned to achieve this outcome (preventing contact) can involve creating an unprepossessing appearance that, as it were, drives others away before they seek any interaction. Of course, one result of this process is isolation, loneliness and a perpetuated and intensified sense of others as dangerous and nasty and as unavailable as sources of support, consolation, survival and human interaction. The result is self-inflicted helpless fear.

We have tried in the foregoing to indicate some of the means by which people create distress in themselves, and some of the motivations underlying the creation of distress. Of course, other examples of means to create distress have already been mentioned in earlier chapters of this volume. We do not intend to be exhaustive in our attempts to identify distress-creating motivations. As we said repeatedly in volume I, we are not seeking perfect peace. We consider perfect peace to be a gift from God.

The reader will notice that, unlike in volume I, indications about what can be done to correct or modify disturbing motivations have been quite sparse in this volume. There are two reasons for this fact. First, unlike self-defeating strategies, motivations can serve at one and the same time to evoke peaceful actions and actions that disrupt peace. To try to modify motivations too early is apt to result in loss of motivations that might be helpful in pursuit of our peace purpose or goal. Second, trying to 'take

away' any motivation is tantamount to robbing the person of a much to-be-valued attribute that (also) serves healthful and joyful ends. Our interventions in the motivational field will be concerned mainly with fostering drivers and redirecting them, where appropriate, to constructive (rather than destructive) purposes or ends. Consequently, our suggestions concerning interventions in the motivational area belong in the main in part II.

## Chapter 7

### Addictive Behaviour

In volume I we selected crime as the target for experiments aimed at isolating factors disturbing the peace. It was selected both as a good representative of one (intra-communal) level of analysis of peacelessness, and as an outcome of strategic or problem-solving (cognitive) activity in people -- the focus of our volume I presentation. We chose addictions to serve as the target for our experiments concerned with motivations -- the focus of our volume II presentation. It seems to us that addictions operate at about the same level of analysis as crime, and that they are an outcome of motivational pressures acting within and between people.

The question we must address now is one of discovering the causal factors acting in addictions. What causes addictions? To

answer this question, we feel forced to begin by stating what does NOT cause addictions. This is because most people have some quite firm and established ideas about the causes of addictions. If the conventional ideas in this connection were valid, addictions ought by now to be understood and no longer a problem. That is, we believe that the most common ideas about addictions are invalid.

Genetic inheritance can be used to account for the existence, structure, chemistry and physiology of the body. In that the body is so constructed that certain kinds of chemicals have temporary, but fairly strong, subjective effects on people, it can be said that, as with anything else, genetics play a small and indirect but basic role in addictions. However, genetics do NOT account for or decide which individuals will, and which will not become addicted. That is, genetic factors do not provide a differential causation for addictive behaviour. And the causal effects from genetics would, anyway, be minor, if only because the genetic level of analysis is conceptually far removed from the behavioural level at which addictions operate.

The physical structure (anatomy) of the body does provide some bases for some addictive behaviours. This causal role relates to the way in which the system is organized. The cerebral cortex is involved in the evocation of strong uncomfortable feelings that are mediated by words and images. Putting the cerebral cortex to sleep reduces its capacity to evoke these strong negative feelings, thus giving relief from anxiety, depression and other negative emotions. Thus chemicals (e.g., alcohol) that have a soporific effect on the

cerebral cortex can result in 'feeling better', and thus can be a basis for addiction. Similarly, the old brain drive centre (Olds and Milner) comes equipped with a 'reinforcement' centre which, when stimulated electrically, can serve to increase the habit strength involved in the use of chemicals that evoke such electric stimulation. This can happen if an epileptic discharge occurs in that area of the brain. Epileptic discharge (short-circuit) can be evoked if the permeability of nerve cell membranes in a particular area of the brain is decreased -- preventing easy de-ionization in a particular fibre (or bundle), and permitting sodium ions to visit neighbouring cells to de-ionize (short-circuit) their chloride ions. Nerve membrane permeability can be decreased by allergic reactions of inflammation of the affected nerves. And it would appear that the grains in some alcohols (transmitted quickly to the site in the alcohol in the blood) are capable of evoking allergic responses in some nerve tissues -- particularly those proximal to the drive centre. Finally, the liver seems to be able to store some chemical cognate of heroin such that less than usual doses of heroin can evoke the addictive response in former heroin users. These seem almost to exhaust the roles of physical anatomy in the causation of addictive behaviour.

The chemistry of the body has become the contemporary touchstone to account for almost anything that happens -- under the impress of propaganda from the co-conspirators and symbiotic twins of physicians and the drug companies they support. Most people seem to believe that the causes of addictions will be found in the

chemistry of given substances. The chemistry of the body is at a level of analysis closer to the behavioural level of addictions than either genetics or anatomy. Thus allergic response to certain substances do provoke ANS-immune reactions that can serve to evoke addictive behaviour -- if the pre-existing condition of the person makes arousal 'feel good'. Also there is no doubt that some chemicals are, and some are not, potentially addictive. However, the manner in which this works needs to be understood. There are at least two steps in that understanding.

First, the body's chemicals serve as messengers and converters that evoke reactions in all sorts of bodily functions. Each type of chemical has a speedy, but temporary, effect on the body's functioning. The body produces the chemicals it needs, sometimes in excessive and sometimes in insufficient amounts. Some of the chemicals produced in the body (or manufactured for exogenous use) alter the way the person feels. If the alteration achieved 'feels good' to the person, the chemical responsible can become addictive. But the addictive effect is achieved because that chemical makes the person 'feel good', however temporarily.

Second, whether the unpleasant feeling that gives way to the 'feeling good', is a product of faulty chemistry or is due to faulty learning, is irrelevant to whether the chemical serves as an 'initial' cause producing a subjective effect. Each chemical has whatever effects it has on the subjective state of the person. And certain actions can serve the same purpose. But the pre-existing state of the person. whose relief can be (initially) caused by an

addictive chemical, is rarely (if ever) a result of faulty bodily chemistry. It is the pre-existing state of the person, which is relieved, that is the differential ('final') cause that forms the addiction or that drives the person to pursue addictive substances once he or she has discovered that the substance has a relieving effect. That is, the primary addictive phenomenon is the existing state of the person that drives the individual to find and use substances that result in 'feeling good'.

It does not surprise us that we were able to find the main causes underlying addictive behaviour at the behavioural level of analysis. Nor does it surprise us, given the compulsive nature and the directed activity in the pursuit of addictive substances, that we found its causes among the motivations of the individual. It is now time to report how we examined addictive behaviour and the results we obtained.

#### Setting for study

The first thing we considered was the relevance of addictions to disturbances of the peace. We had access to large numbers of sentenced offenders, about 75% of whom demonstrated major addictive behaviour, both in their histories and in their responses to tests of addictions. It was clear that addictive behaviour was relevant to criminal conduct in many of these people from offenses involving use of addictives (impaired driving, possession/trafficking of substances), support of addictions (break and enter, theft, robbery to purchase substances), and disinhibiting effects of addictives (dangerous driving, violence while intoxicated or 'high'). Thus in



many of these cases, addictions formed a major instigator of crime.

And the element of addictions was distributed within the available offender subjects. That is, about 25% displayed no addictions, the criminal conduct of about 25% was directly attributable to the use of addictives, and about 50% were criminal offenders who were also addicts. These observations suggested to us that the addiction of our available offenders was distributed such that it might lend itself admirably to the study of addictions as they might relate to disturbances of the peace.

Moreover, since addictions were associated in some way with the criminality of perhaps a majority of these offenders, it ought to be possible to evaluate the effectiveness of procedures we undertook with them against their subsequent criminal offenses. That is, granting that error will be present in any results we obtained (as is true in any study), it might be possible to use subsequent criminal offenses as indirect indicators of whether or not these subjects remained addicted to substances.

The second issue we considered was the relevance of the setting in which our addicts were encountered to the purposes of our intended study. We wanted to develop and evaluate a test to measure the 'causes' of addictions, to devise and implement interventions to modify the identified 'causes', and to evaluate the effectiveness of those interventions on subsequent addictive behaviour -- even if such behaviour could only be estimated indirectly through subsequent criminal offenses.

The correctional treatment facility in which we worked was

almost ideally structured for our purposes. The institution is a modern 220-bed facility, comprised of one 54-bed classification unit and five 30- or 34-bed treatment units. Sentenced adult, male offenders were admitted to the classification unit for assessment and orientation. They were assessed in depth for their addictive and other behaviours in this location. If they then applied for admission to treatment (nearly all did), and if they displayed characteristics relevant to programs being run on the treatment units at the time, they were transferred to living units on which treatment was the predominant correctional program. All inmates on treatment units received some forms of treatment. Since none of the incarcerates had sentences of two years or more, there was a relatively rapid turn-over of bed use, and inmates were released quite soon after treatment -- so their subsequent criminal conduct could be evaluated comparatively efficiently following treatment.

Since all inmates at the facility received some treatment, it is important to indicate at the outset what effects the treatments of all types (other than those to be reported here) had on their subsequent criminal behaviour. That is, we must indicate what the base-rates in criminal recidivism were, without including the effects of our treatments for addictions. In repeated follow-up studies over many years, it was shown (Wolfus and Stasiak, 1991) that, if inmates who were suitable for admission to the O.C.I. served their time in other institutions, their 2-year recidivism rates varied between 60% and 65%. If they served their time at our correctional treatment facility, their average 2-year rate of

recidivism was about 43%. Thus 43% is the best estimate of baseline (NOT treated by the present methods) 2-year recidivism rate for the inmates involved in the studies we are about to report.

We described our test of motivations (ADDICAUS) earlier in this volume (chapter 2). The ADDICAUS test was administered to 650 inmates on the classification unit, along with a series of other tests. The other tests included our test of criminality (STFB: Quirk and Reynolds, Practical Peace I), the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), the Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (MAST), the Drug Abuse Screening Test (DAST), Raven's Matrices (RPM), the ABLE reading test (ABLE) the Cattell Anxiety Scale (CAS) and the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). In addition, all inmates were interviewed separately by an assigned correctional officer/case manager and a psychologist. The purposes of these interviews and their reports were to assemble the justice system documentation on each case, to evaluate the motivation and possible purposes for treatment, to obtain case history information and to provide a clinical evaluation of behavioural and mental status. All this material was summarized and coded into computer files for each inmate to provide data for the present work.

In chapter 2, it was pointed out that several variables were introduced in counter-balanced order into each of the 68 ADDICAUS scales or axes. None of the cognitive (C), emotional (E), visual (V), auditory (A) or kinaesthetic (K) sub-scores provided any differential information about the groups of these 650 subjects. Consequently, further attention to these sub-scale scores was

abandoned. However, there was very real differential information contained in both of the two ways of calculating the total score for each of the scales or axes.

Each item offered a five-point set of response options. The 'S' score summed the indicated response strength (0 to 4) for the twelve items of each axis (Max. score = 48). The 'N' score counted the number of the twelve items of each axis whose response exceeded the value 1 (Max. score = 12). Both these ways to handle each axis total score were retained under the hypotheses that the 'S' score might express the intensity of the respondent's motivation in each driver as represented by the axis, and that the 'N' score might represent the generality of that driver such that the person might be susceptible to reinforcement widely in that area of motivation. That is, the 'S' and 'N' scores might reveal different aspects of respondents' motivations.

Factor analyses of the 'S' scores revealed that the highest loading axes in the main factors were the most 'active' or pursuit-oriented axes, suggesting they might represent pursued needs as motivators. Factor analyses of the 'N' scores revealed that the highest loading axes were the more 'passive' or 'receiving' axes, suggesting they might represent a kind of waiting for reinforcement to be received. Stronger evidence of the relevance of the 'S' and 'N' scores to the differences between 'needs' and 'reinforcers' emerged later in the analyses. Discriminant function analyses were run to distinguish among the ADDICAUS axes as 'causes' of various types of addictive behaviours. In these analyses, the 'S' scores

predominated over the 'N' scores in contributing significantly to discriminant classifications only on 'need-related' axes (called Nd or sD in the list of axes in chapter 2), and the 'N' scores were predominant over the 'S' scores in contributing to discriminant classifications only on 'reinforcement-related' axes (designated Rf or rf in the chapter 2 axis list). It is evident that both these ways of handling axis total scores contribute useful and different information about motivational drivers -- at least in addictions.

Reliability and validity of the ADDICAUS 'S' and 'N' scores were evaluated in detail. Both scores have excellent reliabilities considering their stabilities (retest), internal consistencies (item-scale) and precision (discriminative). And both display excellent validity considering their concurrent (with other tests), predictive (with addictive behaviours) and construct (differential modifiability) validities. We were satisfied with the psychometric properties of the ADDICAUS scales regardless of how those properties were evaluated.

Discriminant function analyses were run to discover how well the ADDICAUS axes classified our 650 inmate subjects for their Years of use (Y) and strength of Use (U) of each of the addictive substances about which we obtained information. The substances investigated included beer, home brew, brandy, wine, rye, rum, scotch, gin/vodka, solvents and 'other' alcohols, marijuana, hashish, opium, heroin, morphine, magic mushrooms, peyote, speed, LSD, PCP, cocaine, crack and 'other' street drugs, glue, gasoline and 'other' solvents, pain relievers, valium, barbiturates,

narcotics, other tranquillizers, downers, uppers, Ritalin, antibiotics, seltzers, and 'other' medications, cigarettes, pipe/cigar and chewing tobaccos, coffee, cola, chocolate, chips/nuts and over-eating. Not all of these substances could be included in the analyses due to insufficient numbers of subjects acknowledging their use, or to manifest unreliability in responding. However, the average correct classification rate in discriminant function analyses was 90% for the alcohols, 85% for the street drugs, and 82% for the other substances where analyses were justifiable. The 82% observed with other substances varied from almost 85% correct classifications for solvents, down to quite poor rates for foods and tobaccos. Still, at least with respect to alcohols and street drugs, the correct classification rates using the ADDICAUS 'S' and 'N' scores suggest that the majority of the 'causes' of these types of addictions were identifiable through the ADDICAUS test. This last statement is justified since the 'causes' of anything are understood to be those events that 'control' its variations.

Before proceeding further we also evaluated the significance of the 'S' and 'N' scores for each ADDICAUS axis or scale as a predictor of each type of substance use for both Years of use and Use strength. This was a necessary step before setting out to characterize the roles of each ADDICAUS variable in addictions.

#### Characterization of Addictive Behaviour

The next step we undertook was to develop regression equations to express the ADDICAUS causation of addictions to alcohols and street drugs. Regression weights were calculated for those 'S' and

'N' scores significantly contributing to discriminations of each type of substance use. The 'causation' of each type of substance addiction was then characterized based on the organization of the axis scores in the regression equations. This characterization was undertaken for each type of alcohol and street drugs, both for use along with other substances ('inclusive' use) and where possible for 'exclusive' use. The same characterization was performed for 'accessory' addictive attributes, such as mode of use (ingestion, inhalation, injection), purpose of use (mellowing, as a soporific, excitation, imagery, etc.), setting of use (isolation, group), ease of access, and involvement in crime (prohibited, severity of any sanctions). The purpose of this exercise, of course, was to express the identifiable features involved in the causation of addictive behaviour. It is impractical to report much detail here concerning these characterizations. However, brief snapshots of each would seem to be demanded to illustrate the kinds of ADDICAUS-derived drivers involved in the addictive behaviours examined.

Exclusive use of ANY kind of ALCOHOL seems to come down to rigidity of habits and the rewarding effect of activation, achieved with relaxation and communication with others, to cope in the face of depression and its associated attempt to avoid feelings. There are few significant accessory factors, including only the social setting of use (bars?) and effects upon lifestyle. However, the generic alcoholic probably also shares qualities associated with his/her preferred drinks that ought to be addressed in treatment, in addition to any treatment for exclusive use of ANY ALCOHOL.

Exclusive use of any substance should, in principle, pull on reinforcement axes over need axes. Exclusive use of BEER performs as expected ( $Rf+rf:Nd+sD = 6:5$  axes) to a slightly greater extent than the inclusive use of BEER ( $Rf+rf:Nd+sD = 5:9$  scales). This is intended to say that the reinforcement effects of a substance ought to be the main factors that select it for exclusive use, while the need pressures acting in the person would likely predominate in inclusive use. This statement should be distinguished from another observation that generic use of a class of substances seems to pull almost exclusively on reinforcement scales ( $Rf, rf$ ), whereas uses of a specific substance tend to pull on both types, with exclusive use differing as stated from inclusive use of specific substances.

BEER: Compensatory needs operating in the face of distress and adversity can be sensed in the higher loading axes in the inclusive use of BEER. Equally, one can detect the roles exclusive use of BEER might serve for the user among its higher loading axes. These kinds of variables account for the observed differences in the axes affecting exclusive and inclusive BEER users.

Exclusive users of BEER may be activated by its sugar content, the social interaction often associated with its use, which may afford a sense of extravagance and rebellion against daily routines. There seems to be some relief of felt pain and a need to be informal and even to be sloppy. There is need and reinforcement value in the self-enhancement of camaraderie, in feeling accepted or 'cool' or 'tough' and in the freedom to vent annoyances. These are the main drivers of exclusive BEER use, in which both needs and



reinforcers play a part. Self-enhancement seems to be the strongest purpose in exclusive use of BEER. And users tend to attribute relatively high potency to it as an addictive substance.

BEER, Inclusive Use: The needs involved include that for self-aggrandizement and experiencing bright images perhaps to compensate for a sense of failure and feeling put down. Inclusive use shares with exclusive use the need to have fun in a social setting in order to distract attention from distress arising from pain, grief, upset emotions and/or boredom or depression. The social contact involved also serves as an active agent to dispel loneliness, to obtain consensual validation for rigidly held attitudes and as a way to relax or 'veg out' to deal with felt pressures.

Inclusive use of BEER serves as a disinhibitor and activator in groups. BEER is also seen to serve the purpose of accompaniment associated with a social setting and some characteristic features of lifestyle (camaraderie?). Inclusive use allows BEER to work as a medication, perhaps to achieve tranquillizing or mellowing effects, which are also significantly related to it.

HOME BREW, Inclusive Use: Only seven subjects in our sample used HOME BREW exclusively. Consequently, only the inclusive use can be evaluated. Again, need pressures seem to operate quite strongly (ratio: 11:9) in inclusive use. The only accessory items that characterize HOME BREW use are the purposes of achieving tranquillity and sleep (opiate). While intuitively one might think that HOME BREW use would be found mainly among isolates or family-focused people, the axes loading with HOME BREW show a surprising

concern with social enjoyments, communication needs and subcultural values. This suggests that HOME BREW use may involve pride and enlivenment, preoccupation with a topic to talk about and active pleasure-seeking. These may serve as compensations for weak self esteem, discomfort, grief, upset feelings, a sense of failure or the expectation of criticism found among HOME BREW users. HOME BREW seems to be used by people who are not comfortable relying on others and who need self-sufficiency, preferring to maintain control over their own lives, perhaps also as sources of access to dependency or addictive substances. Another interesting feature of HOME BREW users is their restless energy. This seems counter-intuitive until it is noticed that home brewing can require a fair amount of activity in preparing the substance and, perhaps, something with which to preoccupy attention and thought. At least for this substance, the needs and rewards of substance use seem to be mutually consistent in some ways.

The same primacy effect of reinforcers is noted in exclusive use of BRANDY, while inclusive use seems to be driven mainly by need states. Accessory data suggests that, in our samples, BRANDY functions as a drug for its users, apparently relieving some kinds of 'pain'. It seems to be associated with an isolated life-style, and it serves such purposes as activation or arousal, to enhance experiences and to foster dreams.

The picture of the exclusive BRANDY user emerging from the loading axes might be characterized as a somewhat dour and dogmatic individual, who feels mistreated and suffers from hypoglycaemia,

some physiological anxiety and loneliness. Mood is both reactively and joylessly depressed, and time may be spent wishing for power, recognition or importance to compensate for self-depreciation from self-criticism. In general, the picture is likely to be based on strong introverted trends. The associated verbal mediation of experience leads to the formation of 'ideals' and perfectionism. That, in turn, leaves the person chronically dissatisfied and disappointed. This person likely depends on rationality and considers him/herself sophisticated, sensitive and dogmatic.

BRANDY, Inclusive Use: Loneliness and a sense of having been mistreated and excessively criticized, coupled with the distress of upset feelings, seem to underlie the needs for sensuous use of a substance considered a luxury item in some circles. Expectations and habits of criticism lead to the formation of high ideals and perfectionism, as well as rigidity of beliefs and attitudes. Although these qualities would ordinarily appear in a socially isolated person, there is a strong need for group contact and satisfaction, apparently as a means to manage loneliness.

The exclusive WINE user has qualities that are not unlike those found in brandy users. The surprising picture of the WINE user that emerges is one of a fairly rigid, defensive person who is anxiously sensitive and who may seek self enhancement at the expense of others. The need for bright imagery is not unexpected, but it seems to be reactive to a rather unhappy temperament or mood, possibly associated with 'empty' feelings within, partly deriving from inhibited dependency needs. The appearance of guilt

intolerance, rumination about rejection and self-derogation in exclusive WINE users suggests that anger too might be inhibited, thus suggesting that the somatic anxiety and pain sensitivity present might, in this case, represent mild hypochondriasis.

WINE, Inclusive Use: Compared with the previously described substance users, overt needs are less apparent in our WINE users as drivers of inclusive use. Defenses (associated with derived needs) seem more involved. It might be that the criminality of our WINE users altered the picture in our exclusive use subjects from that of seeking reinforcements to one of pursuing defensive self enhancement and expansiveness. Or it may be that a characterizing feature of WINE users is defensiveness of a fairly complex nature. For example, it may be that the apparent aesthetic appreciation of some wine tasters might serve in place of genuine emotional experience. Certainly, in inclusive use, our WINE drinkers load strongly in their needs for self-enhancement, even aggrandizement, and for careless enjoyment of immediate external sensory experience as drivers of feelings and to compensate for negative feelings. The latter include failure experiences, felt rejection, weak self-esteem, body-focused distress and stress-reactive depression. Possibly related to these are rigid attitudes and an intolerance for close relationship.

Accessory observations paint exclusive and inclusive WINE users as using wine as a disinhibiting agent (perhaps for social involvement) and as an activating or arousing agent (perhaps to instigate social participation). Of course, WINE often serves the

purpose of an accompaniment (as with food). But WINE is apparently also used as a self-medicating agent to achieve a tranquillized or mellow state, or to serve as an opiate.

Self-protective needs seem to drive inclusive use of GIN or VODKA. The picture is that of one striving for upward mobility and to impress others, perhaps only partly as a compensatory effort. A sense of failure in the history seems to be more marked here than with the users of most other alcohols. GIN or VODKA appear to serve to drown grief, as respite from felt pressures, as relief from a sense of failure and criticism, to forget disappointments and failures, or to soothe physiological distress. They also provide immediate gratification through self-enhancement and, through inclusive use of other substances, a sense of participation in counter-culture.

Like most of the other kinds of alcohol, the tranquillizing effect or function of GIN or VODKA stands out among the accessory observations. GIN or VODKA, like the other 'hard' liquors, serve an opiate function, as well as serving as accompaniments and activators. It may be their tranquillizing or opiate effects that also allow GIN or VODKA and the other 'hard' liquors to function as if they were medications.

Again, needs are apparent in driving inclusive use of RUM. Here there is also some stress and arousal from upset emotions to form part of the driver. Still, some of the latter (eg., anger-hostility, easy going enjoyment or needs for different experiences) may come from the criminality in our sample. The needs include

immediate gratification while having a good time in obtaining others' approval in social contact. There is a need for self-enhancement and for novel experiences, perhaps to deal with felt pressures, stressors, disturbed emotions or a failure history. Perhaps mediated by rather rigid attitudes, there is a sense of hostility or anger not far from the surface.

Accessory factors are similar to gin/vodka, but the opiate effect is less clear with RUM. There is a sense of frustration and discomfort in the picture found of the drivers of RUM use, which is somewhat less apparent among the other alcoholic beverages.

Inclusive RYE users seek immediate gratification in social enjoyments, where they feel the need to be confident or self-assured. They are dogmatic, perhaps to cope with loss, somatic depression or loneliness, or as a product of failure experiences and a history of felt criticism. RYE behaves in essentially the same way as the other 'hard' liquors. It may be perceived as a 'mellowing' agent more than the others, and it seems to function better as a disinhibiting agent. Otherwise, inclusive use appears to be driven largely by need pressures often generated by negative and debilitating feelings.

Inclusive Use of SCOTCH behaves in a somewhat different way from the other 'hard' liquors. Although it might function as a disinhibiting agent, perhaps required by the oppressive inhibitions which load on it, it does not seem to be used for purposes of enhancement, mellowing, or as an opiate. Still, it may have some calming effect on somatic depression -- not referred to here as a

tranquillizing effect since, unlike the other 'hard' liquors, it does not seem to work like a medication.

The things that make SCOTCH stand out from the other 'hard' liquors, in addition to the foregoing, are the inclusion of some inhibitive and rationality traits that do not appear with the other hard liquors. Oppressive inhibitions, excessive rationality, dogmatic attitudes or over-control seem to create the needs angrily to break free and to feel different as a person and to participate in a free-wheeling life style. The picture emerging from the inclusive use of SCOTCH is one of a moody, brittle and inhibited person who has a strong need to feel different from other people.

The exclusive use of ANY kind of DRUG, again, is driven by reinforcers. Here, they include those deriving from the relief effect of the 'rush' or 'buzz' on a flat, joyless existence, whether the 'rush' is felt to be pleasant or aversive, and whether it serves as excitement or as distraction from distress. It is interesting that either social contact or the social isolation accompanying some kinds of drug uses can serve rewarding roles.

The significantly related accessory indicators include the purposes of disinhibition and activation, of a tranquillizer and an opiate, and of achieving different experiences. Not unexpectedly, exclusive use of ANY DRUG is also significantly associated with availability issues, setting, lifestyle effects, paraphernalia, strength, compromise of the law and severity under the law.

HEROIN's inclusive use displays a picture similar to that for

its exclusive use, with some variants in order and variables. This may be due to the probability that, whether or not other drugs are used, the user views his/her HEROIN use as the most engrossing and most problematic addiction. Certainly, defensiveness, rigidity and subcultural values figure somewhat more centrally in inclusive as compared with exclusive use. These features may come from the generality of addictiveness and from the person's social contacts arising from other substance uses.

Another feature of HEROIN use, which is clearer here than in alcohol uses, is the complex and paradoxical structure found in intrapsychic conflict and higher-order conditioned traits. This comment serves as a reminder that the paradoxical nature of conflict may require paradoxical methods for intervention -- a general point made in volume I.

The drivers of exclusive HEROIN use include anxiety-motivated social isolation, in which bright images and fantasies of importance in social settings create experiences that are different from the commonplace. These self-enhancements may also compensate for impaired self-esteem, felt rejection, loss or dependency inhibition, intensified by metabolic or physiological distress. The probability that some of this picture is associated with criminality (usually necessitated by this habit) can be seen in the participation of guilt intolerance and sensation-seeking, which latter is also demanded by flat depression, itself partly resulting from avoidance of affects and dependency inhibition.

The criminality involved in inclusive use of HEROIN can be



seen in the guilt intolerance, marked intolerance of restrictive regulations, sub-cultural values and need for a hedonistic lifestyle. The drivers seem to include metabolic disorder, grief or a need to be different fuelled by failure experiences. The kinds of reinforcers associated with HEROIN use include avoidance of boredom or any feelings or emotional arousal, impaired self-esteem and self-depreciation, loneliness, punishment/criticism history, grief or physiological anxiety. Rigidity is seen to play a dual role in HEROIN use. Consensual validation is sought from social influences to support rigid moralization and habits. Then these oppressive inhibitors seem to be ignored in the use of HEROIN.

As expected, MORPHINE behaves very much like heroin. The only differences among the accessory indicators are that MORPHINE serves less than heroin for purposes of self enhancement, and more than heroin to foster dream-like states. MORPHINE's inclusive use axes stand apart in calming disturbed 'nerves' and dealing with impaired sleep. They also involve a special attempt to defend against feelings, and they seem to have less relevance to criminality variables. The surprise among the MORPHINE-related variables is the appearance of social enjoyment.

The variables involved in exclusive use of MORPHINE, are almost identical to those involved in the inclusive use of heroin. They include guilt intolerance, marked intolerance of restrictive regulations and sub-cultural values. The same drivers operate here, including metabolic disorder, grief and a need to be

different fuelled by failure experiences. The rewards derived from MORPHINE use include avoidance of any feelings/affects, impaired self-esteem and self-depreciation, loneliness, memories of punishment and criticism, grief or physiological anxiety. Unyielding rigidity plays a part in inclusive use of MORPHINE. Consensual validation from social influences seems to be sought to support rigid habits and moralizations. Then use permits the latter's oppressive inhibitions to be ignored. Hedonism and avoiding boredom are the heroin-related axes missing from MORPHINE's exclusive use.

Inclusive use of MORPHINE is driven by needs for sleep and substance dependency due to sleep disorder, metabolic disorder, hypoglycaemia, physiological anxiety, social anxiety, reactive depression, need for calmed nerves or some oppressive inhibitions. Reinforcers deriving from use include avoidance and denial of affects, forgetting memories of failures and criticisms along with immediate gratification and self-enhancement. The surprises are the needs for social contact and social enjoyment. The quite different, but not unexpected, variables in MORPHINE use are the sleep disorder driver and the reinforcing effect of affect denial.

Aside from the expected similarities between inclusive use of morphine and heroin, it may be surprising that the variables (axes) controlling their uses differ as much as they do. One feature of this difference lies in the variety of axes involved in MORPHINE use. Also, for the most part, only the S or N score (needs or reinforcement effects) of a loading axis contributes to its use.

This should mean that both needs and reinforcers play a part, but that the needs and reinforcers relate to different drivers. That is, there may be a greater degree of specificity and precision involved in MORPHINE than in heroin addiction. Perhaps different kinds of treatment programs would be needed for MORPHINE addicts.

In spite of the relative psychological simplicity involved in them, the variables involved in COCAINE's inclusive use do not make COCAINE stand out as being much different from other drugs. The inclusive use of COCAINE has elements that are found in addiction as a whole, such as past failure experience, hypoglycaemia and effects from immediate gratification. It includes elements found for the major drugs, such as reality denial, rigid moralizations and reactive depression. And it includes some elements that relate one substance to another regardless of class of substance, such as guilt intolerance, subcultural values, pain sensitivity and needs for self-enhancement and 'fast lane' living. One way to express the similarity between COCAINE and other drugs is to note that the equation derived from and predicting to COCAINE use significantly predicts use of almost every other substance. This is true for several substances' equations, but it applies most to the inclusive use of COCAINE. Three substances stand apart from COCAINE (and other substances). They are brandy, home brew and peyote. Some features of inclusive use of COCAINE are somewhat different. Allergy stress, rigid self-image, substance dependency, disturbed emotions and masked disappointments are less common elsewhere.

In spite of the apparent commonality among many inclusive uses

of addictive substances', there is some variation in substances' relationships to accessory variables. COCAINE use is related significantly to the mode of inhalation. It is used for purposes of disinhibition, arousal or activation, as well as sleep (opiate) and mellowing out. Why it also serves as accompaniment in our sample is less clear.

CRACK: In considering the axes loading for CRACK, the overlap and similarity among the axes loading with all the addictive substances is quite evident. This is inevitable since there are only 68 axes from which to draw. Still, the composition is not the same as that for any other substance, and the order and strength with which common variables load does vary considerably.

Criminality enters as a variable in inclusive use of CRACK. It seems to involve pursuit of subcultural values, excitement, self-enhancement, easy-going enjoyment and social influence needs, as well as reinforcing effects from immediate gratification, and conduct that challenges guilt feelings and regulations. The need to avoid feelings is coupled with the reward value of denying both feelings and reality. Perhaps as a result, it is not surprising that depression is well represented in CRACK use. Flat depression, somatic depression, grief, disturbed emotions, loneliness, a sense of being mistreated, masked disappointment, allergy stress and impaired sleep all contribute to the use of CRACK, along with a need for relaxation and calmness. Although, as with most inclusive use, need pressures seem to predominate, here there is a heavy implicit involvement with reinforcers -- perhaps due to the

rapidity and intensity associated with the crack reaction.

On the accessory factors, CRACK loads with injection and inhalation, as well as with cigarettes. It also has significant loadings on all the purposes assayed except for enhancement and dreams. It loads with most drugs on severity under the law. And it is assigned high 'strength' as a substance.

OPIUM: Although many of the axes loading with OPIUM seem familiar, the picture is really very different from any other yet encountered. The picture of inclusive use of OPIUM is one of conflict, failure, punishment and guilt fuelling a restless, high stress person. The overall presentation comes as close as any to that of the 'paroxysmal' personality for which axis 37 was written.

OPIUM, Inclusive Use: The needs involved are linked to rigid avoidance of strong guilt feelings, with associated emotional disturbance and depression with a somatic focus. There is a marked effort to avoid depression and forget failures, associated with a history of felt failure and punishment or criticism. Compensatory needs to be different, and for vivid mental images for purposes of self-enhancement are evident, along with a need to control others.

Accessory factors loading on OPIUM use include the expected opiate purpose, along with the pursuit of tranquillity. It is associated with accompaniments but, strangely, not with dreams. Like some of the stronger substances, it loads on the purpose of being different. It also seems to function as an activator and a disinhibitor. It is associated with the inhalant mode of use, and with setting, lifestyle and paraphernalia variables.

The inclusive use of HASHISH seems to involve an array of addictive factors. They include relief of stress from effort strain and allergy stress, of stress hunger and guilt intolerance, and relief of distress of pain sensitivity, impaired self-esteem, grief, a sense of mistreatment, anger and depression, by means of a strong effort at control through rebelliousness and denial of feelings and reality. Inflexible solutions are adopted, including fixed moralizations, rigid habits and minimizing challenges as by avoiding being attractive. Social contact, influence and enjoyment are sought, along with the needs to feel different and to achieve self-enhancement partly in luxurious living. The variety of variables may well be due to the common use of HASHISH (and marijuana) along with other addictive substances. The now familiar picture that emerges is of one who seeks social enjoyments and self enhancement to distract him/her self from many forms of distress and pain. Interestingly, the most frequently loading scale (#37) does not load with HASHISH use.

Like marijuana, HASHISH is not perceived as a substance possessed of much strength, nor is it related to high severity under the law. It shows unstable relationships to most of the accessory variables of purpose, strength and the like. This is probably due to variations in the way this substance is used and in its uses along with other substances.

MARIJUANA, as expected, behaves in a manner that is quite similar to hashish. However, its relationships to the accessory variables are more stable. Presumably, this is due to the rather

standard manner in which it is used. MARIJUANA's accessory factors include the expected mellowing, opiate and tranquillizing purposes -- as though MARIJUANA functions as self-medication. MARIJUANA uses show limited involvement with common drug-related variables.

Hedonistic, hypomanic and rebellious extraverts seem to be prone to exclusive use of MARIJUANA. These might well include dealers who refrain from use of harder drugs by exercising self-control in order to control others. There is some underlying conflict associated with reactive depression and avoidance of depression and personal attractiveness. The picture for exclusive use of MARIJUANA comes as close as any other to the MMPI image of the 4-9 (Pd-Ma) delinquent.

In contrast, the person displaying inclusive use of MARIJUANA sounds most like the grown up ADD or hyperactive person. The rebelliousness and restless energy associated with a need to be different and for self-aggrandizement, along with the denial of guilt and of affect, seem to represent an effort to control the pain, loneliness, depression or grief that are felt from early childhood failures. There may be an additional element of seeking to 'look cool' in the control effort and the sense (impression rather than evidence) that, here, flat depression works like a sought-after need, as though the person has accepted the depression to achieve a sense of being 'removed from' or 'above it all', or as relief from hypomania.

The relatively weak participation of common drug-related axes might suggest that MARIJUANA use has come to be widely accepted as

though it were little more than a recreational substance. It is as though its users view it as having little potency or importance. It is worthy of note that clinical experiences with marijuana users suggest rather strongly that MARIJUANA, at the very least, has the effect of interfering with new learning and/or consolidation of new learning in the personality. If used while undergoing conditioning treatments, it seems to delay, and even to prevent, achievement of therapeutic benefits. Even cessation of its use during treatment appears to make learning sluggish, if it has been used for any appreciable time prior to cessation.

PEYOTE's inclusive use certainly seems to involve the need to try something different, to be different and have different experiences. The hedonistic need for intense experiences and self enhancement sound like hostile ways, as it were, to 'snub the nose' at others. These need pressures look as though they come from a partly formed reaction to failure, punishment, guilt or distress that may have generated a negative self-image, and left a residual of social anxiety, physiological anxiety and somatic depression.

The accessory indicators perform with PEYOTE in very different ways as compared with the other drugs. There is no significance in the relationships of PEYOTE to setting, lifestyle, paraphernalia or severity under the law. Few of the usual purposes, other than those of tranquillity and disinhibition, load with PEYOTE. It does not even load with the dreams purpose where it was thought it would be a relevant substance. It does seem to be a different drug.

The thing that seems to be different about the inclusive use



of magic MUSHROOMS is the need to hold back aggressiveness along with its common consequence in reactive depression. Perhaps MUSHROOMS serve to 'cool' the person out and create distraction in the attendant changed experience. As with so many other addictive substances, the role of subjective distress and depressions, in a context of failure experiences, seems to be a central issue in the inclusive use of MUSHROOMS. One might conclude that criminality, associated with subcultural values, social enjoyment, fixed moralizations and needs for immediate gratification, mediates involvements with other drugs.

The accessory indicators present magic MUSHROOMS as activators and dream-producers, as well as opiates and tranquillizers. The latter purposes of use may be what mediates both the relationship to medications and the inhibition of aggressive impulses.

In spite of the special status afforded it by its properties as an hallucinogen, inclusive use of LSD does not stand out here as much different from any general purpose addictive drug. It seems to include elements that are common to many of the street drugs. Still, although depressions (LSD has been tried as an anti-depressant), failure experiences, and anxiety, with the needs for relaxation and calm nerves are well represented, the overall impression is that it is used as an activating agent to defend against or compensate for inflexibility and debilitation.

The accessory indicators exhibit significant loadings for LSD with all the purposes except, surprisingly, dreams. And, again as a surprise, it is not significantly related to substance potency.

These observations present 'acid' simply as a common use drug.

Inclusive Use of PCP presents a picture not unlike that for many other drugs. The features of its inclusive use perhaps emphasize the role of inhibition and depression, built partly on a foundation of guilt feelings. Fuelled by metabolic disorder, failure experiences, guilt proneness or depressions, and supported by oppressive inhibitions and affect denial, the PCP user exhibits angry, guilt intolerant and subcultural counter-reactions to demand bright experiences, immediate gratification and marked self-enhancement in substance dependency. Half-buried in this is a sense of 'dealing with' life by ending it.

Among the accessory indicators, PCP loads with substance injection, with the opiate purpose, as a tranquillizing and mellowing agent, as well as with disinhibition, activation and as an accompaniment. This wide array of significant relationships probably comes from the association between PCP and other drug use.

There is a sense that the inclusive use of SPEED is driven by the person's needs, bred of failure and punishment, both to break through his/her own inhibitive controls (the application of which likely generates its own stress) and to increase energy in social experiences and enlivening ideas. There is a sense that aversive experience (including socializing effort) is sought as if for the purpose of self-punishment. However, it is admitted that it is hard to get a meaningful picture of SPEED use.

The accessory measures do not help to clarify the picture very

much. There is a significant relationship to cigarette use. The associations with purposes of use are scattered, including dreams, accompaniment, mellowing and tranquillization. Its associations with disinhibition and activation or arousal, however, seem to be more meaningful.

Part of the resistance to change found in exclusive CIGARETTE smokers has to do with the rigid self-images adopted. Along with dogmatism and a general effort at control, this supports a compulsive rigidity in the face of allergy and the felt need for aggression inhibition. They demand pursuit of the pep-up effect and the often remarked social contact needs involved in smoking. But another element includes guilt feelings and a reaction in rebellion and social withdrawal with resulting loneliness. Stress, aggravated by nicotine-evoked biological stress, is a product of the above features. Stress depletes resources and results in reactive depression and a felt need for relaxation and calmed nerves. The confusing nature of conflict involved here (such as rebelliousness vs. aggression-inhibition and social contact vs. withdrawal) adds to the felt need to depend on the substance.

Accessory factors associated with CIGARETTE use include the expected purpose/function as an activator and as a mellowing agent. It also has an opiate effect that is not unexpected. Again, as expected, it is associated with paraphernalia, and with a kind of lifestyle and setting -- that is, it is isolating these days due to political influence-peddling by the anti-smoking lobby.

Inclusive use of CIGARETTES differs little from exclusive use,

except that fewer of the same variables are involved. A similar rigidity in the face of allergy is to be seen, with a similar pressure for social contact. The guilt-motivated rebellion is not seen. As expected, the latter syndrome is replaced by a criminality-related syndrome (deriving from associated use of other substances) seen in subcultural values, self enhancement and enhanced experience wishes, and hypomanic enjoyment-seeking.

#### Reduction to simple structure

The foregoing characterizations of motivational factors in addictions are confusing. And there is a great deal of overlap among the variables contributing to the various addictions. This confusing overlap might be convenient if we were to set out to modify addictive behaviour. That is, it would be difficult to obtain sufficient numbers of subjects exclusively using any single substance for the demands of an experiment. If a mixed bag of addicts were to be treated, the overlapping variables involved might make group treatments practical. Our next step had to be to find commonalities among the drivers of addictions in order to reduce the number of variables involved to permit treatment design.

Reduction to simple structure of the variables involved would require several issues to be considered. We would need to reduce the variables to a number small enough to permit repeated measures and treatment to be practical. We would need to include as many issues as possible by generating quite general variables in order to address the generality of addictiveness. We would have to include both need (Nd, sD) and reinforcement (Rf, rf) variables to

modify both of these motivational factors in any treatments designed. We would have to create variables susceptible to modification using available forms of treatment. Moreover, we would have to ensure that the available treatments to be used were susceptible to use in large-group (50 or more subjects) treatment format -- to minimize experimental error from the procedures employed (as we explained in volume I). And we should be able to represent each treatment-variable among the available Addicaus axes (both by several axes and by a single most-representative axis) to permit short-term treatment effects (if any) to be measured. At least these constraints had to be considered in our efforts to achieve simplification of the structure of addictive motivations.

The first step seemed to us to be one of reducing the 68 ADDICAUS axes to a much more manageable number. We didn't know how many we should select. We were sure that it would not be practical to mount more than ten or so treatments. That suggested we ought to aim for no more than twenty axes in the short-form test.

Simple structure among a host of variables is most easily achieved by means of factor analysis. In repeated factor analyses of the 'S' and 'N' scores, fourteen factors commonly emerged. A large first factor was concerned with arousal of a stressful and uncomfortable kind. A second factor was comprised of many of the axes numbered from 58 to 67 -- axes introduced partly from early discussions in offender groups of causes and effects of substance use. A third factor was interpreted as related to sensation-seeking. A fourth involved social contact variables. A fifth and

sixth suggested criminality, respectively, from a self-centred perspective and from the perspective of values. A seventh was concerned with felt inhibitions. An eighth was concerned with social anxiety. A ninth reflected positive feelings, and a tenth was concerned with rigid attitudes. The eleventh to fourteenth were comprised of single axes, respectively, hedonism, social enjoyment, control others and affect denial. The task now reduced to one of exclusion and selection of axes.

Frequencies of entry into the discriminant analyses is one index of axis generality. Based on this, one variable was selected to represent each of the fifth (#08), sixth (#22), ninth (#24) and tenth (#36) factors, and three variables were selected from the first factor (#53, #48 and #37). We concluded that MMPI scales could be used to account for the seventh and eighth factors. This was an error, since the MMPI was not to be re-administered. The thirteenth factor was omitted because it seemed to bear mainly on drug traffickers rather than their victims. The single axes from each of the eleventh (Hedonism, #20), twelfth (Social Enjoyment, #02) and fourteenth (Affect Denial, #30) factors were included. That left ten more variables to be chosen. Factor three seemed best represented by Pep Up Effect (#40), and factor four by Social Contact Need (#10). One variable (Fast Lane Lifestyle, #44) was used since it appeared in factor one (#44N) and factor five (#44S).

The above thirteen axes were factored with combinations of seven other axes from the first and second factors. The factors derived in this way were considered for their meaningfulness and

for the extent to which they might lend themselves to conceptual simplicity and to design of treatments. In these repeated analyses, Substance Self-Enhancement (#60) seemed to maintain its position with the other variables in the second factor, and so it was selected to represent that factor. The remaining variables that held together apparently meaningfully were from the first factor, which accounted for 44% of the variance. They were Physiological Anxiety (#47), Authority Rebellion (#12), Need to be Different (#34), Allergy Stress (#46), Flat Depression (#13) and Reactive Depression (#03). That seemed to satisfy the requirement for a short-form of the ADDICAUS. But, not yet having defined the specific treatments, we were not yet ready to select specific variables to represent each of the separate treatment targets. We would need to do that in order to permit simplified measurement of any treatment effects.

#### Central Components to be Addressed

Factor analysis of the twenty selected axes yielded 8 factors. However, the first of these factors, accounting for 42% of the variance, seemed to be comprised of two conceptually different elements, namely, a behavioural (rebellious) and a cognitive (values) element. This suggested that the overall treatment program to be developed might usefully be comprised of nine different parts each aimed at a given element or factor.

We have already expressed our views about the importance of final and perpetuating causes. Also, we had been careful to ensure that these two kinds of causes were well represented in the scales

and in the S and N scores. Consequently, you might expect that both types of cause would be richly represented in the treatment program to be developed. We decided that five of the nine parts of the treatment program would be aimed primarily at modifying 'final causes' and four at modifying 'perpetuating causes'. And we concluded that the four parts addressing perpetuating causes should come first in the treatment series to limit the possibility they might perpetuate final causes and prevent modification of them.

It was now time to focus specifically on the nature of the nine component parts of the treatment program. And, in doing so, it would be important to organize each treatment component around a specific variable (axis) in order to permit evaluation of the effects of treatment to be targeted on a specific scale rather than a composite one.

#### Intervention Types

Nine general variables were identified that, it was felt, represented the factors adequately, and that should lend themselves well to treatment intervention. These nine variables are listed below, along with the axes that were construed to be related to them. You will notice that there is a plurality of axes associated with each concept. This is due to the facts that (i) most of the axes selected were generic predictors of abuses of various types of alcohols and drugs and (ii) the attempt to achieve simple structure was made inclusively rather than exclusively to ensure the widest possible coverage of treatments to be designed for the experimental addictions program. For purposes of ease of differentiation among



the several ADDICAUS axes listed for each concept, those construed to be particularly relevant to each concept are presented in **bold**, and the primary single most representative ADDICAUS axis is also **underlined**, with a secondary representative axis presented (underlined) in brackets. Finally, a title was assigned for the treatment program to be designed for each of the simple structure variables identified below.

In addition to seeking to address as many addictive issues as possible in each treatment program, each program was also designed to focus on a specific issue that could be represented simply as related to a single ADDICAUS axis (underlined axis in the above list of general concepts and axes), and a secondary single axis

<u>Tx#</u>	<u>General Concept</u>	<u>Treatment Name</u>	<u>Conceptual Contents and Related Axes</u>
1.	Failure	Creating ... SUCCESS	Failure/Punishment History/Expectation 03, <b>12</b> , 13, 20, <b>24</b> , ( <b>37</b> ), <b>47</b> , <b>48</b>
2.	Inflexibility	Creating ... FREEDOM	Rigid/Inflexible Habits/Adjustment 08, ( <b>12</b> ), <b>36</b> , <b>37</b> , <b>47</b>
3.	Excitement-Seeking	Creating ... EXCITEMENT	Apathy/Inhibition --> Stimulus-Hunger <b>12</b> , 20, 24, 30, <b>37</b> , 40, ( <b>60n</b> )
4.	Gratification Need	Creating ... SATISFACTION	Immediate Satisfaction/Relief Need 10, <b>12</b> , ( <b>13</b> ), 20, <b>24</b> , 36, <b>37</b> , <b>40</b> , 44, <b>47</b> , 48, 53
5.	Conflicted Values	Creating ... VALUES	Subcultural/Primitive/Regressive Values ( <b>08</b> ), 12, <b>13</b> , <b>22</b> , <b>34</b> , 36, <b>37</b> , 40, 44, <b>47</b> , <b>48</b>
6.	Guilt Intolerance	Creating ... INNOCENCE	Guilt-Proneness or Guilt Intolerance <b>02</b> , <b>08</b> , 12, <b>30</b> , 36, 37, 48, ( <b>60</b> )
7.	Distress	Creating ... HEALTH	Ill-Health/Stress/Distress/Anxiety 03, 08, <b>13</b> , 22, 34, 37, <b>44</b> , ( <b>47</b> ), 53
8.	Joylessness	Creating ... HAPPINESS	Depression/Joylessness/Unfulfillment <b>02</b> , 03, <b>08</b> , 10, 12, ( <b>13</b> ), 22, 30, <b>36</b> , <b>40</b> , 48, <b>53</b> , 60
9.	Weak Integration	Creating ...	A/Anti-Social Adjustment/Integration

INTEGRATION      **08,10,12,13,20,(22),30,34,36,37,40,44**

(underlined in brackets). The logic involved in design of the treatments begins to be illustrated by the explanations below of the specific axes selected to represent each treatment component.

Treatment 1 (Creating Success) was designed most specifically to affect axis 48 (History of Punitive Reinforcements), that is, failure expectations (also relevant to axis 37, with its implications of failure history).

Treatment 2 (Creating Freedom) was designed most directly to affect axis 36 (Rigid Moralizations) or the self-reward of fixed attitudes, beliefs and addictive inflexibility (also relevant to axis 12 concerned with rebelliousness).

Treatment 3 (Creating Excitement) was designed most directly to affect axis 37 ('grown up' ADDs/paroxysms) with their need to pursue and react to excitement (also relevant to the N aspect of axis 60, concerned with the rewarding effect of excitement obtained from exogenous events).

Treatment 4 (Creating Satisfaction) was designed most directly to affect axis 47 (Physiological Anxiety) by turning subjects' attention to here-and-now external sources of gratification, and to distract from preoccupation with worries about internal distress (also relevant to the joylessness of axis 13).

Treatment 5 (Creating Values) was designed most directly to affect axis 22 (Subcultural Values) in order to foster the development of values that might support a pro-social life-

style and adjustment (also relevant to the avoidance of guilt feelings expressed in axis 08).

Treatment 6 (Creating Innocence) was designed most directly to affect axis 08 (Guilt Intolerance) or the poignant sense of guilt that the person seeks to ignore or deny in defensive intolerance (also relevant to the aspect of axis 60 concerned with others' attitudes toward addictions).

Treatment 7 (Creating Health) was designed most directly to affect axis 44 (desire for Fast Lane Living) by replacing the defensive motto: 'I will live fast, die young ...' with a focus of attention on and maintenance of health (also relevant to the concern with bodily health expressed in axis 47).

Treatment 8 (Creating Happiness) was designed most directly to affect axis 40 (Pep Up Need) to counter the depressed feelings underlying this need by creating a fairly continuous happy and energized adjustment (also relevant to countering the joyless depression of axis 13).

Treatment 9 (Creating Integration) was designed most directly to affect axis 30 (Affect Denial). The generality of affect denial, underlying several of the variables (including Guilt Intolerance, Rebelliousness in the face of Authority, Flat Depression, Hedonism, etc.), recommended this axis or variable as the one most likely to represent the (summary) generality or inclusiveness intended for Treatment 9 (also represented by the anti-social and disconnected aspect of axis 22).

It is acknowledged that the derivation method for the above variables and the treatments for them is imperfectly explained. There is an element of analogical thinking involved here that it is impossible to recreate in words. The authors' many particular experiences in psychotherapy, and clinical psychology in general, participated strongly in the selection process, along with obvious selective effects acting on their memories of formerly treated clients. Understandably, these varied experiences and factors also defy description. Granting that the derivations cannot easily be explained, it is still possible to describe the treatment elements that were included in each of the above treatment programs -- although this is not attempted here (see Quirk and Reynolds, On the Nature and Modification of Addictions, 1996).

#### Design of treatment study

Scheduling treatments and their components would pose one set of problems. Thursday was Psychology's large-group treatment workshop day at the Ontario Correctional Institute (O.C.I.). Several types of treatment workshops were conducted by various members of the Psychology Department. In order to minimize the disruption of this ongoing program, the present treatment series was scheduled for every second Thursday.

Based on previous large-group treatment experiences (Quirk & Reynolds, 1991), with a brashness that some might think exceeds folly, it was decided that each of the nine treatment components would be addressed in a separate single-day (4-hour) treatment workshop. That is, only a single four-hour day was set aside in

which to provide treatment for each of the nine variables listed above. This would mean that there would be a total of nine Thursdays set aside to implement and evaluate this treatment programme, with the first four days focused mainly on reinforcers and the last five focused mainly on needs.

Each treatment day began at 9:00 AM and ended at 4:30 PM. Due to institutional counts, coffee-breaks and lunch periods, each treatment day would have to be composed of four, roughly one-hour, blocks of time: 9:00 to 10:00, 10:30 to 11:30, 1:30 to 2:30 and 3:30 to 4:30. These time ranges are a bit inaccurate, and the actual time available each day was about 4 hours and 40 minutes. However, as in past treatment workshop studies, the first and last 20 minutes of each treatment day were devoted to administration of repeating monitoring tests of motivations, affects and cognitive activity (not related to the dependent measures of the study).

The day seemed to fall fairly naturally into four hour-long time periods with ample rest between. The four time blocks were used as follows in all the present treatment workshop programs:

1st block: Orientation: The attempt was made during this time interval to direct participants' thoughts and points of view into areas and toward ideas that might foster therapeutic involvement with the methods to be used in the remaining time.

2nd block: Self-Help Tools: The attempt was made during this time to provide participants with relevant psychological tools that they might use on their own to foster therapeutic change -- self-help methods.

3rd block: Therapeutics: Here the attempt was made to get all participants involved in performing specific therapeutic or 'healing' tasks in order to provide specific in-session treatments aimed at the targets of treatment for that day.

4th block: Summary and Integration: The attempt was made in this interval to repeat and summarize that day's activities, to introduce means by which participants might be able to integrate what they had learned in their daily lives, to consolidate their learning and, if time allowed, to undertake other brief therapeutic procedures.

By any conventional treatment standards, the above plan was at least ambitious. And it will be conceived by some as presumptuous and close to preposterous. Even to hope for any therapeutic benefit from such brief and necessarily sketchy treatment would be viewed by many as overly optimistic, and perhaps even arrogant. These remarks are made to let it be known that we are not unaware of what others might think of what was being proposed. To explain, it might be pointed out that the main treatment aim was to discover whether ADDICAUS test scores could be modified by minimal treatments. If test scores were meaningfully modified, it would then be necessary to discover if addictive behaviour, viewed through criminal recidivism, was also subsequently modified.

Any therapist will wonder how treatment motivation could be ensured to obtain any benefit at all from four hours of treatment. We considered this issue carefully. It was and is our contention that treatment motivation is the responsibility of the therapist.

From previous experience with large-group treatment workshops, four factors and several additional considerations seemed to stand out as means by which treatment motivation might be optimized.

Selection of participants is an obvious first step. We were not able to exercise much control over selection of participants. We needed almost 200 O.C.I. inmates for the demands of experimental design for the ADDICURE project. The O.C.I. has 220 beds, of which only 166 are treatment beds from which we could draw participants. About 75% of those treatment beds were occupied by people with significant substance abuse as parts of their presenting problems. The fortnightly presentations, plus a couple of months hiatus after the fourth one, spread the whole programme broadly over 6 months time to permit rotation of bed use. However, this provided just enough people with addictions to fill our experimental needs. One result of this set of facts was that we had to take all available qualifying inmates, without any chance to select the motivated.

Having said this, however, it should be recalled that all residents of the O.C.I. treatment units had applied voluntarily for treatment as their main correctional programme. Moreover, we had an indirect kind of assurance that these people would be motivated to address their addiction problems. The alternative for these men would be that they would have to focus their treatment efforts on personal problems or the offenses of which they had been convicted. Most preferred to focus on their addictive behaviours.

Mutt and Jeff: We had established the practice of using two therapists in each of our large-group treatment workshops. This

was done to facilitate and maintain attention on the part of the participants. There was always a good deal of material to cover. It would be difficult for our inmate participants to keep their attention focused on the task for a full hour of work. They had some exposure to both the therapists in other settings. And the type of exposure differed for the two. We capitalized on these prior experiences, and created quite a sharp contrast between our respective approaches. One of us played the role of the reasonable and rational person who would explain material and demonstrate it. The other one played the role of an extroverted sub-maniac, talking at a fast rate, with much movement, volume and emotionalization of speech. We interrupted each other, jumping in to take over the presentation whenever either noticed a flagging of participants' attention or interest. In old-time language, we Mutt-and-Jeffed each other to keep interest and attention going.

Arousal: Motivation requires activation of arousal. However, nobody can maintain arousal for any length of time. The Mutt-and-Jeffing just described served a second purpose. Arousal occurs whenever the stimulus field involves (i) sudden changes in (ii) colourfulness, (iii) sound, (iv) movement and (v) focusing of attention. We tried to activate arousal through one therapist using (i) rapid changes in (ii) colourful language with varying (iii) volume, while (iv) moving around actively and (v) talking rapidly. The other therapist provided rest from the resulting level of arousal, while also rivetting attention by understandable explanations and intellectually satisfying demonstrations.



Riot Effect: In small-group therapy, each participant's involvement is ensured by focusing on engrossing issues from his or her own life. This source of involvement is precluded in large-group treatments. Something else needs to replace the personal issues in order to enhance involvement. It has seemed to us that this something else is the 'riot effect' in large groups. There is a kind of 'mobilization' of individual energy or arousal by being in a large group of peers involved in parallel activity. We have found that we did not have to do much to achieve this salutary effect other than (1) to assemble fairly large groups (the more the merrier, as far as we were able to go) and (2) to crank up arousal by the means described in the last paragraph. The extra little thing that may need to be done is (3) to affirm and then to provide some kind of demonstration that change and improvement in personal feelings can be accomplished -- which engenders the motivation of hope. We tried to accomplish this last element both by using some methods where immediate improvement in subjective feelings could be experienced, and by using tests to monitor motivations, affects and cognitions (mentioned earlier) at the beginning and end of each treatment day -- without our comments, participants tend to notice changes in their responses. It also seems to help if participants feel a sense of trust and liking for those making the presentation.

It seems to us that these elements, taken together, ensured adequate motivation of participants. And attempts to motivate participants were enhanced by (a) employing pragmatic statements emphasizing personal experiences with indicators of effects sought,

(b) using positive and permissive instructions and guidelines, (c) sending only congratulatory messages (and avoiding any implications of criticism or defamation), (d) speaking in the language of the participants' sub-culture, (e) encouraging the participation of all (like the others) in tasks, and (f) displaying liking, and even affection, for all participants. These initiatives, however, do demand some tiring intensity and vigilance from the therapists.

Treatment Selection: Guided by the essential issue being addressed, and seeking to achieve the outcome expressed in the treatment title (i.e., Creating ...), we selected various types of interventions that might be expected to contribute to the aim of each treatment. We drew from everything we knew, selecting those methods that might lend themselves to application in large-groups.

We tended to choose methods that were as brief as possible. This was not only due to the limitation we had imposed on ourselves in terms of the absolute available time (4 hours). It was also because we wanted to use as many different methods as possible in the time we had. There were two reasons for seeking variety in the methods used. First, people do differ in what they can accept. It should increase the chance for each participant that something might work for him/her if a wide variety of methods were to be employed. Second, in our view, one of the primary purposes of treatment is to increase a person's (sense of) freedom. Freedom is freedom of choice. The more options of response/coping/strategy a person has open to him/her, the greater is his/her freedom. One reason why people seek treatment is that they have become 'stuck'

in the (symptomatic) behaviour that they have learned. Treatment seeks to foster alternative means of coping in life -- that is, greater freedom.

So far, we've tried to suggest a way to understand addictions, to talk about how their causes might be measured, to show some of the characteristics of various kinds of addictive behaviour, and to allude to some treatments we put together to treat some general aspects of addiction. The next question you will want us to address is: 'Does it work?' However, before we can consider that question meaningfully, we have to ask you to think through with us just what 'does it work' means.

Of course, the final question about whether it works comes down to: 'Do the treatments result in getting rid of addictions?' To find a proper answer to that question would require continuing, intimate contact, over many years, with all those treated. We're sorry, but that's utterly impractical. The individual person, alone, at a ripe old age, can look back over his/her life and decide (a) whether his/her addictions changed or vanished, and (b) the turning point at which that happened, if it did. But to do that, he/she would have to wait until the rest of us are dead and gone, and we would have to come back to haunt large numbers of people's lives and to read their minds. Frankly, we plan to be much too happy in our after-lives to worry about doing that. So bear with us while we try to be a bit more practical than that.

You might recall that the ADDICAUS instrument was not only created to help us to understand addictions and to find relevant

variables to treat. Its other purpose was to provide a means to measure changes in the identified causes. It's true that neither you nor we would be satisfied at this stage of our understanding to restrict ourselves to findings about treatment effects limited to test scores. Neither you nor we would yet trust the ADDICAUS test results for the leap of faith required to assume that test measure changes offer assurance that addiction has been modified -- though it would be nice to be able to make that kind of leap someday. Still, hoping to reach that position in the future, our first step should certainly be to find whether implementation of these kinds of treatments has any effect on the ADDICAUS test measures. At least we might consider retest results from the ADDICAUS as one way to get at a short-term answer to the question of 'does it work?'

If we are able to show some short-term effects on the ADDICAUS test scores, it would then be worthwhile to go to the trouble to see if the treatments have any medium-term effects on criminal recidivism. We pointed out earlier that one way to discover whether addictive behaviour has been modified, albeit indirectly, might be to examine subsequent criminal recidivism among addicted offenders. You might want to review that argument at this point. Certainly, if the tests scores change and if criminal recidivism rates change among those treated, we would be in a reasonable position to argue that addictions were affected.

It is true that neither of the above ways to discover whether these treatments 'work' is definitive. Earlier in this chapter, we argued that a proper answer to the question would be impossible, or

at least impractical. The only other possibly practical way we have been able to figure out is that, if the test scores and criminal recidivism can be shown to change following treatment, we might then be in a position to experiment with prevention to see if that results in adequate reductions in subsequent addiction rates. As far as we can see, that sort of demonstration would be as far as we could go to discover whether ADDICAUS (i) does identify causes of addictions that, modified, (ii) modify addictive behaviour.

Subjects: All O.C.I. inmates who were residents on any of the treatment units during the period of time from July to December 1993 were considered for inclusion in this experiment. All those residents whose MAST (Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test) and/or DAST (Drug Abuse Screening Test) scores revealed substance use at significant costs to them in discomfort and inconvenience were accepted as research subjects. About 75 percent (N=193) of the residents on treatment units over that time interval qualified for inclusion in this way.

Experimental Design: Since inmates are admitted to treatment units as beds become available, we concluded that treatment unit inmates' release dates would not be subject to systematic effects, and thus could serve as convenient means to randomize assignment of subjects to groups. Thus subjects were assigned to experimental conditions strictly on the basis of their discharge possible dates.

It was recognized that four hours of treatment time would, at best, serve as minimal time in which to achieve any therapeutic benefits. It seemed likely that greater amounts of treatment might

result in increased therapeutic effects. Since it was intended to undertake follow-up of all research subjects to determine their criminal recidivism status (and implicitly their addictive status) two years following release, provisions were made to enhance the chance of 'success' at that medium-term follow-up point. For this purpose, in addition to the no-treatment control group subjects, it was decided to assign experimental groups to varying 'amounts' of treatment. Five levels of 'amount of treatment' were adopted, resulting in 163 inmates (55 per program), in the following numbers, being assigned to the following experimental groups:

- (c) one control group invited to attend no programs (cN=30),
- (e-m) 9 groups, each invited to attend one program (e-mN=11),
- (a) invited to attend the first 4 treatment programs (aN=20),
- (b) invited to attend the last 5 treatment programs (bN=20),
- (d) invited to attend all 9 treatment programs (dN=24).

Again, it was recognized that four hours of treatment would be minimal time in which to achieve any therapeutic benefits. It was decided, therefore, that, in order to be included in the data analyses as having 'received a treatment program', an inmate should have attended at least a majority of the time for that program. Consequently, the experimental independent variable was set at 3 or 4 hours, to be compared with the control group's zero (0) hours, of attendance at each separate treatment program.

Testing: All inmates, regardless of whether or not they would remain for treatment at the O.C.I., were administered a series of tests at the point of their admission to the O.C.I. intake unit.

The test battery used was listed earlier.

Pre/Post-Testing: All Experimental and Control group subjects were tested again twice following admission to a treatment unit. The tests used at these second and third administrations were the short-form (20 axis) ADDICAUS (DAQ) and the STFB (Reynolds, 1996). The first re-tests were administered after transfer to a treatment unit and about a month prior to participation in the experimental program. The second re-tests were done about a month after completion of participation in the program (or a month or more following the first re-test for the Control group). Because of early releases on parole or transfer to other institutions, not all of the subjects attended all their assigned treatments and/or the second re-testing.

Measures: The regression of each post-treatment measure on its pre-treatment counterpart was computed, and standardized residual gain scores calculated, for all the ADDICAUS ('S' and 'N' scores for all 20) axes and STFB factor scores. The residual gain scores for the twenty ADDICAUS 'S', the twenty ADDICAUS 'N' and the nine STFB scales served as the dependent measures in this study.

Results: In the following tables, the 9 treatment programs are represented in the columns, and the ADDICAUS axes are displayed in the rows. The cells present the two-tailed probabilities of t-tests of mean differences of residual gain scores for subjects receiving 3-4 hours or 0 hours of each treatment. For ease of recognition, significant probabilities are presented in **bold**, and specifically predicted relationships are emphasized by underlining

their probabilities.

We begin by summarizing the results obtained by all nine treatments on all 20 ADDICAUS axes. Of the 17 S and 18 N specific hypotheses (from the earlier listing of treatments and axes), 16 S and 16 N (91%) were confirmed. Of the 24 S and 24 N 'main' predicted effects (**bold** type in listing general treatment concepts and axes) 18 S and 14 N (67%) were confirmed. Of the 42 S and 42 N secondary predictions, 15 S and 13 N (33%) were confirmed. And of the 96 S and 96 N statistical tests where no treatment effects were expected, 7 S and 5 N (6%) displayed statistically significant findings -- just about exactly the 5% rate expected by chance alone. These observations tend to offer confirmation of our experimental hypotheses:

1. The ADDICAUS (DAQ) scores are meaningfully modifiable by suitably designed interventions (construct validity),
2. The ADDICURE treatments did address the addiction-related variables they were selected to modify (precision), and
3. To the extent that the DAQ axes represent causes underlying addictive behaviour, these causes were modified, justifying the planned 2-year follow-up on all the research subjects.
4. The experimental hypothesis that differential treatment could be demonstrated demands visual presentation in table form. Such differential treatment is achieved if a treatment program, devised to address one variable and not others, is shown to affect that variable but not the others.



We had originally selected one primary and one secondary ADDICAUS axis best to represent each of the treatments (earlier listing of treatment issues and related axes), specifically in order to test differential treatment effects. The effects of each treatment on its most specific primary and secondary target ADDICAUS axes are displayed in Tables 1 and 2. Tables 1 ('S' scores) and 2 ('N' scores) present the results associated with the experimental hypothesis that 'differential treatment' can be demonstrated on the ADDICAUS axes.

Tables 1 and 2 display the effects of each of the 9 treatment programs on each of 9 ADDICAUS axes, for which a different treatment was designed -- with the additional axes involved in the secondary targets appended. Tables 1 and 2 are structured so that the ADDICAUS axes on which the primary effects are expected are presented in the same descending order as the treatment programs devised to treat them. Consequently, under the experimental hypothesis of 'differential treatment', ideally, the significant probabilities (displayed in **bold** type) should be found mainly on the diagonal of cells from upper left to lower right -- underlined in the tables to mark cells expected to show significant findings.

Tables 1 ('S' scores) and 2 ('N' scores) indicate that significant treatment effects were achieved, and that differential treatment was also achieved. Significant probabilities were found for all (100%) of the single treatment effects on their most relevant single axes -- upper-left to lower-right diagonal of each table's cells. It is true that differential treatment effects did

not achieve an absolutely perfect match with the 'ideal'. Of the nine secondary predictions in each table, 1 S and 2 N were not confirmed (83% confirmed). Of the 180 cells in which statistical significance should not be observed under a strict application of the differential treatment hypothesis, 31 S and 27 N (32%) display statistical significance, although 26 S and 23 N of those (27%) were predicted under the extended hypotheses (List of Treatments and Axes presented earlier), leaving 5 S and 4 N (5%) of the statistically significant findings in Tables 1 and 2 not predicted.

Tables 1 and 2 cannot be passed over without emphasis and some further comment. The degree of differential treatment effects demonstrated in these tables has rarely been paralleled in research in psychotherapy. We know of no other work reflecting equivalent amounts of precision, whether in test measurement or in treatment design, other than that achieved in our work with criminality (see Practical Peace volume I). Indeed, most psychotherapists would deny that such degrees of accuracy are possible, and some might even say that accuracy at this level is undesirable. Of course, we would disagree with both contentions on empirical and theoretical grounds. On too many occasions we have encountered clients whose former psychotherapy, apparently by addressing the personality as a whole to modify presenting symptom(s), has eventuated in greater degrees of disturbance or disorder and/or more extensive distress or maladaptation than was apparent prior to psychotherapy. The counter-arguments concerning this sort of issue are too obvious, and probably too specious, to warrant further comment.

Short-term Effects: Study 2: The results obtained in ADDICURE Study #1 are sufficiently arresting that they demand replication. If an effect is not repeatable it is of little scientific interest.

Besides, we were uncomfortable with one aspect of the first study. Although we could find no clear basis for doubting the method of randomization we used in assigning subjects to groups, the method was at least somewhat unconventional. We wanted to try out a different way of assigning subjects to groups.

There were two other considerations. First, we wanted to provide for greater 'amounts' of treatment, without, as in Study #1, creating diffusion of treatment effects by admitting subjects to differing amounts of different treatment programmes. We wanted to see what would happen if we increased the amount of treatment (from 4 to 12 hours) for each separate treatment issue (target).

Table 3: Probabilities of Treatment Effects on Most Relevant DAQ 'S' Axes.

TREATMENTS: CREATING .....	Tx1	Tx2	Tx3	Tx4	Tx5	Tx6	Tx7	Tx8	Tx9
DAQ AXES: NAME, NUMBER, SN	SUCCES	FLEXIB	EXCITE	SATISF	VALUES	INNOCE	HEALTH	HAPPIN	INTEGR
Punitive Rewards Hx 48 S	<b>.04p</b>	.21	.22	<b>.10p</b>	<b>.09p</b>	.36p	.24	.19p	.55
Rigid Moralization 36 S	.71	<b>.01p</b>	.58	.35p	.40p	.36p	.23	.13p	<b>.02p</b>
Paroxysmal Energy 37 S	<b>(.01)p</b>	<b>.03p</b>	<b>.01p</b>	<b>.00p</b>	<b>.02p</b>	.12p	.12p	.12	<b>.05p</b>
Physiologic Anxiety 47 S	<b>.00p</b>	<b>.04p</b>	.07	<b>.00p</b>	<b>.01p</b>	.11	<b>(.01)p</b>	<b>.05</b>	<b>.04</b>
Subcultural Values 22 S	.90	.71	.22	.27	<b>.03p</b>	.22	<b>.10p</b>	.11p	<b>(.05)p</b>
Guilt Intolerance 08 S	.18	<b>.10p</b>	.06	<b>.02</b>	<b>(.01)p</b>	<b>.01p</b>	<b>.00p</b>	<b>.01p</b>	<b>.00p</b>
Fast Lane Living 44 S	.43	.85	.43	<b>.05p</b>	.18p	.30	<b>.04p</b>	.11	<b>.09p</b>
Pep Up Need 40 S	.59	.62	.31p	.60p	.60p	.61	.57	<b>.04p</b>	.15p
Affect Denial 30 S	.66	.27	.42p	.50	.39	.91p	.91	.69p	<b>.08p</b>
Authority Rebellion 12 S	<b>.03p</b>	<b>(.08)p</b>	<b>.03p</b>	<b>.00p</b>	<b>.02p</b>	.12p	<b>.03</b>	<b>.02p</b>	<b>.01p</b>
Flat Depression 13 S	.20p	.57	.39	<b>(.05)p</b>	<b>.03p</b>	.15	<b>.04p</b>	<b>(.15)p</b>	.18p
Substance Excitement 60 S	.54	.48	.72p	.32	.10	<b>(.04)p</b>	.06	<b>.05p</b>	<b>.03</b>

Two-tailed tests

**bold** = significant; underlined = main predictions; p = predicted (whether or not significant).Table 4: Probabilities of Treatment Effects on Most Relevant DAQ 'N' Axes.

TREATMENTS: CREATING .....	Tx1	Tx2	Tx3	Tx4	Tx5	Tx6	Tx7	Tx8	Tx9
DAQ AXES: NAME, NUMBER, SN	SUCCES	FLEXIB	EXCITE	SATISF	VALUES	INNOCE	HEALTH	HAPPIN	INTEGR
Punitive Rewards Hx 48 N	<b>.10p</b>	.94	.66	.33p	.14p	.56p	.23	.33p	.49
Rigid Moralization 36 N	.95	<b>.04p</b>	.72	.32p	.42p	.79p	.54	.43p	<b>.10p</b>
Substance Excitement 37 N	<b>(.01)p</b>	.12p	<b>.08p</b>	<b>.01p</b>	<b>.05p</b>	.27p	.17p	.16	.11p
Physiologic Anxiety 47 N	<b>.03p</b>	.18p	.27	<b>.03p</b>	<b>.03p</b>	.31	<b>(.02)p</b>	.09	.09
Subcultural Values 22 N	.92	.87	.34	.48	<b>.02p</b>	.16	<b>.06p</b>	<b>.08p</b>	<b>(.06)p</b>

Guilt Intolerance	08 N	.08	<b>.03p</b>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.00</b>	<b>(.00)p</b>	<b>.01p</b>	.00p	.00p	.00p
Fast Lane Living	44 N	.29	.82	.63	.15p	.19p	.31	<b>.04p</b>	.19	<b>.09p</b>
Pep Up Need	40 N	.85	.90	.49p	.85p	.29p	.57	.34	<b>.04p</b>	<b>.08p</b>
Affect Denial	30 N	.79	.37	.48p	.75	.32	.71p	.54	.52p	<b>.06p</b>
Authority Rebellion	12 N	<b>.04p</b>	<b>(.11)p</b>	<b>.04p</b>	<b>.00p</b>	<b>.02p</b>	.12p	<b>.02</b>	<b>.02p</b>	<b>.00p</b>
Flat Depression	13 N	.16p	.48	.32	<b>(.08)p</b>	<b>.02p</b>	.07	<b>.02p</b>	<b>(.05)p</b>	<b>.09p</b>
Substance Excitement	60 N	.33	.74	<b>(.75)p</b>	.48	.16	<b>(.06)p</b>	.12	<b>.10p</b>	<b>.05</b>

Two-tailed tests

**bold** = significant; underlined = main predictions; p = predicted (whether or not significant).

Second, we had achieved similar differential treatment effects in our criminality project (Volume I). That work also demanded replication. To undertake two complete treatment studies to address fifteen different treatment issues (9 ADDICAUS plus 6 STFB treatment targets) would be impractical, if only because one of us had already retired and the other was about to retire. These three issues (randomization, increased treatment and replication of two projects) had to be addressed.

To reduce the task size, we examined the nine ADDICAUS and six STFB treatment variables to see if they could conveniently be combined. Only two of the target treatment issues

seemed mutually compatible. STFB Factor 0-1, Guilt Intolerance, seemed similar in some ways to ADDICAUS Axis 08, Guilt Intolerance. The STFB factor is concerned with angry denial of guilt, and its conversion to excitement. The ADDICAUS axis is concerned with the need to relieve intolerable felt guilt. The difference between the two variables was there to be seen, but we tended to diminish the differences in the service of expediency given our felt urgency. STFB Factor 0-2, Inferiority Intolerance, seemed similar in some ways to ADDICAUS Axes 48 and/or 37 (history of Punishments and Failures, respectively). The STFB factor is concerned with angry denial of inferiority feelings, with an ego expanding sense of superiority. The ADDICAUS axes are concerned with the internally experienced distress in contemplating personal history and the painful rejections implied in that history. Again, the differences between the STFB and ADDICAUS variables were there to be seen, but were diminished in the service of expediency. Perhaps too incautiously, we selected these two variables (feelings/rejection of guilt and inferiority) as the treatment targets for a combined replication of the STFB and ADDICURE studies.

The amount of treatment could now be increased for the two variables, without making the task impractical. It would allow three day-long (12 hours) treatment workshops to address each of the two selected variables. We were able to accommodate six day-long treatment workshops in the 1995 summer treatment schedule. Undertaking the task in this way would allow us to increase the amount of treatment for the single variables without the risk of

confounding or diffusing effects from other potentially related treatments. We designed the two extended treatments essentially by combining the treatment programmes we had used to target the STFB 0-1 and 0-2 factors and the ADDICAUS 08 and 48 or 37 axes. In retrospect, the treatments were designed rather hastily, and without adequate attention to the detail of the differences between the two types of variables. Incautious design must have its costs.

Subject assignment to groups was undertaken quite carefully. After transfer from the intake unit to a treatment unit, inmate subjects were considered if they met four criteria, representing behaviour and cognitive domains of criminality and addictions. The criteria were: (1) prior criminal recidivism and (2) documented resistant addiction(s) before the present incarceration (behaviour criteria), and major elevations (3) on the MMPI Pd (group Mean T = 84.6), Habitual Criminality (group Mean T = 84.9) and Recidivism (group Mean T = 74.9) scales (Mean sum of the three T-scores = 245, SD = 28) and (4) on the MAST (costs of alcohol abuse; group Mean = 13.4) and/or DAST (costs of drug abuse; group Mean = 10.3) scales (Mean MAST + DAST = 24, SD = 8) at admission (cognitive criteria). Parenthetically, Hare (1991) Psychopathy Checklist (PCL) scores were calculated for a subset of 36 of these subjects. The group PCL-Total Mean score was 22.3 -- i.e., moderately psychopathic.

We knew that age and treatment unit to which an inmate was assigned would affect treatment outcome to some extent. Therefore, those inmate subjects selected to be 'considered' were assembled in groups of three such that all three were from the same unit, and

were approximately the same age (maximum variation to within the same decade of life). The three subjects in each triad were listed in alphabetical order, and then assigned to experimental conditions at random by the roll of a die. The first subject selected was assigned to the Control condition, and the other two were assigned to one of the Experimental treatments. This process was repeated until twenty-four triads were assigned to experimental conditions.

The above procedure provided for 24 subjects in each of three groups (1 control and 2 experimental) such that half of the Control group was yoked to the members of each of the Experimental groups. Given the number of available inmates who passed the 'considered' criteria by the date on which the study was started, it proved to be impractical to yoke all three groups together, as had originally been planned. However, it would not be necessary to compare the performances of the two experimental groups with each other. So the fact that they were not yoked to one another should not pose any problem for the experimental design.

Testing was undertaken in the same way as in Study #1. The same tests were administered to inmates upon admission to the intake unit as in the first study. After they had been moved to a treatment unit, experimental and control subjects were tested again (pre-test) with the ADDICAUS and the STFB about a month prior to their participation in the present study, and yet again (post-test) about a month after completing involvement in the study.

Measures were handled as in the first study. The regressions of all the post- on the pre-treatment ADDICAUS and STFB test scores



were computed, and residual gain scores saved for each subject. These served as the dependent measures. The independent variable was attendance at each treatment series. Subjects in each group were considered only if they had (i) attended more than half (more than 6 hours) of the total treatment time for a program, and (ii) completed the pre- and post- tests. Eighteen (18) of the original 24 subjects in each group met these requirements.

ADDICURE #2 Experimental Results: Table 3 presents the results of the second study. Although not exactly as predicted, hind-sight makes the results seem understandable. When this treatment series was being planned and executed, the authors were actively involved in writing up the ADDICURE treatment program. It would appear that the treatments may have been slightly more closely attuned to the ADDICAUS variables than the to the STFB variables. Moreover, the design of the treatment for Inferiority Intolerance must have been influenced by its distress aspect, at the expense of the sense of social rejection and shame that characterizes the DAQ variable.

The thing that stands out in the results reported in Table 3 is that the treatment effects were not diffused, but seem to have been limited to specific variables. Guilt Intolerance treatment seems to have performed roughly as we might wish on both STFB and ADDICAUS scores. But Inferiority Intolerance treatment appears to have 'missed' both its DAQ and STFB targets, affecting only the 'N' aspect of the Physiological Anxiety (47) axis, and 'skimming' the Guilt Intolerance variables. The same effects are obtained from manova analyses co-varying other variables (Age, MAST, DAST).

What may be more distressing about the results of this study is the narrowness of the effects of the treatments. By seeking to avoid diffusing and confounding effects of treatment for other variables, we may have diminished the breadth of effects on the ADDICAUS variables, thus potentially diminishing the effects of treatment on the general problem of addictions in our subjects. That is, by being too target-specific in our treatments, we may have reduced our capacity to affect our medium-term measure of criminal recidivism (and, indirectly, addictions). However, we are not yet able to discover what happened on that medium-term measure of treatment effects.

Medium-term Effects: Study #3: Although too short a time has elapsed since Study #2 for us to be able to evaluate its medium-term effects, the same is not true of Study #1. All of the former inmates from Study #1 have been released for a full two years time.

Table 3: F-test probabilities (two-tailed) of the effects of two treatments on DAQ S & N and STFB residual gain scores.

F-Test Results	DAQ 'S' / STFB		DAQ 'N' SCORES	
DAQ Axes and STFB Factors	Tx A	Tx B	Tx A	Tx B
02: Social Enjoyment	.97	.51	.69	.83
03: Reactive Depression	.32	.27	.11	.32
<b>08: Guilt Intolerance</b>	<b>.06</b>	.22	<b>.01</b>	<b>.08</b>
10: Social Contact Wish	.85	.70	.45	.96
12: Authority Rebellion	.32	.42	.26	.12
13: Flat Depression	.26	.16	.22	.23
20: Hedonism	.64	.14	.82	.12
22: Sub-Cultural Values	.85	.76	.98	.91
24: PIG; Resiliency	.47	.73	.80	.49
30: Affect Denial	.90	.86	.75	.99
34: Wish To Be Different	.72	.19	.76	.51
36: Rigid Moralizations	.49	.77	.56	.96
<b>37: Paroxysmal; Failures</b>	.32	<b>.92</b>	.25	<b>.85</b>
40: Pep Up Wish	.70	.34	.31	.47
44: Fast Lane Living	.73	.94	.79	.94
46: Allergy Stress	.90	.27	.80	.52

<b>47: Physiological Anxiety</b>	.48	.28	.39	<b>.05</b>
<b>48: Punitive Rewards</b>	.75	.55	.68	<b>.67</b>
53: Somatic Depression	.96	.18	.71	.28
50: Substance Excitement	.51	.52	.56	.59
<b>STFB 1: Guilt Intolerance</b>	<b>.09</b>	<b>.06</b>	---	---
<b>STFB 2: Inferiority Intol</b>	.37	.17	---	---
STFB 3: Distress Intoler.	.61	.19	---	---
STFB 4: Sensitivity Intol	.11	.26	---	---
STFB 5: Conformity Intol.	.17	.38	---	---
STFB 6: Discipline Intol.	.81	.21	---	---

And their justice system records were examined an average of 26.6 months after they were released from the sentences in which they were treated. The types of information obtained on each former inmate from his justice system records is shown below. The dependent measures in this medium-term effects study include:

Recidivism: Criminal recidivism subsequent to the sentence in which they were treated: 0 = None; 1 = Convicted recidivist.

Counts: Number of Counts of any subsequent offenses: 0 = None.

Survival: Number of months on the street from release to the point of criminal recidivism: 24 = Non-recidivist.

Log-Severity of criminal recidivism: Aggregate sentence days (shown to be a good estimate of criminal seriousness: Quirk, Nutbrown and Reynolds, 1991) imposed for subsequent offenses: 0 = Non-recidivist. Severity scores were logarithmically transformed to deal with the problem of extreme seriousness scores obtained by some recidivists who perform very serious crimes, in contrast to the zero scores of non-recidivists.

ADDICURE #3 Experimental Results: Table 4 presents the results of the medium-term (2-year) follow-up for the subjects from Study #1. It displays the results of the several treatments on four

measures of subsequent criminal conduct, namely, reconviction and, if reconvicted, number of offence counts and (log.) severity of offenses (from sentence length), and duration of survival on the street without further offenses. The results are not quite as clear as we might wish. You will notice that Recidivism is significantly affected by all the treatments except the most general one (Treatment 9). Four of the nine treatments appear to have affected the offence Severity score to a significant degree.

Table 4: F-Test probabilities for Medium-term (2-year) follow-up results on criminal recidivism from ADDICURE #1.

TREATMENTS/OUTCOME	RECIDIV.	COUNTS	SURVIVAL	LOGSEVER
Tx 1: SUCCESS	.03	.35	.92	.38
Tx 2: FLEXIBILITY	.00	.08	.27	.04
Tx 3: EXCITEMENT	.03	.28	.95	.31
Tx 4: SATISFACTION	.02	.53	.87	.17
Tx 5: VALUES	.01	.05	.28	.09
Tx 6: INNOCENCE	.03	.20	.55	.19
Tx 7: HEALTH	.01	.13	.39	.09
Tx 8: HAPPINESS	.00	.17	.26	.02
Tx 9: INTEGRATION	.42	.47	.55	.98

Two-tailed tests

In principle, predictions of effects apply to all the cells in Table 4. Out of 36 predictions, 14 (39%) were confirmed -- to be compared with the 5% expected if chance factors alone accounted for the results.

Statistics indicate the degree of confidence with which a statement of effects can be made. That tells us very little about the effects achieved with human beings. We are not yet in position to be able to understand the real human qualities of the people represented by our statistics. (1) We do know that about 95% of

the types of incarcerates we see at the O.C.I. who will be convicted of further offenses, tend to become recidivists within about two years of their releases. (2) We do know that about 60% to 65% of the types of inmates treated at the O.C.I. tend to be convicted of further offenses within two years if they serve their time at settings other than the O.C.I. (3) We do know that, if these types of offenders remain at the O.C.I. and receive the basic treatment programme there, their 2-year recidivism rate drops to about 43% (Wolfus & Stasiak, 1991). (4) The post-release time elapsed for the inmates involved in ADDICURE Study #1 is two years.

Table 5 displays the recidivism rates (percentages) found in ADDICURE #1 for control group (0 hours) and for experimental group members who attended 3 or more hours of treatment at varying numbers of the programs: 1 or more, 2 or more, 3 or more, etc. Of course, the chi-square is significant ( $p < .02$ ). However, the percentages seem more 'telling'. It would seem that a plurality of ADDICURE specific treatments adds appreciably to the overall O.C.I. (non-specific) treatment effect, at least among addicted offenders -- if we can rely on these results, given the decreasing numbers of subjects involved at increasing 'amounts' of treatment.

Table 5: Percentages of ADDICURE #1 subjects convicted of further offenses, and Numbers of subjects in each group (by 'amount' of ADDICURE treatment received).

<u>Treatment 'Amount'</u>	<u>Tx=0</u>	<u>Tx &gt; 0</u>	<u>Tx &gt; 1</u>	<u>Tx &gt; 2</u>	<u>Tx &gt; 3</u>	<u>Tx &gt; 4</u>	<u>Tx &gt; 5</u>
<u>Subject Numbers</u>	32	138	52	45	36	24	9
<u>Recidivism %age</u>	38%	30%	23%	20%	19%	21%	0%

Tx > 0 means 1 or more treatments; Tx > 1 means 2 or more treatments; etc.

Much more needs to be discovered about these treatment effects on individual people. For the present, it seems fair to remark that, considering the minimal amounts of treatment afforded to the inmates in Study #1, it seems almost a miracle that any recidivism effects at all were observable after two years on the street.

But a single study can be misleading. Any experiment needs to be replicated if conclusions and action are to be based on it. Consequently, the addictions and criminality replication (Study #2) was undertaken. The average follow-up interval since the releases of the offenders involved in this study has now reached 15.6 months. Since the average time-on-the-street prior to criminal recidivism, on the part of those in this study who re-offended, was 11 months (range 1 to 16 months), it seems likely that most of the recidivists in the study can be identified at this point. Thus, the justice system files of the subjects of study #2 were examined.

It might be recalled that there were three groups of subjects in Study #2. The (no treatment) Control group was yoked half to each of the two Experimental treatment groups. The Experimental treatment groups each were invited to attend three days (12 hours) of treatment aimed at a single aspect (more or less) common to addictions and criminality. There were highly specific, if not entirely as predicted, effects of these targeted treatments on these subjects' ADDICAUS and STFB (criminality) scores.

The subsequent criminality of these subjects was expressed for purposes of this study (Study #4), as in Study #3, in terms of subsequent criminal Recidivism, Survival time on the street without

further convictions, Number of offence Counts and Severity of offenses in the event of further convictions. The results obtained on the test measures have already been reported (Table 3).

Medium-term results, Study #4: The two replication study treatments had no significant effect on Survival on the street. However, both treatments eventuated in significant reductions in Recidivism rates ( $p < .001$ ) and in Number of Counts and Severity of offenses in the event of further convictions. Unfortunately, the follow-up interval used in this replication study was somewhat less than might be hoped (see above).

### Conclusions

In this chapter, we have tried to illustrate the role of motivations in addictions. We showed that a test of motivations (Addicaus) accounted for most of the variance of addictive behaviour in groups of addicted criminal offenders, and that we were able to identify most of the causes controlling various types of addictive behaviour in need (final cause, purpose) and outcome (perpetuating cause, reinforcement) aspects of motivation. Moreover, we were able to show that minimal amounts of treatment aimed at modifying these kinds of variables significantly reduced subsequent test scores relevant to the involved motivations, and significantly and profoundly reduced subsequent criminal recidivism over a two-year follow-up interval -- implicitly due to modifying the addictive behaviour of the offender subjects. And most of these effects of treatment were shown to be capable of replication in a second controlled experiment.

Since subsequent criminal conduct was used as the means by which to evaluate the behavioural effects of the addictions treatment programs, it seems clear that the results of these studies are directly relevant to the modification of disturbances of the peace. And, since the target of modification was motivation (relevant to addictions), it seems fair to conclude that we have been able to show that motivations related to peace and its disturbances can be modified in brief and efficient treatment or training programs.

Once more in this volume we must apologize for the relatively lengthy and convoluted presentation concerning addictions. We can only justify all the above detail by saying that we felt it was important to select one part of our presentation for explicit and extended presentation to illustrate the fact that we have proceeded carefully and self-critically in this segment, as in all parts, of our work in preparing for this treatise. Although it is true that NOT all of the statements we make throughout this volume have been as carefully evaluated as those made in this chapter, we have tried to restrict our remarks throughout to statements concerning which we believe we have at least some convincing evidence -- although we have not cluttered the presentation elsewhere with the relevant evidence.



## Part II

## Trying a Positive Approach

## Chapter 8

## Creating Serenity

Why would anybody set out to achieve serenity? Arousal and excitement are fun. Serenity would be pretty boring in the eyes of many people. Part of the reason for this view of serenity lies in how many people understand the idea. Many of us have allowed ourselves to experience feelings mainly from one pole of arousal, namely, distress as fear, anger, depressed mood or the inhibited feelings of rationality. These people tend to experience arousal as either unpleasant or exciting, and the absence of arousal as little more than a kind of relief, rest or temporary hiatus. For these people, serenity is most like the experience of 'vegging out' or boredom, or even mild depression.

Since the view referred to above is fairly common, it demands attention here. How does restriction of feelings come into being? Contrary to stereotypes, this state is as common among women and men. It is a fairly simple by-product of a particular kind of experience during the years of growing up. The child passes through several stages of development of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1976: Moral stages and moralization: The cognitive-developmental approach. In Likona, T. (Ed.) *Moral Development and Behavior*. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston.) identifies the first three stages as those of (1) avoiding punishment, (2) 'good' child mentality (seeking reward) and (3) 'law and order' thinking (avoiding

disapproval). Many people, including most criminal offenders, do not develop beyond the third stage. They may become 'stuck' or fixated in one of the earlier stages. Such people tend not to experience human interactions and life in ways other than distress and its relief.

A similar outcome can occur in a different way. In volume I we described a couple of outcomes of introversion. In addition to the restraining effect of thought on activity and the excessive 'rationality' derived from the pressure of thinking, thought itself, being abstract and nominalized, tends to create avoidance and evaluative values. The result tends commonly to be that the person is conscious mainly of critical attitudes and avoidance kinds of motivation -- anxiety. Reliance on nominalizations also tends to fixate the person in any experienced feeling inhibition.

The foregoing elements refer to 'final' cause initiatives of the developing individual. His or her approach to life is formed by his or her purposes -- to avoid disapproval or criticism. But there might also be an 'initial' cause element involved here.

Parents have many things to do, in addition to being parents. They have to work, interact with their friends and communities, eat, sleep and be entertained. To meet all the requirements of their lives, they have to be efficient. No parent has the time to follow a child around all day long reacting favourably ('good', 'good') to each action of the child. Instead, they allow the child to grow up, taking responsibility mainly for the child's safety and needs during the crucial early years. To do this efficiently, they

tend to go about their life tasks watching the child out of the corners of their eyes. When the child does something dangerous or suggesting a risk of faulty development, they warn, reprove or correct the child. Such parental reactions, being concerned with worrisome or dangerous child behaviour, tend to be uttered with both urgency and anxious arousal -- which certainly communicates itself to the child. Thus most children experience their strongest kind of arousal as anxiety, and the commonest demand made on them as that for avoidance or prevention. Thus a major part of the child's growing up experience tends to involve drawing his or her attention to his or her mistakes and failures to meet standards.

By the time the child has grown up, he or she tends to know more about his or her mistakes and failures than about his or her successes and 'goodnesses'. In our experience, when we have asked people to describe themselves, they tend to start off with a series of their strengths and 'good' points and, when pressed further, go on at great length talking about their many weaknesses, failures and mistakes in life. This predominant focus on mistakes and failures sets the person up to spend much of his or her life trying to avoid error. This can be seen in the ways in which people approach daily tasks such as cleaning (getting rid of dirt), cooking (avoiding food poisoning or unliked foods), working (avoiding complaint, error and poverty), interacting (avoiding hurtful or impolite acts), etc. We have spoken of this predominant tendency in many people before in our remarks about avoidance or negative values.

You might remember our description of the conflict between approach and avoidance tendencies (volume I, chapter 2). There we pointed out that the avoidance gradient is stronger than the approach gradient at any given moment in time (the events of the moment are represented as close to the immediate 'goal box'). If avoidance becomes habitual by any of the means described above (or others), avoidance values tend to be formed, and much (even all) of life becomes a constant experience of anxious arousal and avoidance -- punctuated occasionally by 'relief' when successful avoidance has occurred. It is in this way that the state described at the beginning of this chapter is acquired by many people.

The problem we have encountered in trying to modify this kind of almost exclusive pursuit of avoidance, with its anxious and exciting arousal, is that most people having these characteristics tend to consider their way of reacting as the only possible, and certainly the only 'safe' way. To tell such people that we live in an engineered safe society where risks are minimal, is to ensure that the speaker is looked upon with (perhaps amiable and tolerant, but surely) condescending amusement at the speaker's naivete. To go the further step of suggesting that there is a whole other dimension and world of joyful, satisfying and positive emotions, is usually to evoke ridicule or scorn. After all, the person subject to the avoidant state does not know much about any other world (so how could it exist?), and anyway he or she would probably tend to denigrate such a world or experience as insufficiently rational, controlled or safe.

Even although means were suggested in volume I to modify avoidant behaviour (desensitization) and values (e.g., the Squash), in light of the above remarks it is unlikely that a person subject to a predominant avoidance approach (note the paradox of conflict) to life would accept any available 'corrective' method. Are we left where we started? We think not. In volume I, we pointed out that the brain has been wonderfully programmed through the years of development to react instantly as it should -- so that much the same actions would emerge with or without careful thought. That is, control and careful thought are likely unnecessary. We remarked that, notwithstanding the errors of coverage and understanding in our lives brought about by media preoccupations, we live in an essentially safe world, where the main dangers are engendered by our own caution and avoidances. That is, anxiety and avoidance are essentially unnecessary. Still, the person using an avoidance approach to life is likely to remain unconvinced.

In the present part (II), our task was to be concerned with a positive and approach mode of presentation. There are at least two ways to approach the motivational issues involved in the avoidance approach to life. These are the relevance of the present (where avoidance occurs) to learnings from the past, and the hopeful possibilities of the future (where danger is thought to lie). We would like to talk about each of these briefly.

Before proceeding, we ought to acknowledge the importance to our understandings and work of James and Woodsmall's (Time Line and the Basis of Personality, 1987) views. In the service of brevity,

we have not acknowledged their work nearly as often as we should. They taught us much about how to understand and deal efficiently with many of the issues we encountered in our recent work.

By the time that any of us does anything in the present, we have had whatever experiences we have had. And those experiences have been stamped, more or less indelibly, into our minds and imagery with whatever learning they have left there. The learnings we have accomplished have been accomplished, and they will operate in our actions essentially automatically. We don't have to evoke learning from the past by thinking about it or by consciously trying to awaken it.

James and Woodsmall suggest that, if we resist growth or change in our personality organization or daily handling of life, we might be fearful that, in permitting change, we could 'lose' our past learnings which foster safety or survival. They suggest that we might usefully 'go inside ourselves' and ask ourselves 'what we would lose if we were to permit change?' That is, what 'danger' do we fear (avoid) if something about us were to change? The method of inducing change can then ensure that the useful parts of former learnings are retained. Besides, by making particular relevant learnings from the past conscious, we can consciously retain them along with any new learning or changes we introduce into our lives. The advantages of this are obvious. Including these assurances in change procedures, permits us to grow and advance in experiences and life, without the stultifying effect of fear/avoidance, while retaining as an integral part of any new learning important

elements or learnings that the past has taught us. That is, present learning and experience does not need to interfere with the lessons of the past.

Anxiety is essentially always anticipatory in nature. It anticipates danger in the future. One way to express this is to point out that the most common self-talk involved in anxiety is the statement: 'What if ...?' One way to deal with this kind of anxious self-talk is to add one word to the sentence, namely, 'So what if ...?' Most often, the additional word permits us to lighten up a bit, even to laugh, and affords a kind of cognitive 'distance' from the danger, making it (appropriately) seem less. It is unknown quality of 'the future' that is the source of our anxiety. And when the future seems imminent, the avoidance response is the predominant one. The simple addition of the word 'so' to the anxious self-talk seems to put the future at a greater distance, allowing the avoidance gradient to be diminished a bit.

The same kind of 'distance' from the imminently unknown (and thus threatening) future can be achieved by allowing ourselves to visualize the feared outcome in whatever detail seems required, and then allowing the image thus created to move farther and farther away in the distance -- perhaps even until it is merely a dot on the horizon. This method of performing 'the Swish' also serves to diminish the avoidance motivation (by creating distance), at least long enough to permit the 'approach' aspects of the situation to present themselves and to be considered.

Either (or another) method to diminish the immediate impact of avoidance motivation in a fearful situation permits the 'approach' motivation to achieve at least temporary attention -- without actually taking away any imagined safety in the avoidance pressure. Equalizing the approach and avoidance pressures, of course, can create uncertainty and indecision (conflict). But it can also increase our freedom. It can make it possible for us to choose what we want to do without being enslaved by the constraint to act only in the avoidant manner. That choice tends to be denied to us if the avoidance motive is strong or predominant.

If the resulting temporary reduction in avoidance motivation is used constructively, the future can take on a whole new meaning. The future is the realm of possibilities. Of course, we can construe some possibilities as dangerous. But most of the future possibilities are either neutral ('nothing to write home about') or exciting, challenging and fun. To make the foregoing remarks understandable, we have to pursue another direction for a moment.

For people who feel driven by an avoidance approach to life, every moment is one involving the attempt to prevent error or mistakes. This can be expressed as involving a focus of attention on perfection -- absence of error. If our focus of attention is on 100% perfection, the only direction of variation is 'downward' toward error. The constant struggle is to avoid error, or less than perfect performance -- resulting in fear of error. And the only success is the achievement of less than imperfection or error -- resulting only in temporary 'relief' from fear of error. There



is NO possibility of achievement 'upwards' above the ceiling defined by perfection, that might allow the achievement of 'joy'.

In order to make fun or joy possible in these people, there are really only two alternatives. The responsibility for error can be shifted to others (reflexive values, making others the only ones susceptible to error/criticism) -- by being 'entertained' by others. Or the person can shift his or her expectations or focus of attention toward less than perfect performance (toward zero expectations of the future -- which few perfectionists are likely to accept) so that 'upwards' accomplishment can be appreciated. Few perfectionists are willing to permit themselves error (i.e., less than 100% perfection). Most can only achieve fun or happy feelings by being entertained by others (hence the contemporary power of the entertainment media), or by the use of disinhibiting means (such as addictive substances) to permit temporary relief of the cognitive strategies they employ to avoid danger -- which thus reduce the conscious sense of anxiety/avoidance.

There is another way of stating what we are trying to say. Freud has had a considerable impact on the ideas most of us have about the nature of 'mind'. One of his most central concepts was the idea of an unconscious part of the mind. Since his patients seemed to fear what they might do (errors), he concluded that the unconscious was the realm in which dark and dangerous motivations lurked, threatening to erupt in destructive acts. It was because he imagined danger in the 'repressed' id that he used the word 'defenses' to refer to the avoidances by means of which people

protect themselves from the imagined dangers within. There is NO satisfactory evidence that unconscious motives are dangerous or threatening. It is mainly the uncertainty or the ambiguity of the 'dark' region of the unknown that evokes anxiety in people leading them to imagine dangers within. Perhaps Freud misunderstood the nature of those parts of ourselves of which we are unaware.

We prefer to think of the 'unconscious' or unaware parts of ourselves as the 'realm of the possible'. The unimportant, and therefore forgotten, past is replete with possible events that might or might not have happened (probably did not). The unknown, fascinating and exciting, future is replete with possibilities, many of which could happen if we selected and pursued them in a positive and approach-oriented manner. As the possibilities are made kinetic or real, through memory retrieval or goal-setting, the unconscious becomes conscious, and life becomes what we want it to be. The conscious pursuit of purposes, along with the exercise of free choice, about what we will remember and how our futures will proceed, is a uniquely human capability, worthy of human dignity. By setting out to actualize some of the possibilities in our future lives, we harness motivation (some of it from anxiety about the unknown) to create our own futures and to foster excitement or joy.

The techniques we suggested earlier, to achieve 'distance' from any situation in which anxiety/avoidance is predominant, serve to diminish the urgent attention to immediate (probably non-existent) danger possibilities, and to allow other kinds of future possibilities to be considered. These other future possibilities

commonly afford the person the option of achieving fun, excitement or joy by means of his or her own initiatives -- not restricting such possibilities to the availability of others to provide the 'entertainment' to colour life.

We would like to offer examples of the rather abstract ideas expressed above. Unfortunately, to do so would tend to limit the options of this approach available to many readers. We have observed that many 'perfectionists' (those using an avoidance approach) find it very difficult to extend the range of joy-giving options they can consider beyond examples given. It seems to work best for such people to be placed in the position of having to find their own examples most relevant to their own lives. Since most of them are relatively fluent in handling abstractions (due to their history of reliance on nominalizations), the task of finding their own examples tends to be one in which they feel they can excel and, in fact, in which they tend to be very competent.

In devoting as much space as we have to the problems of the avoidance approach to life, are we suggesting that this is the main way in which we create distress in our own lives, and thus the main factor by which serenity can be prevented/created? In general, we believe this to be the main area of impediment to serenity. That is, the main impediment to serenity might just be the difficulty many of us have in conceiving of serenity as a desirable, worthwhile, fun or even a possible state of being.

But we have not yet done what we advertised as the main task of this part (II). So far we have only focused on an impediment to

the achievement of serenity. We have not yet expressed the nature of serenity or how it can be achieved.

Strange to say, we believe that serenity is a state or a behaviour that is qualitatively different from distress. It is not just a result of an absence of distress -- although distress likely has to be diminished, or even extinguished, before serenity can be experienced. Physiologically, serenity is most nearly approximated by activation of the parasympathetic response of the autonomic nervous system. That is, the parasympathetic response is NOT just an absence or lack of a sympathetic reaction (vegging out), nor is it merely a means by which to suppress, restrain or inhibit the sympathetic response. It is a nervous response that involves relief of sympathetic arousal and a sense of pleasure or peace. In order to achieve serenity, the first thing to do is to minimize anxiety/avoidance or sympathetic responses, and the second thing to do is to maximize a pleasant parasympathetic response. These are both learning tasks, equivalent to desensitization and some of its cognates. However, the activation of a parasympathetic response does NOT account fully for the experience of serenity.

On a cognitive level, the experience of serenity involves at least a predominance of positive, active and approach values among those at the highest priority levels of importance among our values -- as we remarked in volume I. This means BOTH that the person's predominant values fail to evoke much anxious vigilance or avoidance (or much reflexive dependency on others for his/her fulfilments), and that the person's values tend to breed or create

active joy and fulfilment. Moreover, positive, active and approach values tend to subsume beliefs that are inclusive (non-excluding), tolerating and joy-giving, and attitudes that involve acceptance, enjoyment and respectfulness (find the 'good' in others). Thus, if serenity is to be achieved, it also requires the acquisition of a special array of approach and active values (see volume I).

At a motivational level, the creation of serenity seems to require the achievement of adequate (definitely NOT excesses of survival resources -- more than NEEDED resources create distress) gratification of the basic survival needs (food, water, shelter, sleep, etc.), coupled with the development of some self-actualizing needs and the approach values just mentioned. We all make a basic mistake about our needs. Somehow, we have been taught that 'more' is better. Just a bit more income, food, entertainment (etc.) than we really need seems to most of us to be the 'right' amount. The problem then becomes one of 'how much (more) is enough'. We all find ourselves struggling to 'keep up' with others, to 'get our share' and to get that little hedge to preserve our security. There is no end to that struggle. And it prevents serenity. Also the struggle to add to our survival resources impedes our abilities to pursue self-actualizing needs -- since the latter always await satisfaction of the former. All of us need the freedom to pursue some self-actualizing needs such as 'beauty', 'wholeness', 'truth' or 'oneness'. We present two partial lists of needs below. The first list suggests basic 'survival' needs, presented roughly in the order of urgency for their gratification. The second list is

a partial list of self-actualizing needs that might be pursued. It should be remarked that no single list will encompass all of the possible needs of this kind that people might pursue. Some kinds of self-actualizations are particular to specific people.

#### Survival Needs

Need for Air (oxygen and carbon dioxide) to breathe

Need for Fluid (water) to drink

Need for Food (nutrients) to eat

Need for Elimination (of body wastes)

Need for Warmth (protection from weather extremes)

Need for Health (absence of debilitating illness)

Need for Safety (from real dangers)

Need for Sleep (rest, rejuvenation)

Need for Activity (doing things, exercise)

Need for Change (variety in life's experiences)

Need for Sex (sexual gratification)

Need for Social Contact (other person(s) for interaction)

Need for Nurturance (being nurtured/someone to nurture)

Need to Control or Dominate (in some area of living)

#### Self-Actualizing needs (a partial list)

Need for Accomplishment (to Accomplish tasks)

Need for Achievement (to Achieve purposes/goals)

Need for Affiliation (with Others)

Need for Aggression (to Assert self strongly)

Need for Aliveness and Energy (to feel Alive/Energetic)

Need for Beauty (to experience Beauty)

Need for Certainty (to 'Know')

Need for Change (for Variety)

Need for Closeness (to be Close to others)

Need for Completion (to Complete tasks)

Need for Consistency (to be Consistent)

Need for Contentment (to be Content)

Need for Control (to Control; to be Controlled)

Need for Creativity (to be Creative; to Create)

Need for Dependency (to Depend, Rely)

Need for Discovery (to Discover)

Need for Diversity (to see events Differently)

Need for Effort (to expend Effort)

Need for Enjoyment (to Enjoy)

Need for Excellence (to Excel)

Need for Goals to Pursue (to be Goal-directed)

Need for Goodness (to be Good)

Need for Gratification, Fulfilment (to be Fulfilled)

Need for Growth and Expansion (to Grow)

Need for Happiness (to be Happy)

Need for Harmavoidance (to avoid Dangers)

Need for Health and Feeling Good (to be Healthy)

Need for Identity (to Identify self; to be like others)

Need for Importance (to be Important)

Need for Justice and Fairness (to obtain Reciprocity)

Need for Love and to Love (to be Loved; to Love)

Need for Mastery (to Master things)

Need for Meaningfulness (to find Meaning)  
Need for Necessity (to be Necessary; to have Needs)  
Need for Nurturance (to be Nurtured; to Nurture)  
Need for Oneness (to feel One with the universe)  
Need for Orderliness (to find Orderliness)  
Need for Perfection (to achieve Perfection)  
Need for Playfulness (to be Playful)  
Need for Power (to acquire Power)  
Need for Purpose in Life (to find Purpose)  
Need for Recognition (to achieve Recognition)  
Need for Recreation (to Procreate; to Exercise)  
Need for Respect and Honour (to be Respected)  
Need for Rest (to Rest)  
Need for Richness of Life (to achieve Rich experiences)  
Need for Safety (to be Safe)  
Need for Security (to be firmly Secure)  
Need for Self-Esteem (to like Self)  
Need for Self-Reliance (to Rely on Self)  
Need for Simplicity (to find Simplicity)  
Need for Success (to achieve Success)  
Need for Truth (to find Truth)  
Need for Understanding (to achieve Understanding)  
Need for Uniqueness (to be Unique)  
Need for Value (to value and pursue important issues)  
Need for Wholeness (to feel a Whole person)



The motivations that push us toward our goals are the most important features of ourselves. They can evoke mainly defensive caution that prevents error and joy in life, by serving to create avoidances. Or they can stimulate us to accomplishments and lively enjoyments of life, by creating approach pursuits. As we have been at pains to show, motivation comes from our values, our needs and our purposes. It is enhanced and rendered poignant by creating a 'mission statement' for any given epoch of our lives. Our mission statements bring together the parallel courses we are pursuing in our values, needs and purposes, and seek to drive us toward the abstract and worthwhile ventures that are represented in the rest of our motivators. Positive motivations are our most worthwhile possessions. And positive motivations are the main source of pleasure and gratification from serenity, which they also foster.

In the foregoing we must seem to be arguing for the creation of serenity by developing the necessary prerequisites for it, such as pervasive parasympathetic responses, positive values, beliefs and attitudes, and both moderation in fulfilment of survival needs and extensive pursuit of self-actualizing needs, purposes and worthwhile mission statements. But the argument does not seem to show how these salutary states might be achieved. The 'how' is mainly a volume I task, and various means to achieve these goals have been offered throughout the two volumes. The task we are trying to address here is one of 'helping' to develop motivation to adjust our motives to the ends proposed. In performing this task the first step seems to us to establish, if possible, the cognitive

filters that might allow us to seek positive drivers, and to be aware of positive motivations when they are developed. That was the reason for the 'arguments' mounted above.

Once the filters are in place and the part I tasks of reducing the negative and avoidance motivations (through desensitization or some of the NLP procedures) have been accomplished, positive motivational drivers can meaningfully be introduced. Autonomic-parasympathetic responses can be enhanced by consciously setting out repeatedly to pair daily events and behaviours consistent with our 'mission statements' with pleasurable rewards and experiences. This can be accomplished by actively seeking to notice nice things, pairing them with enjoyed food snacks (raisins, etc.), enjoyed experiences (taking a moment to look at flowers or trees, to listen to enjoyed music, to sniff a preferred aroma) and/or imaging or thinking pleasurable situations or ideas. This is little more than a learning operation seeking to evoke habitual parasympathetic activation in the context of our daily worthwhile activities.

Positive values, beliefs and attitudes can be induced and made a focus of preoccupations by methods already described in volume I. Or they can be consciously selected, using relevant principles already discussed, and 'lived into' by consciously pursuing them in derived goals and habits, intentionally designed and pursued. The importance of ensuring that our values, with their subsumed beliefs and attitudes, are active and approach in their nature can hardly be over-emphasized. Moreover, seeking repeatedly to ensure that our cognitive filters allow us to be open to pleasurable, positive

and enlivening experiences (as opposed to anxious, avoidant and defensive ones) might well be considered a life-long mission for each of us, to ensure that we continue to experience good, happy and joyful feelings to colour our lives. Cognitive filters allow us to (or prevent) experience positive events in life.

Development of motivations that foster positive fulfilment might seem a bit harder to understand and pursue. Certainly the first, and most difficult, part of that task would involve an analysis of the motivations operating within us, such as that afforded by our test of motivations (Addicaus). The existing motivations need to be understood for themselves, for their sources in our habitual characteristics (e.g., introversion/extroversion) and for the purposes and roles they play by themselves and in our lives. It was to provide some tools for this task that we spent as much time as we did on the nature and analysis of needs (chapter 2). The problem of understanding the nature, sources, purposes/roles of our needs lies in our common readiness to adopt 'neurotic' solutions to felt pressures within us -- solutions that provide temporary relief and feel like solutions, but that do not deal with the underlying issues that produce the (usually conflicted) needs in the first place. This statement is intended to suggest great caution in this stage of the development of motivations.

After a good analysis of our existing needs and purposes has been accomplished, the task is first one of modifying the avoidant, conflicted or other qualities of the identified operating needs, and then selecting alternative personality characteristics and

needs to replace them. Modifying distress-creating qualities of needs or purposes depends upon at least two elements. First, of course, an appropriate understanding of the underlying or source features (e.g., introversion, torpor/under-motivation, avoidance habits, reflexive values) to permit the essential roots of the motivational problems to be addressed. Second, the distress-creating qualities need to be modified and positive joy-evoking motivational drivers increased to replace them.

Procedures such as the Squash or restructuring the sensory qualities of images (see volume I) can be used to address source features such as avoidance habits or reflexive values. Features such as introversion or torpor might best be addressed by means of a compound use of goal-finding procedures. An 'achievement goal' strategy might be used to reinforce habits of being active and energized in pursuit of work, leisure or community-focused goals. And a 'self-development' strategy might be used to enhance goals for personal qualities such as 'outgoing', 'lively' or 'happy' as foils against introversion or torpor. These kinds of strategies were outlined in volume I.

But something else might also be needed. In addition to selecting self-relevant self-actualizing needs (see earlier in this chapter), and partly to counter-act the subtly destructive effects of media contents to which we are all exposed daily, we might need to find 'good' models for motivational drivers that we conclude we ought to enhance in ourselves. We want to resist suggesting that anybody function in a potentially reflexive way. However, we think

we have no choice. All of us, whether or not we seek in every possible way to avoid and ignore the constant impress of media contents, are constantly exposed to such destructive contents, if only by virtue of passing exposure to the public blare of 'music' and to media-derived comments from those to whom we relate. To counter the damaging effects of these influences, most of us need to select particular 'others' that we admire and respect to serve as mentors or modellers of values, beliefs, attitudes and habits to be copied voluntarily by us. The problem most of us encounters in trying to find worthwhile such mentors or models is that, partly under the impress of media influences, we are apt to choose as our heroes 'well-known' and media-defined 'important' people. We, Doug and Reg, have been faced with the implications of this latter problem too. For a while we didn't know how to resolve the matter. Finally, we adopted concrete people-models that we respected from our own profession to provide some of the detail to be modelled in life, and we realized that all along we had accepted the general model of Christ in his human life.

## Chapter 9

## Creating Harmony

The interactive relationship between motivational and cognitive elements is nowhere closer than in the area of interpersonal harmony. In volume I (chapter 7) we listed a series of proposed 'principles of peace'. These are cognitive principles, beliefs or attitudes. However, in adopting them (or any other similar principles), relevant motivational drivers for behaviour are automatically established.

In particular, it might seem that 'respect', 'trust' and 'love' are emotional-motivational states. The argument is made in volume I that these qualities, values or principles, and the actions they evoke (finding the good, feeling safe and being drawn toward others) are really consequences of cognitive decisions to 'respect', 'trust' and 'love' others -- rather than the causes of respect, trust and love. If this is true, accomplishing the results of respecting, trusting and loving others could be acquired by the conscious decisions to adopt those qualities, or might be achieved by rewarding spontaneous occurrences of relevant actions if those qualities were selected as 'personal development' goals. However, if our view of the 'cognitive' nature of these 'decisions' is considered false, then the motivational domains of respecting, trusting and loving might be adopted by practice in specific methods. Practising the strategies proposed in volume I of desensitizing anxiety about 'giving others the gift' of respect, taking chances with 'trusting others' and 'close emotional

involvement with others', with or without affective responses training (equivalent to assertive training) might serve to install the relevant motivational habits in us. In the area of harmony there is a kind of reciprocity between motivations and cognitions.

The main problem affecting motivation in the area of harmony is the common fear of 'who will start' an initiative, and worry that the other person will accept but not reciprocate. Why should I take the initiative? Why shouldn't he or she make the first move? The obvious answer, which is part of the experience of every one of us, is that if I don't take the initiative, nobody will. Of course, we all have also experienced the case in which we took an initiative and it was not reciprocated. One of the consequences of these kinds of experiences, and the expectations they establish, is that when others don't initiate respect, trust or love (or any other response) we tend to disengage from further contact with those people. That is, we create disharmony, justifying it on the grounds of others' lack of initiative or reciprocity.

In volume I, we tried to point out that the person who gains from 'respect', 'trust' and 'love' given is not the receiver, but rather the giver. The giver feels good finding him or her self in a world full of good people doing good things, feels safe in a world in which others are trusted, and feels joyful in a world of those we love. However, many will not be willing or able to accept that kind of conclusion. We're all a bit 'mean-minded', being ready to refuse to give what we consider to be a gift to others before they are willing or ready to give the gift first or to

express acknowledgement and gratitude for our 'gifts' to them. Obviously, this quality of ours, involving an avoidance motive as well as a cognitive-attitudinal resistance, will most certainly interfere with the creation of harmony.

Avoidance motives can always be reduced by desensitization, cognitive restructuring or 'counter-example' learning, were it not for the attitudinal resistance to change -- which becomes a driver or motive for opposition (commonly nominalized as oppositionality). The motive to oppose is the main issue that needs to be addressed in this chapter. However, because this is part II, the topic has to be handled (also) as an approach task concerned with developing an accepting motive.

The need to oppose, like the need to accept, is a derived or learned need. It is based partly upon a process in which beliefs become rigidified after they have been developed in a 'clique' setting. It is also based upon territoriality needs, upon competitive habits and upon impaired self-esteem. Each of these elements underlying oppositionality is considered below.

Opposition is partly based upon 'clique' experience. We have all participated in 'cliques' of some kinds -- families, peers, employees, religious and other types of cliques. We have already described how beliefs are formed in the context of cliques. And we have pointed out that a 'clique' has no meaning if there is not an in-group and an out-group. The out-group exists in opposition to the in-group -- at least from the perspective of the in-group members. That is, those in the in-group oppose the out-group and



its members. If involvement in the clique is seen as particularly important to any given in-group member, opposition to the out-group and its members is fostered, becomes a crucial act of faith, and precipitates intense beliefs that resist or oppose modification or limitations. That is, to the extent that a member feels dependent on a clique or in-group, to that extent rigid opposition to others and their points of view is established as a habit.

There are two important corollaries of this fact. First, it must be clear by now that exclusive cliques or in-groups are one of the most destructive forces that oppose peace. This is partly because of the oppositional conduct they foster in people. Second, it ought to be noticed that, contrary to what might seem right intuitively, oppositionality is partially a derivative of people's dependency needs. That is, oppositionality is a manifestation of dependency on an (opposing) in-group. It seems important to state the latter point because most oppositional people do not want to think of themselves as dependent people. However, they are. Also, as dependency on former cliques diminishes, oppositionality tends to diminish. That is, peace through harmony, and reduction of one of the factors that interferes with it (opposition), is increased as we withdraw exclusive attitudes as our involvements with cliques declines. The importance to peace of the Principle of Inclusion (volume I, chapter 7) is made clear in these remarks.

Opposition is also partly based upon territoriality needs. As such, it represents the other main aspect of exclusive domains. To the extent that a person exercises territoriality, all those who

are not part of the family are opposed in order to exclude them from the home range. That is, family members are accepted and included in close proximity to the home, while others are opposed. Of course, family is the primordial form of the 'clique', and the rules of cliques were really derived in the context of family cohesiveness. However, the territoriality factor in opposition stands apart from the clique in that it creates a kind of angry or aggressive motivation with which to colour opposition. That is, the aggressive nature of oppositionality derives from its relevance to the territorial imperative.

The territorial imperative has quite wide applicability. It demands a kind of 'personal space' for each individual. Thus, as urbanization has increased, and people are forced closer to one another in their living arrangements, defensive 'distance' between people has also increased. People are increasingly unable to tolerate close (even emotionalized) relationships. This is one of the main factors underlying increasing divorce rates, increasing interactions with distant people (through the media and the telephone), and increasing emotional aloofness or coldness between people (including partners). It probably also accounts for the common observation that (particularly) apartment dwellers tend not to be on close terms with immediate neighbours, but instead have friends who live some distance away.

The feeling tone accompanying the above consequences of urbanization is often a readiness to feel angry with those in relatively close proximity, frequently accompanied by bitterness

and aggressive acts. This kind of association, with its oppositional consequences, marks territoriality (as opposed to in-group membership) as the probable feature accounting for these growing trends in contemporary urban life.

The territorial imperative, of course, is a residual of primitive life circumstances that demanded hunting or growing space to support familial survival. It no longer has relevance to life beyond the maintenance of monogamy. And it no longer really works as a support for monogamy since people (males or females) no longer 'own' other people -- witness the growing denigration of possessive desires and the increased divorce rates. Moreover, it stands in direct conflict with the growing non-exclusive inter-dependence of people within society as our main contemporary survival resource.

In considering how we might go about diminishing the strength of the territorial imperative in any given individual, we began by using desensitization methods aimed at reducing anxiety about close emotionalized relationships with others. That worked moderately well, but it did not entirely eradicate territoriality in those treated. We observed that it did not, by itself, greatly diminish the felt need to 'control others' that seems to be an associated 'political' consequence of territoriality. We have already sought to denigrate the wish to 'control others' as the essence of our use of the term 'corruption' that is inevitably a part of political initiatives of any kind. Incidentally, we are aware of our own attempt to 'control others' by talking in this way about the effort to 'control others' -- which is why we have attempted to be as

clear and 'out in the open' about our attitudes as we have been in this paragraph.

In seeking ways to help ourselves and others to diminish our motivated investment in trying to 'control others', we have tried to analyze some of the means by which such 'control' tends to be exercised. Means used for this purpose seem to include the use of 'guilt trips', threats or creation of 'dangers', arousing 'hype', advertising and propaganda concerning beliefs, and recognition or implicit rewards for 'controlling' actions. There are probably other means, but these seemed sufficient for our purpose.

'Guilt trips' are probably the most common domestic means by which we seek to 'control others'. The simplest form taken by 'guilt trips' is merely the use of negatively formatted utterances ('Don't do'). Prohibitions define limits transgression of which is implied in the utterance -- if only in imagination (or why else would the prohibition be stated?) Thus, guilt motivated, defensive denial of any transgression is automatically induced, at least implicitly, in the recipient of any prohibition. Direct use of 'guilt trips' is to be found in any aggressive 'You-statement', especially if the statement expresses criticism -- that is, states that the other has failed to achieve expected standards of conduct. All criticism is, by its nature, an attempt to 'control others' to conform to the wishes, beliefs and attitudes of the critic. It is for this reason that we were able fairly easily to understand the first criminality factor that we identified (volume I), namely, guilt intolerance. And it was for a number of related reasons,

including its relevance to the causation of crime, that we expended considerable effort to develop treatment tools to modify guilt feelings (susceptibility) in our criminal (factor 0-1) and addicted (axis 08) subjects. The methods we used are described in some detail in Quirk and Reynolds (On the Nature and Modification of Addictions, 1997).

Threats or the creation of dangers are the means most commonly used in political initiatives to foster acquiescence to 'control' efforts. The most obvious examples of these means are found in the methods by which governments prepare their subjects for war, or in the methods used by unions and guilds to prepare their memberships for 'job actions' (as another kind of war). Governments and unions have to convince those they seek to 'control' that the proposed 'enemy' threatens imminent harm or danger to them. Nazi Germany set out to convince its population that the Jews were dangerous foes of the personal best interests of the German people. The allies in World War II had to convince their countrymen that 'the Hun' threatened everyone's 'freedom' and life, and that the 'axis' powers were mean-minded, sneaky and an imminent threat to the lives of 'free people' everywhere. In these or any other examples that might be offered, 'the truth' or falsity of the views expressed is less important to government than the purpose of expressing the views, namely, the need to 'control' the beliefs, and thus the actions, of the affected populace.

Advertising and propaganda, aimed at beliefs and habits, are the media through which political and economic enterprises achieve

the above purposes, and are the daily means by which they seek to 'control' us. Advertising may have an informational content. However, in order to protect oneself from its 'controlling' effect, it might be necessary as a blanket choice to consider absolutely all advertising, like all propaganda, to be false, misleading and calculated solely to 'control us'. We cannot avoid contact with advertising and propaganda since the intelligences of many bright people are preoccupied with finding ways to invade our sensory experience. All media contents employ arousing and 'glitzy' stimulation to activate interest, belief and acquiescence in the initiative of the moment. Even if we were to disengage ourselves from all the conventional mass media (television, newspapers, radio, 'junk mail' and the like), we would still encounter bill boards beside the roads, ads and bulletin boards at our grocery stores and places of employment, mail calculated to influence us as surreptitiously as possible, and conversations of friends and acquaintances who have not insulated themselves from 'control' by advertisers and propagandists. None of us can practically evaluate the validity of anywhere near every statement to which we are exposed. And the very fact of exposure ensures that to some extent we will be influenced or 'controlled' by the contents, attitudes and motivation-arousing elements in everything to which we are exposed in the various media that bombard our senses.

We have decided not to believe anything we are told, without carefully examining its validity for ourselves. Still, one of us feels sufficiently vulnerable to being 'controlled' by others that

he will not even allow himself to activate his modem lest he be tempted to get on 'the Net' where those cleverer than he might 'access' his attention. Perhaps that's a trifle extreme, but we are not sure that it is anything more than practical now that we are both retired and on fixed incomes.

Arousing 'hype' is commonly used to 'control others' for economic or political acquiescence to 'control'. Witness the artificial 'hype' created to support political candidates during elections, to arouse interest in commercial or intramural sports events, to encourage unconscionable expenditures on clothing fashions, to acquire expenditures on new products on the market from domestic products to 'artistic' products, or to gain support for political enterprises of governments, unions or special interest groups. Every time we hear background music or other noise, that we experience colour and motion from around us, and particularly when we are asked to 'participate' in anything, we are being asked to arouse 'hype' in ourselves in order that we may allow ourselves to be 'controlled' in some way by others to their purposes, beliefs or needs.

In the simplest case, this is the purpose when we or others put on 'attractive' clothing or make-up, speak in 'interesting' or entertaining ways, play out interesting roles in relation to one another, and so forth. Of course, such events or activities are interesting for us and do add colour to our lives. And that is precisely why we and others use such things (namely, to 'control' one another), and our enjoyment is what we receive as a kind of

payment for 'being controlled'. That is, we are not trying to say that we 'ought not' to allow ourselves to be 'controlled'. All we are trying to do is to alert us to the fact that we are daily being controlled by others. That is fine, as long as we are consciously aware that we are allowing ourselves to be controlled.

Recognition and other implicit rewards seem to be offered to any who succeed in 'controlling others' in the political and economic spheres. Public recognition accompanies political office and those who entertain others enough to command economic success. Such people, by virtue of their wide exposure in the media, tend to be considered 'important' and economic advantages tend to accrue to them. Indeed, one might meaningfully argue that the media, by offering free advertising in the 'news' for politicians, media folk, criminals, and other purveyors of warfare, assign recognition and 'importance' to such people (and events) effectively to reward their actions in controlling the lives of others. Again, the reader is apt to think that we are over-stating the case. We think we are stating the case as it is. There is an extensive and definitive experimental literature that consistently demonstrates that the media have strong and pervasive deleterious effects on the personalities and conduct of those exposed to it.

Returning from our analysis of the motivational roots of our need to 'control others', it might be recalled that we were considering the nature of oppositionality. Opposition is partly also based upon competitive habits. One might choose to consider competition as one domain of territoriality. And it likely is.



Still, its importance as a factor in disturbances of the peace (see volume I) suggests that competition ought to be addressed as a separate issue.

Competition amounts to an external representation in the inter-personal sphere of conflict in the intra-personal sphere. It seeks to express the opposition between two or more enterprises or initiatives. It is fostered by edict of adults to children, by example and training established in the way that academic, sports and peer activities tend to be organized by the adult world, and it is rewarded by recognition and status afforded to those who succeed. Its absence is even denigrated by heroes in our cultural folk-lore -- although this might be used mainly as propaganda to support warfulness. Let it be known that we denigrate any and all competitiveness. General Patton notwithstanding, we would offer our heart-felt congratulations to anyone who lost in a competition and laughed at it. Indeed, that is the first thing we would recommend for anyone who wanted to reduce his or her commitment to competitiveness.

However, our most basic idea about how to deal with our old habits of competitiveness would be to foster in ourselves a sense of the value of cooperativeness, and to adopt a congratulatory attitude toward ourselves and others when we or they demonstrate cooperativeness. If we could apply both of the principles of Inclusion and Cooperation (volume I, chapter 7) we suspect that competitiveness might well lose its damaging effects on peace. It seems to us that cooperation is the natural foil for competition.

Opposition is partly based upon impaired self-esteem, partly because of its relationship to competitiveness. Self-esteem tends to be impaired most directly by a sense of having 'failed'. And failure is meaningful only in relationship to somebody else's 'success' in a competitive setting. If competition were to be abandoned, failure would lose its meaning. As we said in volume I, all other forms of failure are based upon (our incorporation of) others' judgements about what we ought to be (must have been) trying to do and how to do it, or about past behaviour seen in the light of later judgement (after learning has taken place).

Impaired self-esteem is always unnecessary, since all failure is a myth. Humans succeed in everything they do -- as far as their level of maturation and learning permits. People only seem to fail when evaluated by others, or as if through the eyes of others (e.g., when we examine our own appearance). In the usual case, others do not know what we are doing, and thus tend to judge how and how well we are doing in achieving purposes and goals different from those we were pursuing. But, it might be argued, there is a limiting case from the perspective of people succeeding in what they are trying to do. What about the conduct of intellectually challenged people? The answer, of course, is that they are not tuned to pursue the same goals others of us might pursue. They might seem to be trying to do things 'they can't do'. But it seems more likely that they don't even conceptualize the tasks they try in anything like the same ways we conceive of their assigned tasks. They tend to have much more simple and real purposes than we have.

While impoverished self-esteem derives from a myth, there is little doubt that impaired self-esteem can arouse opposition. The kind of opposition it evokes is best represented in criminality factor O-2 (volume I), which we labelled inferiority intolerance. The surface manifestation of inferiority intolerance tends to be a compensatory 'superiority'. It is unnecessary for anybody to seek to be superior (as in competitive initiatives) unless the person feels painfully inferior or inadequate. Indeed, a person's presentation as in some way 'superior' tells a clinician that a painful sense of inferiority lies within the person.

Even a complaint of an 'inferiority complex' only means that the person is struggling to feel superior (or to be reassured that he or she is superior) -- because of felt inadequacies. Of course, in clinical work we meet any complaint of an 'inferiority complex' by assuring the person that he or she 'doesn't have a complex, but instead is inferior.' It's easier to deal with inferiority feelings than with a 'complex'. The method we use to deal with inferiority feelings or low self-esteem in clinical work is described in some detail in Quirk and Reynolds (On the Nature and Modification of Addictions, 1997).

Of course, there is much more that might be said about our motivated attempts to create disharmony. We have chosen to limit ourselves mainly to a discussion of the various domains of opposition to show how disharmony can evolve and, implicitly, how we might attempt to foster harmony. But we have not really dealt fully with the positive and approach aspects of harmony.

We have an image. Serenity might be thought to be represented best by kinaesthetic imagery that expresses emotions. Cooperation might be thought to be represented best by visual imagery in which the elements are distributed in space so they might be resolved strategically. However, harmony might best be represented by auditory imagery, if only in that harmony requires communications of a friendly nature between people. By saying this we want to express the idea that the goal of harmonious interactions depends for its achievement upon open, free, friendly and assertive conversations between people. The most important features of such conversations need to be the use of permissive statements, the expression of pleasure in the contacts with the other, and the mutual pursuit of common and shared tasks to enhance the quality of life for each and the communities they share.

If we could talk to one another in (only) these ways, we would quickly find harmonious relationships throughout our lives. That is, the beneficiary of the effort to talk to others (only) in these ways is the speaker him or her self. If we prevent ourselves from being dragged into other forms of communications or preoccupations, eventually others learn from our examples how to get along in harmonious ways. But it will always be we who gain. Let there be peace in the world, and let it begin with me.

## Chapter 10

## Creating Cooperation

In the context of conventional views, the essence of crime involves invasion of another's property, whether the property is the other's body, possessions or agreements/contracts. The Law seems to consider an individual's property to be sacrosanct. In the approach adopted here, a permissive statement of this basis of law might be that 'everybody's property (body, possessions and contracts or agreements) is to be respected.' This formulation has a particular value that is almost most clear in the context of crime or cooperation. The permissive formulation implies that respect for each person's property extends to that of the potential perpetrator. It seems probable that if the potential perpetrator were to learn respect for his or her own property, he or she would become much less likely to invade the property of another.

There is another wrinkle in the above attitude of conventional law. By making 'property' the sacrosanct issue concerning which the law is most directly preoccupied, it has consequently seemed to lawyers that the motive underlying most offenses is greed for more possessions. This most common view of the causation of most crime is a direct derivative of the focus of law on the preservation of a person's property (body, possessions, contracts). Even although the practice of law now functions in this way, we were able to show in volume I that the causation of crime does not even include greed or the pursuit of possessions in any way. Perhaps the whole basis on which law is founded is wrong. Oh dear, there we go again being

utterly counter-intuitive in what we say. Still, the possibility merits at least brief attention.

In one study we inter-correlated the ADDICAUS axes and the STFB O-factors. There were consistently high and significant correlations between ALL the STFB O-factors and the ADDICAUS axis 44 (wish for fast-lane living). However, fast-lane living is not particularly dependent upon the acquisition of possessions. Instead, it tends to be concerned with exciting experiences -- however achieved. There is NO significant correlation between any of the STFB O-factors and either hedonic pleasure (axis 20) or the problem of immediate gratification and enjoyment (axis 24) -- where greed and possessions might seem to be important issues. It seems to us that acquiring enlivening experiences and possessions is much more directly relevant to the motivation underlying addictions than to the drivers of crime.

If, as we believe, the contention is true that possessions and their acquisition, although basic to the present definition of crime, are essentially irrelevant as motivators underlying crime, then it is unnecessary to consider crime to be offenses against personal property. It does not pose a problem if crime is defined largely in such terms. But it opens the possibility that crime might (in a future) also be defined in relation to anything else. That is, the motivations of people do NOT restrict the nature of crime to offenses against property. Incidentally, in saying this we do NOT intend to argue that crime ought to, or might, be defined in reference to anything else. We are simply trying to comment on the

liberating effect of the idea that motives coloured by the pursuit of property do NOT define the occurrences of crime.

We are actually seeking to make another point altogether. We wonder whether it is necessary AT ALL to define crimes. Since the laws enacted under codified law are prohibitive in nature, they result in defining UNlawful acts or crimes. Perhaps, after all, we lose nothing by transmuting our laws into permissive statements -- nothing that is except the ease and convenience for lawyers and other justice system workers in addressing 'crime'. It is only EASIER to identify and enforce laws that are in prohibitive form. It is NOT to the advantage of offenders or the citizenry to have prohibitive laws, as we have implied repeatedly in these two volumes. Indeed, we think there is ample reason to believe that permissive (in contrast to prohibitive) laws would tend to reduce offenses, and thus victimization in society, and would lend themselves much better to effective means to correct (retrain) those who demonstrate that they are not yet fully socialized.

Of course, we are aware that our puny efforts are not going to turn the justice system around. We would like to be involved in the task of planting the seeds that might eventuate in changes to the ways in which laws are formulated. Meanwhile, there is another purpose underlying our attempts to make the foregoing points. We are really concerned in this chapter with the attempt to show how we might all create cooperation.

The first method is surely for each of us to adopt for his or her life a set of positively formulated principles that might

contribute to cooperation, such as those proposed under Principles of Peace (volume I, chapter 7). Having formulated such principles in personally attractive ways, it might then be incumbent upon us to seek daily to practice the principles we select.

But what might motivate us to seek to achieve cooperation in our many communities? Currently, most of us seek to prevent crime (avoidance motive) under the impress of drivers such as personal safety or security (covert avoidance purposes), to avoid any sense of vulnerability, harm or loss in our communities (overt avoidance purposes). That is a 'natural' reaction and solution to prohibitive laws and to 'crime'. It would seem that our efforts to prevent and avoid have not been greeted with extensive success. We would argue that our efforts are directed in a conflict-maintaining and hopeless direction. However, in case this needs to be said, we are NOT proposing that we leave our doors unlocked or that we reward people for crimes.

But the last remark does remind us of one interesting method that has been used with some success in bed-wetting problems. The bed-wetter is held responsible to report daily to the parenting one the condition (wet or dry) of his or her bed. If the report is that the bed is/was wet, the adult, without further comment, gives the bed-wetter a reward (say, a dollar). The child is apt to be surprised by this 'acceptance' of his or her delict by the adult. At the very least, it communicates NO guilt or punishment to the child, permitting to child to pursue the desired and comfortable goal of 'dry bed' instead of having to contend with the difficult



task of NOT wetting the bed. Most people would simply scoff at such a procedure, even although it often works to increase 'dry beds'. Another story might illustrate just how this method might achieve effective motivation.

A sociologist named Slack was assigned to provide services for a group of tough, nasty convicts living in a prison range. He got hold of an old teaching machine that was programmed to provide rewards (in the form of coins) for correct answers to questions presented on the screen. He rewired the machine to reward with dimes any wrong or incorrect response. He then had a janitor who spoke little English lug the machine down the common area in the range, set it up and plug it in. Of course, the convicts asked what the machine was for. The janitor said that it was a machine that was going to pay them money if it failed to teach them right. The convicts expressed the expected scorn and ridicule. However, it was noteworthy that thereafter the convicts were observed to work away at the machine trying NOT to make mistakes and trying NOT to make any money from the machine. Apparently, successfully learning, and the self-esteem it bred, was MORE worthwhile or valuable to them than receiving money.

The purpose of telling this story is both to illustrate the irrelevance of greed or economic gains to offenders, and to point out that there are wonderful other motives that operate within people to drive them toward accomplishment and socialization in their (our) conduct. Cooperation is itself a socializing motive, and it can be used by us to draw us as pairs and as communities

together in constructive and cooperative ways. And there are many other such motives. Not the least of these are the reflexive purposes of achieving recognition (hopefully in the future for cooperative and socialized behaviour, rather than as now for criminal and anti-social behaviour), importance (for entertaining a friend at tea, rather than for ripping the other off) and appreciation (for desired acts, rather than recrimination for undesired acts). Reflexive needs of each of us can usefully be supported and employed in inter-personal and intra-communal interactions. Other drivers might include successes (to build self-esteem, as in the story above), learning or change (which is inherently interesting and exciting if failures to learn are ignored), acceptance by others and happiness, plus a host of others. Obviously, the reason for listing some of these drivers that can support socialization and cooperation in behaviour is to point to effective means each of us can use to motivate desired behaviour in ourselves as well as for others.

One might be inclined to say that recognizing motivational drivers does not install them as effective operators in our lives. That is only partially true, It is true that our pre-eminent values, purposes and needs define in large part what we will pursue in our lives. If the above drivers do not appear toward the top of our personal priorities of values and needs, they may not be pursued too actively. At the same time, it is possible to re-structure our priorities of values and needs, as we showed in volume I. And every primary driver operates to some extent within

every one of us -- at least as a source of reinforcement or reward. Perhaps just as importantly, becoming consciously aware of some of the available positive and approach drivers (values or needs) provides us with cognitive filters facilitating recognition of the occurrences of the drivers and allowing us to seek them. Partly based upon our natural histories of development (described above in chapter 8), our filters tend to be preoccupied with negative and avoidance drivers that interfere with our ability to notice the more positive ones.

When we began to consider the role of motivational drivers in crime or cooperation, we were unduly influenced by our findings that few of the drivers measured by the ADDICAUS test seemed to vary meaningfully in relation to crime. We were about to ignore the role of motivations in crime. However, we noticed two things -- that's a lot for dumbos like us. We noticed that some of the ADDICAUS axes (notably #22, subcultural values, and the failure-related ones #37, failure history, and #48, history of punitive rewards) did seem to relate significantly and meaningfully to crime. And we noticed that at the very least motivational drivers were involved in addictions which, in turn, were related to crime. We spent some time in volume I to explain how to modify values to create peace-provoking ones. It might help to spend a bit of time here to show how failure-related drivers can be modified.

The methods we used to modify failure-related drovers in our treatment programs most often involved 'time-line' methods as described by James and Woodsmall (1987). The person is asked to

'discover' how he/she has organized his/her memory and other images in space. Picture yourself eating breakfast today, a week ago, a month ago. How can you tell which picture relates to which time? Point to the place in space where each image seems to be, and estimate how far away from you it is. Picture yourself taking your next bath, a bath a week or more from now, a bath a month or more from now. How can you tell which picture follows after the ones before it? Point to the place in space where you see each picture, and estimate how far away from you it is. Picture yourself here and now. At what location do you see that picture? In your mind draw a line through the locations of past images, through the present images to future images. That imaginary line is your present time-line -- how you organize your images of your past, present and future. It doesn't matter where it goes or what it looks like, as long as it 'seems right' to you for the present.

Mark the present with a bright yellow flag, so you can find it whenever you want to. Drift up, way, way up, above your time-line until it appears to be a line seen way below you. It might help to paint a thick white line along your time-line so you can see it clearly way, way below you. Now drift down a bit so that you are well above your time-line, but close enough to see into it. Now drift back along your PAST time-line until you are hovering over a place where something unpleasant seems to have happened that might have been a root cause of a problem (such as failure-proneness) that you have felt since. Take yourself by the scruff of the neck and dip yourself ever so briefly into the situation of that time

and pull yourself out of it again. The only purpose of this action is to discover once more the feeling you experienced at that time.

Drift back twenty minutes to an hour BEFORE that time, and let yourself down into your time-line. Where are those feelings now? If some of the feeling is still there, drift up and back farther in time to find an earlier such situation. Repeat the actions. Keep going back until you find a time BEFORE which you were free of any of those unpleasant feelings. When you are in your time line somewhat BEFORE the (first) event when you had the unpleasant feelings, walk slowly forward into the (first) event. Where are the feelings now? If the unpleasant feelings remain in place, drift up again out of your time-line, return to the present and pick up whatever resources you feel you have and can use (your adult status, loved ones, accomplishments, etc.). With your resources packed closely around you, drift up again, return to the (first) event and, just BEFORE it, drift down into your time line. Where are the feelings now? If they are absent, walk slowly into the event with your resources. Where are the feelings now? If they are absent, walk slowly forward through other such events, picking up along the way and hanging onto any learnings of importance to you. When you reach the present without the unpleasant feelings, the task is (only) half done.

Imagine future events that might be similar to those of the past where you developed some of the previous unpleasant feelings. Toss the images of those future events along your future time-line. Now, still surrounded by any resources you have picked up, walk

slowly along your future line, looking for the kinds of events you have tossed along it. Walk into those events. Are there any unpleasant feelings? If so, repeat the past time-line exercise. If not, enjoy the future you have created for yourself, adding enlivening colours, sounds and movements to events you encounter in your future. Whenever you are ready, return to the present.

This strange little exercise seems to 'change history' as it exists in and for the person, and to provide challenge, excitement and fun in the future. The exercise with the past time-line undoes the negative emotional charges that create unpleasant images and negative (avoidant, conflicted) feelings in the person's life. The exercise with the future time-line creates new drivers to help the person achieve the kind of life he or she might want, coloured with good and joyful feelings. Of course, this is only one of many ways that psychotherapists use to achieve these kinds of effects. We use this method because it is quick, efficient and relatively reliable in achieving its desired subjective effects.

Psychotherapists tend to preoccupy themselves with the person's past, whether due to their own or their clients' assumptions concerning the operative (initial) causes affecting experience and behaviour. It might be useful to unravel and 'fix' the events of the past that are conceived by the person as contributing to his or her problems.

Unfortunately, psychotherapists tend much less often to concern themselves with 'future pacing', or a concern with the future possibilities of life. The future is not only the place of

many exciting possibilities. It is also the location of the purposes and needs (final causes) that really seem to shape the nature and quality of life. At the very least, the future is the realm of the motivational drivers that pull people's present behaviour toward as-yet-to-be-realized purposes and gratifications. We believe that 'the real' task in treatment and in acquiring the kind of life we might seek is that of defining our futures and pursuing their purposes. This is really a task of 'future pacing'.

Our morality is such that we would want to deny ourselves the right or opportunity to tell you or anybody else what you should believe, how you should approach life, or what purposes you ought to pursue. Those choices are your responsibility and right, and are yours alone. Although we have tried not to say what motives you might want to develop, we have done two other things. We have indicated some of the consequences that we think we have found to flow fairly naturally from various options of choices, and some of the factors that seem to us to contribute to peace and to its disturbances. And we have tried to suggest 'where' these kinds of factors exist (i.e., past or future, initial or final causes), and some methods that one might use to achieve whatever outcomes you or anybody else might choose.

## Chapter 11

## Creating Peace

Peace and war are universal states of mind. Everyone wants peace, but not until after war. Everyone harbours some bitter feelings and some wish for others to suffer, if not hatred for others. If the 'others' are not susceptible to other forms of retribution, the desire is for war. As soon as any warlike actions result in the inevitable discovery that pain and retribution affect both sides of the conflict, the wish for peace starts to grow. This sequence of events indicates that for most people peace amounts to an avoidance of war rather than an pursuit of peace.

Indeed, most people would think that peace has no other meaning than the absence of war. We found ourselves with that head-set, which accounts for our use of the term 'peace'. We had to examine our own views when we tried to consider 'a positive approach to peace'. In north America, Americans and Canadians have, for a very long time, enjoyed close and friendly relations. They have been close trading partners, rich destinations for tourism for each, relatively cooperative allies, and friends who talk easily with one another. Is this peace? These two countries are also chronically involved in economic controversies, fairly resentful about each other's political relations with nations having differing political persuasions, and historically they were formed from warful conflict and independence pressures. Do these represent the derivatives or seeds of war? Perhaps 'peace' merely amounts to a kind of toleration of others, probably only possible



in the context of and absence of threat or danger, and maybe also in the context of the passage of time without major conflict or political invasiveness.

Careful observation of clinical material and concerted thought have finally convinced us that peace is much more than merely an absence of war. Nations that enjoy peaceful relations, such as the United States and Canada, tend to have a history of individual and group friendships and other forms of extended contact. It is as though getting to know one another finally affords assurance that no danger of harm or ill-will exists or can have a lasting or devastating effect on existing relationships. This opinion might seem to be challenged by the American Civil War. However, it is noteworthy that the amount of friendly contact between individuals from the northern and southern states prior to the Civil War was really quite minimal. Travel was difficult in those times, and people tended to be preoccupied with the pursuit of local economic and political issues. Even where northern troops were located in southern settings, they tended to isolate themselves from the local populace. And, it ought to be noticed that, in spite of political bitterness between the people of the north and south, a genuine sense of discomfort and horror was eventually common about the necessity for war between Americans.

If prolonged close and friendly contact is a foil against war, what are the motivations or drivers that underlie such contact? At first, we decided that the main driver is the absence of fear. That is, we saw the driver as absence, lack or prevention of the

motivation that activates avoidance -- fear. But avoidance of avoidance implies a doubly-conflicted, doubly-negative approach to human relationships. It would be equivalent to a complex neurosis in an individual -- something we certainly encountered often enough in our clinical work. Still, it seemed to us that some instances of international peace might be based on just such an approach. There probably are nations that relate to other nations in an anxiously docile, dependent or subservient way to prevent or avoid fear. However, where this happens we would expect that peace would be a brittle and tenuous state, perhaps punctuated by resentful utterances, covert hostilities and considerable dissatisfaction on the part of individuals and groups in the affected nation. And such feelings existing within the one, more or less docile, nation would tend to have (probably barely conscious) reciprocal responses toward that nation on the part of the nation it fears. This kind of barely conscious reciprocal relationship is well illustrated in Zimbardo's experiment described in chapter 4. We think that this may well be what happened in the late twentieth century between the United States and Cuba.

Can peace be motivated by other than avoidance drivers? We finally concluded that it can. We reached this conclusion from an examination of those people, to whom we related in clinical and community life, who seemed to 'get along' happily and comfortably at peace with everybody. There were a few. How did they manage to live that way? At first, based on our pre-existing views of human conduct, we assumed that they must have developed values that were

mainly positive and approach values. For the most part we found this to be true, although it was difficult to arrange to evaluate them since they were rarely part of our clinical samples. But there seemed to be something else involved.

The key, according to us, was found when we matched their attitudes and behaviours against the Principles of Peace that we formulated (volume I, chapter 7). They tended to act in concert with others, seeking agreements, generalizations among views expressed and inclusiveness in interactions, while cooperating with others and reserving no special powers for themselves. But the most noteworthy features we observed in them seemed to relate to the 'principles' of respect, trust, love and reward. They seemed able to find 'the good' in everybody ('respect'), rarely finding fault. They seemed to feel safe and accepted/accepting with everyone ('trust'), rarely feeling vulnerable or 'distant'. They appeared to be drawn toward others by their own caring feelings ('love'), rarely holding themselves aloof. And they seemed able and willing to acknowledge others' accomplishments, attitudes and efforts ('reward'), rarely 'putting down' anybody. These people appeared to us to be objectively 'good' people, whether or not they were encountered (as most were) among our religious acquaintances.

But was there any way to find cognates of such people among nations or cultures -- to permit the positive drivers of peace to be identified? In truth, we were unable to find a nation that seemed to serve as a cognate for these people. The closest we could come to this ideal was to be seen in Tibet and perhaps in

some of the early cultures among the Pacific islands. Some of Ghandi's followers in India, and some of the groups of black people in Africa might be added to our list. But we were impressed by the possibility that such cultural heritages were not well maintained when exported to other cultures -- with the possible exception of Tibetan Buddhism. While our own religious persuasion led us to seek peaceful qualities among Christians, we felt sad as we noted the factionalism between denominations and the brittle and rejecting beliefs of one sub-group with respect to another.

We examined a possibility related to our 'target' group of peaceful people. How did it happen that we were able to identify such individuals? Obviously, they must be communicating qualities of themselves in their conduct with others. Certainly, none of them set out to declare or advertise his or her peaceful nature to others, with or without the help of a brass band. Communication of their qualities was accomplished, with little self-consciousness, by the 'example' displayed in their daily behaviour with others. It is true that the roles they played tended to be respectful of others, and the words they used were largely warmly affectionate, acknowledging, congratulatory and permissive in nature. Could whole nations or cultures act in these ways?

How do we get to know how another nation or culture feels and acts? Certainly, we see and hear the conduct of its individual members when we have contact with them. But what we see and hear is apt to be construed as individual conduct in relation to ourselves, based on friendship, to the extent that we have personal

contact with individual members of another group. The main way in which we get to know something about the character and nature of another nation or group is through its public communications -- that is, through its mass media. Oh dear, we are in trouble! The mass media are controlled in large part in any given country by its funding sources (advertisers, purchasers), fervent 'artistic' types (e.g., in public television), politically active wealthy people (who seek a communications platform for their views), or political groups or governments (that can afford or are committed to exerting influence over the citizenry). Given these controlling influences, we are likely to receive a very biased picture of any culture through its media -- even if, over time, the propaganda effects on its citizenry tend to shape the culture in the directions led by its media (to which the people are also subjected).

Perhaps, after all, in this shrinking world of ours, we are forced to depend upon individual and small-group contacts between people of different nations or cultures to 'discover' the peaceful nature of any nation or culture. And that might already be taking place through expanding international travel, video exposure to people of other cultures, and direct person contacts on the world-wide web. But can we each allow ourselves to conclude that each contact we have with persons from other nations or cultures is truly representative of the wider range of its people? There is danger and peacefulness in doing so. To the extent that the individuals we encounter in person contacts represent relatively provincial attitudes (perhaps less likely among those exposing

themselves to inter-nation contacts), the interactions are likely to seem arrogant, presumptuous and perhaps demeaning -- hardly viable in the pursuit of peace.

In considering the effects on peace of the kinds of individual variants that might be encountered in international interactions, we returned to our experiences with the 'model' peaceful people we had encountered in our lives. Essentially, they seemed to adopt an interesting attitude toward the people they encountered. If the person with whom they were interacting evidenced peaceful ways, they seemed to think of that person as representing the wider group of individuals. If the person they encountered acted in nasty, mean or miserable ways, they seemed to think of that person as a unique and special case (perhaps even one who had other things bothering him or her at the time), not representative of other people or groups.

Some might think the approach apparently adopted by these people to be an unrealistic one in human interactions -- overlooking the manifest nastiness of other people (for which there is no satisfactory evidence). We are inclined to think of this approach as a highly worthwhile and valid approach -- at least pragmatically. We put the question this way. Do we benefit more by being sophisticated and aware of the nastiness of others in order to avoid dealing with others and to foster warfulness with others, or by being naive and conscious merely of the pleasant and good qualities of others to foster comfortable and peaceful interactions with them? If we would personally benefit more from

relating to others in pleasant and peaceful ways, then any means for achieving that goal is pragmatically valid. In principle, we believe that sophistication is valueless, and that naivete is a marvellous basis for human interactions.

Having said all these things, we must now return to our main contention. In our view, it turns out that the achievement of peace is entirely equivalent to the achievement of joy, as we talked about it in volume I (chapter 8). We argued that the most effective means by which to achieve joy involved the developed in successive steps of 'respect' (seeing the good in others), 'trust' (feeling safe with others) and 'love' (being drawn to others). Once these three response habits are well entrenched in one's life, we concluded that the person would automatically experience 'joy'. Now we would add that the same three qualities, plus development of positive reward habits (acknowledging to others their good and attractive qualities and acts), automatically results in 'peace'. If these four qualities are evidenced in the conduct of a nation or a culture, that nation or culture will be 'at peace' with other nations or cultures. That is, individual joy is equivalent to, or a cognate of, the wider cultural attribute of peace.

We can do no more here than wish you as an individual all the joy you might want and, as a member of your many communities, as much peace as you might want.